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Introduction
Stephen Albrecht, Maik Fielitz and Nick Thurston
The RighT wARds PRessURe 
Web 2.0 and the proliferation of social media platforms enable user-gen-
erated content to be shared instantly via networks that record their own 
searchable archives. This advent has accelerated and deepened the effec-
tive reach of activists and organizations from across the political spec-
trum. However, in the neoliberal democracies of Europe and the US the 
most alarming surge of online political pressure in recent years has come 
from the far right and been felt in the centerground. Far-right movements 
from around the world have relentlessly intervened in both the private 
and public spheres of our digital worlds, from the deep web to the surface 
net, from public chat rooms to multi-player gaming environments. Digital 
platforms that bypass traditional editorial and governmental controls yet 
overlay our traditional political milieus have empowered such groups to 
directly broadcast their content globally to witting and unwitting audien- 
ces alike. What this extent of fluid connectivity generates is the dream 
of all digital marketeers: it motivates reciprocation and sharing among 
users who become communities bonded in tribal ways (Roberts 2017; See-
mann 2017). Those communities have digitally-driven ecosystems whose 
filters favor the reinforcement of shared terms yet facilitate inter-commu-
nity collaboration at any level. Those levels range from the local and inter- 
personal spaces that we inhabit to the imagined communities and coali-
tions that we can create across cyberspace. 
With growing confidence, bolstered by the electoral successes of right-
wing politicians across both continents and beyond (India, Russia, Brazil 
and Turkey), far-right activists online now openly share offensive content 
and promote incitements to violence against vulnerable people. They use 
a range of harassment methods, from the blunt to the innovative, harness-
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ing the pooled click-power of such communities to loosely coordinate pro-
paganda and intimidation campaigns. Not only do these “tactical media” 
(Raley 2009) publishing strategies normalize access to far-right ideas, 
they also normalize the ideas themselves. These ideas blur into, or some-
times brazenly constitute, ‘dangerous speech’, which are expressions that 
go beyond the fuzzy category of ‘hate speech’ because they increase the 
risk that audiences will condone or participate in violence against the tar-
geted group (Benesch 2018). They typically exploit a fear of the unknown 
to build on a patriarchal foundation of anti-feminist, anti-LGBTQ+, racist 
and anti-minority scapegoating.
The quantity, sophistication and inter-connectedness of both unof-
ficial activists and official party channels online has made it more and 
more difficult to carry forwards established academic categories to explain 
the far-right’s renewal. Virtual activists celebrate their transgressive be-
havior while political parties veil their ideological agendas with rhetori-
cal trickery (Feldman/Jackson 2014), both blurring their traditional roles. 
The categorization of these actor positions on a spectrum running from 
the socially accepted and legally protected ‘radical right’ to an anti-consti-
tutional and violent ‘extreme right’ is now obsolete. To avoid exhausting 
debates about terminological essentialism, throughout the chapters that 
follow, contributors work on or under the umbrella idea that the far right 
is a “political space whose actors base their ideology and action on the 
notion of inequality among human beings, combining the supremacy of 
a particular nation, ‘race’ or ‘civilization’ with ambitions for an authori-
tarian transformation of values and styles of government” (Fielitz/Laloire 
2016: 17–18).
Many far-right groups were early adopters of the internet as a space 
in which they could create their own ideological publishing frames (Fox-
man/Wolf 2013). For example, the world’s largest white supremacist web-
site, Stormfront, was established in 1996 and preceded by a bulletin board 
system that operated during the early 1990s. Indeed, the development of 
early online far-right subcultures forecasted political changes in the orga-
nized far right (Kaplan/Weinberg 1998). We have witnessed the potency 
of their new operational models on the streets and in parliaments since 
the financial crisis of 2007-8 and the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of 2015. 
These changes are measurable in terms of their policy impacts, inclu- 
ding the pressure to close borders in Greece and Germany, the ongoing 
rightward shift of political cultures in Italy and Austria, the installation of 
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authoritarian regimes in Hungary and elsewhere, and explicit collusions 
between governments and far-right influencers that have become com-
mon knowledge in the US.
Having expanded on to the world wide web, far-right activism evolved 
from the grounded street marches of previous protest eras to take on dif-
ferent characteristics. Generally speaking, early accounts stress how it 
became more individualized, anonymized and geographically scattered 
(Köhler 2014; Bennett 2012). Too often these accounts ignore how the net-
working aspects of the technology empowered the creation of broad-brush 
alliances with pan-national ambitions (Margetts et al. 2018). Terms like 
‘clicktivism’ and ‘slacktivism’ became popular in the early 2010s as a way 
of dismissing the credibility of online campaigning. We now know that 
these atomization arguments created blind spots in mainstream thinking 
and power vacuums online, both with dangerous repercussions.
The Berlin-based Amadeu Antonio Foundation has come to call what 
has heated up since the 2010s a conflict over digital civil society (2017). 
This book goes further by thinking holistically about contemporary civil 
society as a context that is being re-defined by the normalization of digital 
networked technologies in everyday life, a context that demands we take 
online actions seriously if we are going to better understand their offline 
consequences and vice versa.
Social media tools like Twitter and Facebook are now considered in-
dispensable by protest groups from across the spectrum (Gerbaudo 2012) 
and have generated (or at least significantly intensified) their own play-
books, led by click-swarm tactics like trolling and doxing (Bartlett 2015). 
On the far right in particular, at a macro level, the symbols and icons that 
anchored such communities have shifted from the tropes of National So-
cialism to re-coded hipster emblems (Miller-Idriss 2018) and humorous 
memes (Lovink/Tuters 2018). Just as the means of communication were 
brought up-to-date, so too were the vocabularies and outreach agendas of 
the larger far-right movements and parties (Mammone 2009). At a mi-
cro level, time and again we can trace the planning of anti-migrant pro-
tests, vigilantism and anti-Muslim squads back to social media crusades 
(Awan/Zempi 2016; Busher 2016). These evolved macro and micro tactical 
changes demonstrate that there is no longer a simple distinction between 
online and offline campaigning practices – in fact, that the two are now 
evermore inter-effecting and that contemporary protest politics is funda-
mentally post-digital. 
10 Stephen Albrecht, Maik Fielit z and Nick Thurston
The PosT-digiTAl FAR RighT 
In the social sciences, much has been written about why the far right has 
tipped the balance of online political discourse rightwards, away from the 
supposed ‘liberal hegemony’ they rail against, including, for example, sev-
eral publications on the use of the internet by far-right extremists (Caiani 
2018; Caiani/Parenti 2013). Such studies tend to focus on the communica-
tion potential of digital networks as something subsequent to the politics 
of the actors using that channel, thus reducing the digital to a ‘means to 
an end’. Relatively little has been written in accessible terms to explain 
how the far right is tipping that balance. Less still has been published 
to explain how or why such technologies have transformed the very na-
ture of contemporary far right political action and discourse. This book 
offers thirteen perspectives on these developments, exploring the ways 
in which their entwinement is reciprocal and urgent in different national 
contexts with ramifications that are felt around the world. It re-casts of-
ficial and unofficial far-right groups, movements and parties as activists 
in a post-digital world, one where they seem to be winning many of the 
ideological battles.
Most media historians agree that we are living in an era in which 
so-called ‘new media’ are ever-present and no longer new in the sense 
that theoretically sustained the category distinctions of old and new me-
dia. Our technical era is intermedia and digitally driven – one in which 
old and new interact – and our intermedia tools run software that allow 
multiple simultaneous user-tool and user-user interactions with “glocal 
scope” (Hampton/Wellman 2002). This connectivity makes the online 
and offline responsive to one another, and their growing augmentation 
makes them increasingly inter-dependent. This book introduces the con-
cept of the ‘post-digital’ to social science discussions about the resurgent 
far right, re-contextualizing their shocking power to mobilize online and 
offline in terms of this pervasive inter-effectivity. It therefore promotes a 
network-oriented, sociological account of the nearing far right.
The term post-digital was coined in 2000 by American composer Kim 
Cascone to describe an aesthetic tendency in contemporary computer 
music that champions processing glitches as a source of unique sounds 
(Cascone 2000). That tendency is now more commonly labelled by the 
pan-arts term “glitch aesthetic” (Applegate 2016), and media theorists in-
cluding Geert Lovink and Florian Cramer have re-directed post-digital to 
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describe a bigger, deeper phenomenon: “‘Post-digital’ … refers to a state 
in which the disruption brought upon by digital information technology 
has already occurred. This can mean, as it did for Cascone, that this tech-
nology is no longer perceived as ‘disruptive’” (Cramer 2014: 12–13). Here, 
the prefix ‘post-’ signifies a dependent break from the word it precedes, 
in much the way we might talk about the post-modern or post-human. 
The post-digital names a technical condition that followed the so-called 
digital revolution and is constituted by the naturalization of pervasive and 
connected computing processes and outcomes in everyday life, such that 
digitality is now inextricable from the way we live while its forms, func-
tions and effects are no longer necessarily perceptible. 
This ‘naturalization’ has been accelerated by the growth in computing 
power, internet-enabled mobile devices, the low participation barriers to 
internet culture, as well as the push within that culture towards an em-
phasis on mass postproduction, compressed expression, images and “cir-
culationism” (Steyerl 2013). For those post-digital far-right actors leading 
the current resurgence, intermedia systems are not neutral communica-
tion tools. Rather, they are a catalyst for highly social processes and fo-
rums where political opinions are created, expressed and practiced. These 
media are mediating politics. They connect larger audiences more quickly 
and widely, allow for autonomous spreading, circumvent regional and na-
tional restrictions, can host parallel channels that range from open access 
to the encrypted, and use overlapping frames, feeds and windows to keep 
politics, digital citizenship and users’ personal lives in constant contact. 
Every contributor to this book has tried to analyze these dizzying layers 
of relationships through a real and recent case study, contextualizing the 
national and historical frame of their sample in an engaging narrative, 
and doing all of this in a medium-length essay.
 mAinsTRe Aming The e x TReme
A general climate of fear and political despondency seems to be percolat-
ing through societies in Europe and the US, which must play some intan-
gible role in making both contexts amenable to reactionary extremisms, 
especially of the conservative sort that promises to restore some mythic 
version of proper order. In traditional political milieus, this despondency 
has been coupled with a failure on the part of civil society and the Left 
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to act collectively. In non-traditional milieus, the far right has excelled, 
heeding Breitbart’s often-quoted maxim that “politics is downstream 
from culture” (Meyers 2011). As well as the ease with which different far-
right subcultures can share news using the internet, it has also proven a 
rich playground for the adaptation of propaganda material (Whine 2012) 
and visual content (Doerr 2017) across contexts, flattening circumstantial 
differences in favor of general ideological alignment. For example, memes 
have become one of the most common ways that far-right content gets 
shared, often playing with a cynical or ironic stance relative to current af-
fairs to recruit new sympathizers and make its messages attractive (Mill-
er-Idriss 2018). Through forceful play and distributed action the far right, 
as a political space, has established unity in difference, in ways that the 
liberal center and Left have failed.
In an always-connected content-saturated era, attention becomes dis-
tracted. Understanding the attention economy and designing campaigns 
responsively to manage audiences’ attention has become a hallmark of suc-
cessful far-right movements. This typically involves offering an array of con-
tent-type choices simultaneously, which mimic variety, even disagreement, 
but actually all share the same narrow ideological range. Compressed and 
dogmatic forms of social media posting have risen in importance alongside 
public message boards such as 4chan that were a hotbed for the American 
Alt-Right when it was organizing in support of Donald Trump’s 2016 elec-
tion bid (Nagle 2017; Wendling 2018).1 Yet other, semi-discrete publishing 
platforms like moderated web forums can accommodate public and private 
exchanges. As such, they are the tip of an iceberg of more invisible com-
munication channels used by far-right activists on the dark web (Bartlett 
2015) and encrypted messenger services (Ebner 2017). What has become 
abundantly clear is that the far right has a core of tech-savvy participants 
who are willing to teach and advise, and their post-digital strategy is flexible 
enough to migrate from one platform to the next (Donovan et al. in this 
volume). The Alt-Tech movement is an important example of how and why 
this works. Its aim is to provide a self-sufficient safe haven for right-wing 
communities to freely express their opinions, as a response to what they 
1 | The convention of bracketing the name ‘Alt-Right’ in speech marks to question 
that group’s status claim is one we support, and is discussed in this volume by 
both Fledman/May and Miller-Idriss. However, unless it is a subject of discussion, 
in this book we have chosen not to follow that convention for the sake of clarity.
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consider the unjust censorship of their right to free speech by mainstream 
providers. Alt-Tech works to achieve that goal by creating its own techno-
logical infrastructure (Roose 2017).
The startling result of this attention management approach – its fake 
variety, constant multiple channels, and mix of content types – is the gra- 
dual mainstreaming of ideas, expressions and behaviors that would have 
previously been considered extremist. Here this active verb, ‘main-stream-
ing’, describes a confluence of processes that together cultivate sympathy 
amongst large portions of the general public for social attitudes that would 
otherwise be considered beyond the pale, then tries to mobilize that sym-
pathy to institutionalize those attitudes in policies, legislation and public 
opinion about what is considered normal. Although the factors at play and 
their success are always difficult to pinpoint, their impact does not need 
to be complete or explicit for the strategy to have influence. The payoffs 
from shifting the frame of what is acceptable in mainstream discourse 
are demonstrated by the frailties of hate speech legislation. If the range of 
what is considered normal can change, and change differently in different 
contexts simultaneously, then so can its opposite, the range of what is con-
sidered prejudicial and unacceptable. This contextual dynamism, plus the 
complicated issue of free speech in democratic countries and the global 
reach of online media, make it incredibly difficult to define and enforce 
what constitutes hate within national jurisdictions.
Across Europe and the US, this gradual rightwards shift in the frame 
of what is normal has also had an array of knock-on effects (Davey et al. 
2018). A strange mix of subcultures have been absorbed by the far right, 
from particular fashion brands (Idriss-Miller 2018) to anonymous and 
pseudonymous sections of the deep web (Tuters in this volume). The far 
right has its own internet stars and social media influencers, including 
Lauren Southern and Milo Yiannopoulos, who use their accounts like in-
dependent media channels that blur the distinction between lone actor ac-
tivism and strategic movement campaigning in a manner best described 
as “post-organizational” (Mulhall 2018). Such ideologues often publish 
shock-tactic content as click-bait to compete for audience attention – the 
more controversial the better. In a highly politicized climate like ours, no 
matter how independent or distasteful these accounts are, they seed ideas 
and hyperlinks that attract more attention to local far-right organizations 
in the real world, often becoming a news story in themselves and so ser-
ving as a gateway to radicalized cultural spaces. The scope of other, more 
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collective efforts has also been stretched by the technical affordances of 
overlapping networks. Militant far-right groups have become more agile 
and are quicker to re-organize after their websites are deleted or banned 
(Hess 2018). InfoWars, Rebel Media and Breitbart represent the growing 
importance of alternative right-wing news platforms, while book presses 
like Arktos give a semblance of intellectual credibility to the European 
New Right’s worldview (de Keulennar 2018).
CoUnTeR-ThoUghT And CoUnTeR-ACTion
No book can exhaustively catalogue let alone solve these problems. In fact, 
a hero politics based on strongmen who save their people through sove-
reign action is a recurring feature of our current mess. This book has been 
developed in the opposite spirit. It is a collaborative attempt to pay close 
critical attention to a complex tangle of urgent problems, and to share the 
informed research of a range of academics, policy advisers and activists 
who want to communicate with broad readerships. The main body is orga-
nized into two sections, yet all of the contributors use grounded examples 
and try to offer actionable advice.
Section One gathers seven chapters that focus on ‘Analyzing’ va- 
rious far-right strategies and collaborations that have involved a blend of 
virtual- and actual-reality campaigning, which are either little known in 
themselves or have had an under-discussed impact on national or interna-
tional debates. Understanding exactly how online communities function 
requires a kind of double literacy: a technical appreciation of how the me-
dia operate has to be paired with a cultural awareness of what the content 
it mediates is trying to represent.
Rob May and Matthew Feldman together unpick the online strategies 
of the infamous Alt-Right. They explain how the apparent breadth and 
lightheartedness of the US-based movement has allowed fascists and 
neo-Nazis to hide in plain sight among its ranks. They trace the links 
between the supposedly jovial culture of online LOLs, their sharpened 
derivative lulz, and the booming popularity of pseudo-comic shaming 
tactics used by activists including Richard Spencer. Closely tied to all of 
this is the Alt-Right’s weaponized use of irony and subcultural idioms, 
which Marc Tuters takes up in a detailed account of the connections 
between gamer culture, fan culture, the deep web and the far right. Tu-
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ters introduces his concept of the “deep vernacular web” to explain the 
affinity or sense of existential threat shared by some online subcultures 
with white supremacists. He also deftly explains how the gatekeeping 
practices common to the former have been adapted by the latter, such 
that inclusion and exclusion are constantly reinforced through “live ac-
tion role play” or LARPing protests that distinguish those ‘in the know’ 
from the enemy. Joan Donovan, Becca Lewis and Brian Friedberg critique 
the free-speech and market-disruption claims of the Alt-Tech movement. 
They unpack how its participants have created and stabilized new tools by 
cloning and consolidating popular features from corporate platforms that 
have blocked extremist users and advertisers. While platforms might be 
sociotechnical infrastructure that adapt to the norms of their users, ideo-
logical bubbles like Gab show that the moral values of their design teams 
are encoded in each system.
One of the most thriving platform types is, of course, social media, 
and two further contributions take up case-studies that concentrate on 
how European far-right political parties have successfully innovated so-
cial media strategies that enhance their offline authority. Philipp Karl 
investigates the post-digital promotion of a family-friendly, youth-orient-
ed nationalist message that elevated Jobbik into position as Hungary’s 
main opposition party. He explains the simple but consistent messaging 
that framed Jobbik’s annual Nationalist May festival. These celebrations 
of Hungarian culture mobilized food, drink and music in support of a 
populist agenda, but relied on Facebook and Twitter to cash their lasting 
symbolic impact as political capital. Lynn Berg presents a damning assess-
ment of the anti-feminist views and standards expressed by Germany’s 
far-right AfD party through speeches, adverts and constant micro-aggres-
sions online. She shows how the perpetual reinforcement of regressive 
gender roles by male and female party representatives and supporters 
typifies the tandem bond between far-right ideology and a patriarchal un-
derstanding of gender norms. Further, she connects this to an on-going 
ethnicization of sexism in the culture war being waged by far-right actors 
across Germany and elsewhere.
Caterina Froio’s and Bharath Ganesh’s co-authored chapter reminds 
us that far-right activism has always had a transnational dimension, but 
shows how Twitter has opened up new opportunities for parties, move-
ments and organizations with cross-border interests. They use a dataset 
of re-tweets by far-right parties in France, Germany, Italy and the UK to 
16 Stephen Albrecht, Maik Fielit z and Nick Thurston
assess what does and does not garner international attention. Their find-
ings are surprising in many ways, especially at the level of take up. Yet 
they also re-affirm some sadly familiar trends, including the importance 
of hash-tags and issues-led posting for international circulation, and the 
ubiquity of anti-Muslim prejudice among such groups. Kaja Marczewska 
flips our focus to consider the booming zine culture amongst factions 
of the far right in contemporary Poland. She contrasts the pseudo-slick 
stylistic features of her examples against the traditional cut-and-paste aes-
thetic that was a signature of zine-making in its leftwing origins. Rather 
than dismiss the limited online presence of this strange boom as a failure 
to migrate to ‘new media’, Marczewska credits the offline limited circu-
lation of such zines with being generative of a powerful safe space for 
community building. 
Section Two has the intentionally ambiguous title ‘Unmasking’ be-
cause the six chapters it gathers try, in various ways, to draw the back-
ground practices and convictions of far-right communities into the fore-
ground so that we can think critically about what actually unifies their 
memberships. Much of what unfolds in this section involves sensitive 
forms of disentangling and disambiguation. These are critical skills that 
are becoming all the more necessary in an era when digital networking 
makes the propagation of obfuscation, misinformation and ‘fake news’ a 
media strategy in itself for those who care more about power than truth.
Processes of meaning-making are always contextually specific and 
depend on shared terms and tools for understanding. Deciphering mean-
ings, particularly of the symbolic sort, connect individuals to specific 
collective histories. They can fortify a community against the unversed, 
and also encourage a sense of belonging among the versed. As Cynthia 
Idriss-Miller explains in her chapter on youth culture and fashion, both 
of those payoffs make the symbology of far-right cultures a powerful as-
pect of how they define themselves, caricature their enemies and perpet-
uate the anxieties and obsessions that give them (positive and negative) 
continuity. She shows how iconography is adapted, commercialized and 
traded, and how consumer goods can become a symbolic force for polit-
ical messaging on image-driven platforms like Instagram. Lisa Bogerts 
and Maik Fielitz study the power of visual memes used by the German 
far-right project Reconquista Germanica, which mobilizes troll armies by 
remixing generic tropes of white nationalism. Cartoons, the crusades, na-
ture and motherhood get spun through Vaporwave visual distortions or 
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neo-Romantic collage techniques. Bogerts and Fielitz find a “humorous 
ambiguity” to be so consistently deployed that it qualifies as a strategy, 
one that continues the long history of fascist movements aestheticizing 
politics. Alina Darmstadt, Mick Prinz and Oliver Saal survey a disinfor-
mation campaign that hijacked the tragic murder of a 14-year-old girl in 
Berlin in 2018 to fuel xenophobic fear about migrants and to stage overtly 
racist rumours about refugees. Politicians and citizens swarmed to echo 
the misleading claims that were drip-fed via social media about the eth-
nicity of the perpetrator. Darmstadt, Prinz and Saal show how this case is 
sadly typical of the politics of fear being sown by the far right in Germany 
and beyond, whereby suspicion becomes a racialized social lens. They also 
offer a clear-sighted list of everyday counter-actions that civil society can 
engage in to offer some push back.
The question of counter-action is central to the last three chapters in 
this book. Julia Ebner develops an analysis of far-right communication 
tactics and the ecosystem they create for cyber content, focusing on the 
use of satire, their odd claims to alterity, and the scary impact they are 
having amongst Generation Z digital natives. She maps out four pillars 
on which an international community could collaboratively build a frame-
work to protect those who are targeted by radicalization, manipulation and 
intimidation practices. Gregory Sholette draws upon his long history as 
a participant and teacher in activist art communities to give a theoreti-
cal overview of the challenges now facing socially-engaged arts practice. 
Situating these challenges relative to capitalism’s precarious prevalence, 
he contrasts two rebel impulses. One is an essentialist push towards a 
homogenous, white concept of identity. The other faction are bonded by 
the long struggle for equality, which demands some space for uncertainty 
so that more equal futures can be imagined, a space that art might be 
well-suited to creating. Lastly, Nick Thurston loops this book project back 
to its starting point, an artwork called Hate Library (2017). His chapter 
connects the importance of sociable settings for reading, like libraries, 
with the value of pausing fluid streams of online language in print. Draw-
ing on documentary poetry, file-sharing practices and the choreography of 
installation art, he outlines some of the roles that the arts might play when 
societies are faced by fundamental questions about who is responsible for 
the consequences of public expressions. 
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engAging APPRoAChes 
One paradox of editing any collection of new essays is that there is always 
more to say and more people who deserve to be read, but you have to stop 
somewhere to publish the book. A second paradox of the form, exacerba- 
ted by a topic like ours, is that in an era of accelerated change grounded 
analyses are outdated pretty quickly by real life events. This book has been 
developed reactively, with the aim of sharing some informed opinions 
about a growing problem that has been all-too-easily ignored by people 
with power. Those opinions bridge art, activism, policy research and poli- 
tical science. As such, the editors and authors who have worked quick-
ly and ambitiously to create this book have chosen to engage with the 
post-digital cultures of the resurgent far right – from a range of novel per-
spectives – rather than bury their heads in the sand, against the academic 
trend for quietism or socially-detached scholarship.
We are sensitive to the many problems that come with an engaged ap-
proach to researching global issues. Publishers face economic struggles, 
sensationalist media coverage about current affairs circulates everywhere, 
and attention spans of readers are supposedly decreasing. Social science 
literature is trying to keep up with these trends, as is research funding, 
but what sells is policy-oriented studies of causes, consequences and best 
practices. Similarly in art, so-called socially-engaged approaches have to 
accept their complicity with the structural inequalities that underwrite 
their industry. For example, discussing the co-option of artists’ critical 
conscience by institutions who have different priorities is now a platitude. 
Nonetheless, we hope that the many original insights offered by this book 
will strengthen the great work already being done by civil society cam-
paigners and contribute to a more sophisticated common understanding 
of how the personal and public, micro-action and macro-repercussions, 
online and offline behavior, are all tied-up in contemporary politics whe-
ther we like it or not. 
As mentioned above, this book stemmed from the research into, and 
conversations about, an artwork by Nick Thurston called Hate Library, 
which was commissioned by Foksal Gallery in Warsaw where it was first 
exhibited in 2017. The advisory support of Matthew Feldman and cura-
torial trust of Katarzyna Krysiak on that exhibition were invaluable, as 
was the support of Inga Seidler and her colleagues for its next showing 
at transmediale 2018 in Berlin. We are sincerely grateful to all of them 
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for helping to develop this project. However, this book is worth reading 
because of the quality and intellectual generosity of the international mix 
of specialists who have contributed to it, to all of whom we owe endless 
thanks. Our editors at transcript Verlag recognized the importance of our 
topic and have supported us with great enthusiasm to start and finish this 
publication in less than 10 months, which would not have been possible 
without Florian Eckert’s editorial care. We have remained determined to 
the end to make sure the length, variety and tone of this book makes it en-
gaging and useful for specialist and non-specialist readers. To that end, it 
has been released in a post-digital manner, in a print edition and for Open 
Access download. Neither version would have been possible without the 
generous support of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the Amadeu 
Antonio Foundation, and we owe special thanks to Research Institute for 
Societal Development (FGW) for ensuring the digital edition would be 
available for free to readers anywhere in the world.
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Understanding the Alt-Right  
Ideologues, ‘Lulz’ and Hiding in Plain Sight
Rob May and Matthew Feldman
The Alt-Right has perhaps performed the most successful rebranding of 
fascist ideology since the Axis dénouement of 1945. Fascist ideology has 
been a vexatious term for almost as long as fascism has existed, resistant 
to definition and typically used as either an insult or political hyperbole. 
Yet the utility of the term as a definitional starting point for understan- 
ding fascists past and present has changed markedly over the last genera-
tion. There has come to be a notable confluence of scholarly views on this 
forward-looking, revolutionary and even cultic form of (usually ethnically- 
based) integral nationalism:
“Since it first emerged in the wake of World War One, fascism can be profitably 
conceptualised as a specifically modern form of secular ‘millenarianism’ con-
structed culturally and politically, not religiously, as a revolutionary movement 
centring upon the ‘renaissance’ of a given people (whether perceived nationally, 
ethnically, culturally, or religiously) through the total reordering of all perceivedly 
‘pure’ collective energies towards a realisable utopia; an ideological core impla-
cably hostile to democratic representation and socialist materialism, equality and 
individualism, in addition to any specific enemies viewed as alien or oppositional 
to such a program” (Feldman 2008: xviii).
Not all groups falling under the umbrella term ‘Alt-Right’, fit this view; 
for instance, the arch-reactionary racists of the League of the South take 
their inspiration from the Civil War-era Confederate States of America. 
Yet most of the ideologues who self-identify with the Alt-Right movement 
do fit this understanding, like hand in glove.
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The Alt-Right’s ‘hand’, in the analogy above, is its explicit ideological 
extremism. In keeping with historic fascism, despite savvy use of social 
media, this is a movement that seeks ethno-national ‘purity’ through re- 
volution. Such revolutionary change is directed against social and political 
‘sickness’; like a patient dying in the emergency room, fascists believe that 
only a defibrillating shock can return the race (and often synonymously, 
nation) to mythic glory and dominance. While this zap would undoubtedly 
be violent – and, as in the past, target leftists, ethnic and religious minori-
ties – the emergent society is invariably cast in utopian terms. For the Alt-
Right, this means reactionary gender roles; a militant state focussed on 
dynamic expansion, even colonization; and above all, a top-down policing 
of ethics and politics putting the collective above any and all individuals, 
save a charismatic leader. The latter also helps to explain the importance 
of Alt-Right ideologues today, in both charting this ‘regenerative’ course, 
and in embodying the ‘healthy’ nation, giving it a renewed sense of self be-
lief and, in a Nietzschean sense, a racist will to power capable of eradicat-
ing weakness and opposition from all quarters – internally and externally.
To pursue this simile a bit further, far from the jackbooted para- 
militaries who marched across the ‘fascist epoch’ between 1919 and the 
end of World War Two, the Alt-Right’s ‘glove’ – that is, its identifying fea-
ture and way of displaying its beliefs – has typically been the defence of 
mere ‘lulz’. A distortion of ‘LOL’, or ‘Laugh out Loud’, lulz are a sharp-
er form of offensive humour directed by online activists. Exemplified by 
Pepe the Frog avatars and targeted ‘humour’ about ethnic and religious 
minorities in Europe and North America, lulz provide ironic distance 
where necessary. In this way, the public response of ‘just joking’ is used 
as a ‘frontstage’ mechanism; or better, a shield to protect against charges 
of racism and their potential consequences, like falling foul in Europe 
of anti-racist legislation, including Holocaust denial. This characteristic 
feature is candidly described in Andrew Anglin’s Normie’s Guide to the Alt-
Right for the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer online site, which has swiftly become 
one of the most popular Alt-Right websites today: 
“While racial slurs are allowed/recommended, not every reference to non-white 
should not be a slur and their use should be based on the tone of the ar ticle. Gene- 
rally, when using racial slurs, it should come across as half-joking – like a racist 
joke that everyone laughs at because it‘s true. This follows the generally light tone 
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of the site. It should not come across as genuine raging vitriol. That is a turnoff to 
the overwhelming majority of people” (Anglin 2016).
A subsequent section of this Normie’s Guide is still more explicit:
“Lulz 
The tone of the site should be light. Most people are not comfortable with materi-
al that comes across as vitriolic, raging, non- ironic hatred. The unindoctrinated 
should not be able to tell if we are joking or not. There should also be a conscious 
awareness of mocking stereotypes of hateful racists. I usually think of this as self- 
deprecating humor – I am a racist making fun of stereotype of racists, because I 
don‘t take myself super-seriously. This is obviously a ploy and I actually do want to 
gas kikes. But that‘s neither here nor there” (Anglin 2016).
Speaking in forked tongues to a wider public while signalling a fealty to 
committed activists has long been a tactic for the postwar far right, eager 
to counter the stigma of wartime totalitarianism and genocide committed 
by the Axis. Fully a generation earlier, Roger Eatwell (1996: 100) raised a 
distinction between the neo-fascist British National Party’s ‘esoteric’ nods-
and-winks to hardcore members and their more populist ‘exoteric’ appeal 
intended for the general public. In a book examining this phenomenon 
across a range of different countries and groups, Chip Berlet termed this 
persistent feature “coded rhetoric” (Berlet 2014), while Graham Macklin 
described this frontstage-backstage dynamic as ‘ideological bifurcation’:
“ideological bifurcation functions as an innate component of the operating sys-
tem of post-war fascist ideology. It serves as a mode of communication and as a 
‘coping strategy’ enabling far right groups to organize themselves around certain 
forms of ‘rejected knowledge’ which, since the Second World War, have been pro-
foundly out of step with the values of the societies in which they organize. This 
duality co-exists without contradiction, resulting in an ‘exoteric’ ar ticulation of its 
ideology for public consumption and an ‘esoteric’ truth understood by an initiated 
hardcore of political activists” (Macklin 2014: 123–124).
To take just one Alt-Right example – chosen simply by reading the com-
ments on the Daily Stormer about a mainstream new story current at the 
time of writing – in response to a child who was bullied for being gay and 
then committed suicide, Andrew Anglin’s (2018) headline is LOL: 9-Year-
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Old Mulatto Niglet Commits Suicide After Bullying! God Bless the USA! The 
opening of this account then proclaims: “It’s a proud day for all Ameri-
cans. Things like this don’t happen in Europe, you know – because they 
love sucking cock and actually encourage little boys to do it, instead of 
bullying them into suicide for saying they like doing it. This heart-warm-
ing tale reminds me of my favorite patriotic song…” Further racist and 
homophobic content is then cossetted in just enough lulz to provide a 
semblance of ironic distance, just as the Daily Stormer’s Normie’s Guide 
advocates. 
Put simply, leopards do not change their spots. ‘Ironic misdirection’ 
is vital for understanding the mainstream push by Alt-Right ideologues 
and online activists. It is but one of the key techniques deployed in the Alt-
Right’s rise to prominence over the last five years. The panoramic glimpse 
provided by this chapter, emphasizing recurrent themes and leading fi-
gures in this still-nascent movement, also serves as a salutary reminder 
that the revolutionary goals of fascist socio-cultural ‘purity’ – especially in 
the previously hostile terrain of mainstream politics in Europe and North 
America, the most familiar stamping grounds for the Alt-Right to date – 
has many paths toward this goal. ‘Joking’ about the Holocaust is but one 
of them. 
Although not all far-right trolls are as gratuitously offensive as the 
Daily Stormer and its stable of online neo-Nazis, normalizing fascism, 
and above all Hitler’s Third Reich and its Axis partners’ genocidal crimes, 
remains the principal tollbooth through which every Alt-Right group and 
ideologue must pass. As this chapter underscores, it is Alt-Right ideo-
logues that frame, justify and often direct the growing online army of so-
called ‘shitposters’. The idealogues are the self-appointed ringmasters of 
this racist circus, even if they often disagree and sometimes directly clash 
with one another. Richard Spencer, perhaps their most influential and so-
phisticated ambassador, demonstrated this shockingly when speaking to 
a roomful of Nazi saluters shortly after Donald Trump’s shock election to 
the presidency: “For us, it is either conquer or die ... Let’s party like its 1933 
… Hail Trump! Hail our people! Hail victory!, accompanied by an English 
version of Nazism’s Sieg Heil!”1
1 | See a video recording of this speech, alongside commentary with cited quo-
tations, in NZ Herald (2016): “The Big Read: Insight the Alt-Right world of Richard 
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It was Richard Spencer who first popularized the term ‘Alternative-Right’ 
in 2008. Son of an heiress to cotton farms in Louisiana, Spencer is edu-
cated to MA level – having read English Literature and Music as an un-
dergraduate and Humanities as a postgraduate – before dropping out of a 
Ph.D. in History “to pursue a life of thought-crime” (Burghart 2014). Per-
haps tellingly, Spencer’s entrance essay for the Ph.D. examined the Ger-
man judicial theorist and onetime Nazi, Carl Schmitt. Thereafter, Spencer 
became an Assistant Editor at The American Conservative, a magazine led 
by the noted paleoconservative Pat Buchanan who was White House Di-
rector of Communications under the Reagan administration. Spencer was 
dismissed for his extremist views (Lyons 2017: 2; Wood 2017). After a two-
year period as Executive Editor at the fringe publication Taki’s Magazine, 
Spencer founded the now-defunct www.AlternativeRight.com in 2010, 
which he defined as “an online magazine of radical traditionalism [which] 
marks an attempt to forge an intellectual right wing that is independent of 
and outside the American conservative establishment” (quoted in Hartzell 
2018: 19). As far back as 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Centre described 
the website as extreme right and “loaded with contributors who, like Spen-
cer, have long lamented the white man’s decline” (Keller 2010).
The success of AlternativeRight.com opened up various new avenues 
for Spencer. He accepted the role of President and Director at the National 
Policy Institute (NPI), a racialist organization dedicated to the “heritage, 
identity, and future of people of European descent in the United States and 
around the world.”2 On its website, the NPI continues to describe itself as 
“a central and indispensable component of the international Alt-Right” 
while boasting that “Richard Spencer and NPI are at the forefront of Alt-
Right activism.”3 Spencer is also the Executive Director at Washington 
Summit Publishers, a white nationalist publisher specializing in euge-
nics, anthropology, and human biodiversity. As an offshoot of Washing-
ton Summit Publishers, Spencer also launched the online Radix journal 
Spencer”, 23 November 2016 (https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.
cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11753791). 
2 | National Policy Institut: “About”, (https://www.nationalpolicy.institute/who 
arewe).
3 | Ibid.
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which, according to its website, produces “original work on culture, race, 
tradition, meta-politics, and critical theory.”4 
Most recently, Spencer launched www.Alt-Right.com, an ‘academic’ 
think-tank seeking “to give a platform to dissident opinions within the 
right.” Its thinly-veiled racist aim is to “promote information and discourse 
in support of Western civilization and draw attention to the imminent 
demographic threat of mass immigration which is on course to complete-
ly erase the unique cultures and peoples of the Occident.”5 Notwithstan- 
ding the sanitized language above, a legal complaint by civil rights groups 
claimed that the white supremacist site was actively promoting violence 
and hatred against racial and ethnic minorities. In response, the internet 
domain registrar GoDaddy.com, which hosted Alt-Right.com, shut down 
the website in May 2018 (see Murdock 2018; Sharwood 2018). In recent 
weeks, however, www.Alt-Right.com has re-emerged online. 
As a self-identified white nationalist, Spencer’s vision for a utopian 
United States is a place for whites only. He claims that “European Amer-
ica is being demographically dispossessed [and therefore] we are losing 
our culture [and] our sense of being.” Spencer’s aim is to influence politics 
and culture by “raising consciousness and influencing people”, which he 
claims to be engaged in daily. Spencer insists that he has an “amazing” 
opportunity to achieve this with Donald Trump in the Oval Office. Al-
though conceding that Trump is not Alt-Right himself, he sees Trump’s 
presidency the first step towards white nationalist policies in the US.6 For 
his part, though one of many Alt-Right ideologues, Spencer can rightly 
claim the mantle of primus inter pares given his editorial undertakings, 
media savvy engagements and long-standing activism for an ‘Alternative 
Right’.
However, the most repulsive and (at least publicly) extreme devotee to 
the Alt-Right is Andrew Anglin. In 2006, Anglin launched the conspira- 
torial website, Outlaw Journalism, which was modelled on the works of 
Infowars founder Alex Jones and gonzo journalism (journalism without 
objectivity) originator Hunter Thompson, who he greatly admired. Before 
forming his first neo-Nazi website Total Fascism in 2012, Anglin went 
4 | Radix: “About”, (www.radixjournal.com/about/). 
5 | Alt-Right.com: “Who We Are”, (www.Alt-Right.com/who-we-are/). 
6 | Los Angeles Times: “Richard Spencer, Chairman of the National Policy Insti-
tute”, 18 November 2016 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=jm4DNMNEZM0&t=29s). 
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on a spiritual and psychological journey resulting in his conversion to 
‘full Nazi’. He worked as an English teacher in Asia where, according 
to Anglin, “all the White people you meet are outcast sorts who you can 
usually connect with easily” (Anglin 2015). In comments that must again 
be treated with large helpings of salt, Anglin claims that “having been 
raised mostly without exposure to non-Whites, this was when I first start-
ed thinking seriously about race as a biological concept. Eventually, I got 
fed up and realized that I couldn’t live in a jungle with a bunch of 80 IQ 
jungle people” (ibid.). Combined with his continental experience was his 
obsession with the uncensored imageboard, 4chan, where anyone can 
post anonymously. Anglin explains how he had latched on to the less 
overtly fascist ‘brand’ of the Alt-Right, helping to give his patch a more 
explicitly neo-Nazi inflection:
“I had always been into 4chan, as I am at heart a troll. This is about the time [I 
k]new [I]was going full-Nazi, and so I got into Hitler, and realized that through 
this type of nationalist system, alienation could be replaced with community in a 
real sense while the authoritarianism would allow for technology to develop in a 
direction that was beneficial rather than destructive to the people” (Anglin 2015).
Due to its lengthy articles, Anglin replaced Total Fascism a year later with 
Daily Stormer, named after the infamous antisemitic weekly newspaper 
Der Stürmer run by a Nazi called Julius Streicher, which vehemently at-
tacked Jews. With shorter and more provocative pieces, Anglin hoped his 
new platform would appeal to a broader audience. Central to Anglin’s 
website is extreme racism, misogyny, homophobia, Holocaust Denial and, 
above all, antisemitism. According to traffic statistics website Alexa, Daily 
Stormer is ranked 5,722 most viewed in the US and 17,558 globally, making 
it one of the most popular Alt-Right websites.7 The success of Daily Storm-
er has established Anglin to one of the most influential ideologues in the 
Alt-Right, resulting in his inclusion (along with Spencer) in a leaders’ pact 
to unite the Alt-Right in December 2016.8
7 | Alexa: “dailystormer.name Traffic Statistics”, (www.alexa.com/siteinfo/daily 
stormer.name).
8 | SPLC: “Andrew Anglin”, (www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/indi 
vidual/andrew-anglin).
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Anglin’s mission is to create a Nazi world (2015). As a proud Hitler-wor-
shipper, he admits to philosophizing over “what [would] Hitler do if he’d 
been born in 1984 [the year of Anglin’s birth]?” Unsurprisingly, given his 
adoration of Hitler, Anglin harbours an innate hatred of Jews. In his vi-
tal 78-page primer, A Normie’s Guide to the Alt-Right, Anglin defines the 
Alt-Right thus: “The core concept of the movement, upon which all else 
is based, is that Whites are undergoing an extermination, via mass im-
migration into White countries which was enabled by a corrosive liberal 
ideology of White self-hatred, and that the Jews are at the center of this 
agenda” (Anglin 2016: 2).
Through the Daily Stormer, Anglin has created an ad hoc group of fol-
lowers called ‘The Stormer Troll Army’ who perpetrate harassment on his 
behalf, mostly directed towards Jews. In December 2016, Anglin target-
ed Tanya Gersh, a Jewish woman who had a disagreement with Richard 
Spencer’s mother. Anglin uploaded photographs of Gersh and her con-
tact details along with a rally cry to his readers: “Are y’all ready for an 
old-fashioned Troll Storm?” (quoted in Stevens 2017). Subsequently, Gersh 
received “more than 700 threatening, hateful, harassing, antisemitic com-
munications from Anglin’s followers at all hours of the day and night”. 
This included harassing telephone calls, asserting that she should have 
been murdered in the Holocaust “with the rest of your people” (Beckett 
2017). As the SPLC has stated: “Anglin is infamous for the crudity of his 
language and his thinking, a contrast to his sophistication as a prolific 
Internet troll and serial harasser.”9
While there is no doubt that the Alt-Right was originally, and remains 
predominantly, an American phenomenon, there is more to it than that. 
Needless to say, the internet connects across national borders, and Alt-
Rights white supremacism is similarly transnational (if heavily weighted 
toward Anglophone countries like the US and Britain, together respon- 
sible for more than half of the global site visitors to The Daily Stormer).10 
Notwithstanding this English-as-first-language propensity, Daniel Fri-
berg is the most prominent Alt-Right figure in Europe. The Swede has 
a background in neo-Nazism and convictions for criminality, including 
possession of illegal arms. He has also been involved with several fascist 
9 | Ibid.
10 | Alexa: “dailystormer.name Traffic Statistics”, (www.alexa.com/siteinfo/daily 
stormer.name).
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parties in Sweden, including Sweden’s National Alliance and the violently 
extreme Swedish Resistance.11 In 2009, Friberg formed the publishing 
company Arktos in Sweden, which has evolved into “the most impor- 
tant purveyor of European New Right and Alt-Right material, publishing 
works by the likes of de Benoist and Dugin.”12 With over 150 titles trans-
lated into 14 different languages, Arktos publishes “literature that dares to 
challenge the current paradigm of liberal democracy.”13 In January 2017, 
in an attempt to unite the Alt-Right, Spencer’s NPI, the Alt-Right’s Scan-
dinavian Independent media company, Red Ice Creations, and Friberg’s 
Arktos merged to form the AltRight Corporation, with Friberg sitting on 
the Board of Directors as its European Editor.14 Relatedly, Friberg is the 
organizer of a prominent Alt-Right conference series in Europe, known 
as ‘Identitarian Ideas’, where he and his fellow Alt-Rightists deliver lec-
tures.15 
Friberg is a vocal supporter of Spencer and shares many of his per-
spectives. He describes Spencer as “a great guy [and] a great advocate of 
our viewpoints”, further revealing that “I share a lot of viewpoints with 
Richard Spencer […] we come from the same ideological background”. 
Like Spencer, with the phrases ‘White guilt’ and ‘White dispossession’, 
Friberg similarly claims that European civilization is under threat of ex-
tinction (Kovacs 2017). The latter differentiates between the ‘real right [the 
Alt-Right]’, to which he claims allegiance, and the ‘false right’, which some 
call the ‘Alt-Lite’ and is fronted by such non-fascist radical right figures 
as Milo Yiannopolous and even onetime special advisor and chief strat-
egist to President Donald Trump, Stephen K. Bannon. According to Fri-
berg, unlike the more reform-minded reactionaries of the ‘Alt-Lite’, the 
‘real right’ adheres to traditional values, ethnic consciousness and the pre- 
servation of European civilization, while the ‘false right’ believes in civic 
nationalism and liberal economics, bringing together old-style American 
11 | AltRight.com: “Daniel Friberg Annihilates BBC Journalists in Interview”, 
4 February 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0etLTAFu1Po&bpctr=153
7382158).
12 | Hope Not Hate: “Daniel Friberg”, (https://alternativeright.hopenothate.
com).
13 | Arktos: “About Arktos”, (www.arktos.com/about/).
14 | Hope Not Hate: “Daniel Friberg”, (https://alternativeright.hopenothate.com).
15 | Ibid. 
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Republicans and even fringe figures like the provocateurs from Breitbart. 
In separating the Alt-Right from even far-right groups like UKIP or the 
Tea Party, Friberg argues that a strong meta-political basis and theory is 
crucial for the Alt-Right to triumph. In sum, he claims that controlling 
culture is pivotal to political success. It is only a matter of time, according 
to Friberg, before the ‘false right’ are replaced by the ‘real right’ – that is, 
proud fascists – in all western European countries.16 
hiding in Pl Ain sighT
It is no coincidence that all the key ideologues cited above are male. The 
sociologist Hannah Bergman (2018) conducted an extensive analysis of 
rank-and-file supporters of the Alt-Right to explore the preponderance of 
white men in the movement. Bergman argues that the Alt-Right promotes 
a sense of “male entitlement” which, in turn, is “easily radicalized and 
connected to white nationalism and white supremacy” (2018). By attack-
ing feminism and liberal notions of gender equality, the Alt-Right has 
“created a culture of vitriolic defensiveness among young white males, 
which aims to establish a common belief in white male victimhood”. Im-
portantly, Bergman points out that the Alt-Right’s existence, in part, relies 
upon a “rejection of the accomplishments of feminism”. This negation 
raises the spectre of the ‘f’ word for uniting revolutionary-minded white 
men around a core of misogynistic disgruntlement, which licences the 
Alt-Right to “view the subordination of women as both part of a functional 
society and a stepping stone to a larger movement: one steeped in fascist 
ideology and willing to openly champion a politics of hate and violence” 
(ibid.).
This misogyny is but one of the indelible features of the Alt-Right’s 
fascism. Given the commitment of chief ideologues of the movement, like 
Anglin and Spencer in the US, and Friberg in Europe, it is a phenomenon 
which shows little sign of abating. This is despite the washout of the se-
cond Unite the Right rally in Washington D.C. in August 2018 – a year 
after the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally in 2017, which saw one pro-
tester killed by and many more injured, some severely – underscoring the 
16 | AltRight.com: “Daniel Friberg Annihilates BBC Journalists in Interview”, 4 
February 2018 (https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1240745/).
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fact that this is a movement much more at home in the eddies of online 
extremism. This is in no small part due to the way digital networks allow 
them, on one hand, to mobilize fluid groups of activists, especially for 
online trolling and ‘pile-ons’; but on the other, to hide behind the ‘lulz’ of 
alleged irony and defence of hateful incitement as free speech. More than 
anything, it is these strategies that allow the fascists of the Alt-Right to 
hide in plain sight, ever like leopards ready to pounce on their prey. 
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L ARPing & Liberal Tears  
Irony, Belief and Idiocy in the Deep Vernacular Web
Marc Tuters
In the summer of 2017, the American Alt-Right gained international re- 
cognition following the violence at their Unite the Right rally in Charlot-
tesville, North Carolina, which left one counter-protester dead and dozens 
of others injured. Unwilling to condemn this act of far-right violence, the 
American president Donald Trump instead spoke of violence having oc-
curred “on many sides” (Peters 2017). As exemplified by this response, 
over the course of his election campaign and early days in office Trump’s 
reluctance to distance himself from the far right had the effect of normal-
izing the public expression of their ideas to an extent that seemed unpre- 
cedented to many (Mulhall et al. 2018; Marwick/Lewis 2017). Beyond the sixty 
million Americans that voted for him, Trump’s inflammatory political style 
also appealed to heretofore little known elements of internet subculture for 
whom he also appeared as an avatar of their indignation at feeling somehow 
demographically displaced. This source of indignation, however imaginary, 
is what accounts for the resonance between bizarre internet subcultures and 
the global insurgency of far-right populism, and is the subject of this chapter. 
Although Trump’s initial rebellious appeal was somewhat diminished 
in the eyes of radicals by the time of Charlottesville, a significant number 
of those at the rally still saw themselves as the loyal foot soldiers of the 
world’s first meme president, who they imagined themselves as having 
helped elect through their skillful deployment of “meme magic”. While 
self described “internet trolls” were pleased to publicly pronounce such 
ridiculous sounding claims in the media (Shreckinger 2017), one may rea-
sonably ask if they actually believed it to be true? While there are those 
who have attempted to seriously grapple with such claims (Lachman 
2018), the standard fallback response from most of these figures when 
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pushed to explain their actions is that they are ‘trolling’, which is to say 
they are just playing around. To put it in the jargon of computer game 
culture, they are ‘live action role playing’ or LARPing. This explanation of-
fers those involved with a convenient excuse if and when things get out of 
hand. It is based on the core belief that “teh Internet is serious business”, 
an ironic slogan whose meaning is its opposite, which is to say that the 
internet is not serious business, and anyone who thinks otherwise should 
be corrected and is, essentially, undeserving of pity. 
The Identitarian Movement (in Germany), LARPing at Pepe.1
For many this dualistic outlook was, however, no longer sustainable in the 
face of the bloody violence in Charlottesville. Indeed, in the aftermath of 
that event the apparently inexorable rise of the Alt-Right was, for the first 
time since Trump’s rise, brought into question. A year later, on the anni-
versary of the rally, the movement’s momentum appears rather dimin-
ished. It seems that there has been a softening of the Alt-Right as many 
who had been flirting with its explicit white-racial supremacist elements 
have fallen back to the more ‘mainstream’ position of contemporary far-
right populism, with its reactionary suspicion of ‘migrants’ and celebra-
tion of ‘Western culture’. But while the disturbing spectacle of violence in 
1 | Source: https://blog.identitaere-bewegung.de/pepe-und-identitaere-aktivis 
ten-waren-heute-in-mecklenburg-vorpommern-unterwegs/. 
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Charlottesville may have tested the commitment of many to ‘real-world’ 
political organizing, from an online audience perspective the rally never-
theless seemed like the culmination of a trend which had been consistent-
ly developing for some time and which continues unabated.
If the Alt-Right can be said to have accomplished anything, besides 
briefly normalizing ‘ironic’ expressions of intolerance and hate, it would 
be in their innovative infusion and deployment of elements of high con-
cept fan culture in the form of political tactics. It would seem that many 
continue to see themselves as engaged in an online culture war whose 
primary battlefield is social media (in particular Youtube), and in which 
they appear to have the upper hand, in spite of an apparent disenchant-
ment with the Alt-Right’s more ideologically extreme propositions. While 
the European far right, unlike its American counterpart, has a long and 
established tradition of organized street protest, it would seem that they, 
too, are learning from the Alt-Right playbook. 
The deeP VeRnACUl AR web
While much has been made of the Alt-Right’s supposedly ironical stance 
(Neiwert 2017), their ideological core lies in an essentialist vision of identi-
ty politics developed by the European New Right, which has been referred 
to as “differentialist racism” (Taguieff 2001). Many radical right populist 
parties in Europe have embraced these same ideas, seeing themselves as 
engaged in a civilizational struggle. This worldview implores supposedly 
autochthonous Europeans to prevent the “great replacement”: waves of im-
migrants overtaking Europe, all orchestrated according to the nefarious 
multicultural agenda of the “globalist” class. Like some of the radical right 
populists, there is an expressed feeling amongst these long-established 
denizens of the web that their web is being encroached upon and gentri-
fied. The rise of social media platforms that have corporatized the expe-
rience of the web has led these otherwise disparate and marginal niches 
of what I call the deep vernacular web to see themselves as an oppositional 
subculture tasked with keeping alive what they perceive to be the original 
spirit of the web. Due in part to the cleverly strategic amplification of these 
antagonisms via platforms such as Twitter and Youtube, in practice this 
has manifested as an online culture war, the opening battle of which was 
the notorious Gamergate that I unpack below. 
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The concept of the deep vernacular web can be understood as a heu-
ristic intended to historicize these online antagonistic communities as 
antecedent to social media and even to the web itself. The deep vernacular 
web is characterized by anonymous or pseudonymous subcultures that 
largely see themselves as standing in opposition to the dominant culture 
of the surface web. Identified to an extent with the anonymous 4chan im-
age board – which hosts one million posts per day, three quarters of which 
are made by visitors from English-speaking countries2 – these subcultures 
tend to imagine themselves as a faceless mass. In direct contrast to the in-
dividualized culture of the selfies associated with social media, we might 
thus characterize the deep vernacular web as a mask culture in which indi-
vidual identity is effaced by the totemic deployment of memes. Insofar as 
this mask culture constructs an image of itself as an autochthonous cul-
ture whose integrity is under threat, we can perhaps begin to understand 
how grievances of the deep vernacular web have been capitalized upon by 
those espousing a far-right ideology. Conversely we can also see how the 
vernacular innovations of these often bizarre subcultures, such as Pepe the 
Frog, have themselves been absorbed in the service of far-right populism. 
The reasons why 4chan is productive of vernacular innovation have to 
do, in part, with the affordances of the platform. 4chan ‘moves’ very quick-
ly – threads are quickly purged from the website, meaning the website 
does not offer a way to ‘catch up’ with the latest developments (notwith-
standing external archival websites or wikis like Encyclopedia Dramatica). 
Furthermore, 4chan is anonymous, which means that if one wants to par-
ticipate in the conversation one has to demonstrate a degree of subcultural 
literacy. Although there are other 4chan boards which operate differently, 
on its most popular board, /pol/ – which has, since about 2015, increas-
ingly been viewed as a point of convergence been online subculture and 
Alt-Right ideas (Heikkilä 2017) – if you speak out of turn you are likely to 
be either brutally insulted or else, even worse, simply ignored. As a result 
of this blend of affordances and practices, /pol/ drives many away while 
exhibiting a strong socialization effect on those remain – one byproduct 
of which is that sensationalist behavior helps one to be noticed on /pol/. 
Combined with an ironic relationship with the idea of belief, discussed 
below, these factors help to account for why 4chan is so productive of ver-
2 | Anon (2018): “Advertise”, (http://www.4chan.org/advertise).
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nacular innovation and arguably why /pol/, a board devoted to ‘politically 
incorrect’ discussion, appears so productive of far-right hate speech.
The adepts of the deep vernacular web engage in gatekeeping pro- 
cesses to mark-off and maintain its boundaries from the surface web. In 
spite of the familiar purist tendencies of the hard core that wish to re-
main resolutely underground, the broader influence of their subcultural 
imaginary can be seen as extending rather deeply into aspects of corporate 
social media. As an example of such an incursion we might consider the 
Kekistan meme that had its origins in 4chan but which came to promi-
nence on Youtube as a kind of imaginary homeland for trolls (de Keule-
naar 2018). In a series of videos posted on Youtube over the course of 2017, 
the Kekistan meme developed the mythology of an imaginary country 
with its own flag and history, a kind of ‘ethnostate’ in the language of the 
European New Right, whose people imagined themselves to be engaged 
in a civilizational conflict against the forces of ‘political correctness.’ 
Initially functioning as a kind of in-group slang expression for gamers, 
in 4chan the term ‘kek’ (at the root of Kekistan) became a conceptual 
marker for the concept of ‘meme magic’. As such ‘kek’, often symbolized 
by Pepe, signifies the peculiarly postmodern idea that an empty symbol 
can itself be used as a tool to create belief in which its ‘adepts’ bear witness 
to effects of that idea without necessarily believing in any sort of truth, as 
one would normally expect from ‘believers’. Since expressions of sincerely 
political belief would be dismissed as ‘causefagging’ on 4chan, any polit-
ical memes that it generated were thus veiled in layer upon layer of irony. 
As a keyword, ‘kek’ spread from 4chan to other parts of the deep vernac-
ular web, such as /r/The_Donald, a popular discussion board on the ag-
gregator site Reddit devoted to Donald Trump’s insurgent candidacy. On 
the Facebook page God Emperor Trump, the candidate was envisioned as a 
figure of divine chaos, the embodiment of the ‘cult of kek’. On Youtube the 
Kekistan meme was developed in a number of directions by a variety of 
channels including some associated with Youtube’s so-called “intellectual 
dark web” (Weiss 2018). Common to most of these channels were videos 
which staged confrontational encounters with liberal protesters, so-called 
social justice warriors or SJWs. Following a well established technique 
of internet trolls, the objective of these Youtube videos was to ‘trigger’ 
an emotional reaction from the SJWs, who are considered to exhibit an 
embarrassing and predictable lack of composure – connected to this, for 
example, was a whole new genre of ‘liberal tears’ videos.
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The idioTiC AdjACenT 
The Kekistani flag became emblematic of Alt-Right trolling tactics. It was 
‘iconically’ modeled on the Nazi Reichskriegsflagge, an echo that was in-
tended to ‘trigger’ SJWs into accusing their opponents of being Nazis. 
While the ironic use of Nazi iconography may appear baffling, the logic de-
ployed is that, as memes, even the most taboo symbols can be disconnec- 
ted from their fixed historical meaning and made to function as floating 
signifiers for those who understand the rules of memes. As with Trump’s 
own populism, we can think of the essential formlessness of the Kekistan 
meme as having created a kind of “equivalential chain” across an other-
wise disaffected group of people, thereby uniting them (Laclau 2005). As 
opposed to SJWs, trolls thus perceived the flag of Kekistan as being gov-
erned by the first and second laws of the internet: that all discussions find 
their end in a fallacious comparison with the Nazis (Godwin’s Law) and 
that, in any case, it is impossible to distinguish between sincerity and 
parody online (Poe’s Law). These videos thus staged a conflict not only 
between Alt-Right Kekistanis and liberal SJWs but also between the ima-
gined depths of authentic web subculture and its superficial surface. We 
could call this LARPing deployment of 4chan ‘meme magic’ in the sphere 
of protest politics a kind of idiocy, in the sense that Isabelle Stengers dis-
cusses “the idiot” as someone who takes a kind of stand against objective 
reality (Stengers 2005). To this end, self-described Kekistani’s imagined 
themselves as staging a kind of counter-protest against what 60s count-
er-culturalists sometimes referred to as “consensus reality”, represented 
in this case by all the “‘normies’ and ‘basic bitches’ who ‘don’t get’ the 
countercultural styles of the amoral subculture” (Nagle 2017: 107).
But while this ethnographic perspective may offer some insights, and 
in spite of how adamantly or articulately some self-described Kekistanis 
may protest their ideological innocence, as the Kekistan flag should make 
clear, the meme also draws its transgressive appeal from its subjunctive 
adjacency to actual violence – violence made possible thanks to the deep 
vernacular web’s digital dualism. Although the digital dualist notion that 
the online world is somehow distinct from ‘real life’ is an relic of an earlier 
era of 1990s ‘cyber-theory’, there is residue of its effects in the deep ver-
nacular web. Given its roots in the pre-web era internet, the deep vernacu-
lar web’s subcultural imaginary may be understood as predating the cur-
rent social media dispensation of the surface web, pre-dating Facebook’s 
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global imposition of a “real name policy”. As articulated by 90s libertarian 
media theorists with roots in the 60s counter-cultural movements, the 
earlier cyberspace dispensation promised to be a “new home of Mind”, of 
disembodied avatars exempt from the laws and constraints of the physical 
world (Barlow 1996). For all of Facebook’s hegemony, the frontier ideology 
of this earlier cyberspace dispensation has continued in the pseudony-
mous and anonymous cultures of the deep vernacular web, in particular 
in the thriving parallel reality of online multiplayer gaming.
Trump supporter in New York 2017 with a Kekistan 
flag. Photo by Alec Perkins from Hoboken, USA.3
As has been well explored elsewhere (Massanari 2016), the current reac-
tionary populist moment in online culture can be traced back to the convo-
3 | Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trump_supporters_May_
Day_2017_in_New_York_City(34430306665).jpg, CC BY 2.0.
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luted narrative of “Gamergate”, which was essentially an anti-feminist pro-
test movement bewilderingly disguised as a moral outrage against “ethics 
in game journalism”. Gamergate may be understood as having pioneered 
a new model of right-wing activism centred around a fundamentalist de-
fence of free speech, neo-reactionary and traditionalist notions of identity 
politics and a series of online harassment tactic referred to as ‘brigading’. 
What is of particular significant for our purposes is how Gamergate served 
to politicize a cross-section of previously relatively politically unengaged 
internet users in the service of a cause. (In a rare instance of such censure 
on an otherwise uncensored platform, discussions of Gamergate were in 
fact banned from 4chan since they violated its ‘causefagging’ prohibition.) 
In apparent violation of 4chan’s irony imperative, Gamergate created true 
believers. Through a process they referred to as ‘red pilling’, coverts came 
to see themselves as part of a collective quasi-religious community. While 
this awakening had none of the individual piety of prior American reli-
gious revivals, it did draw its strength from the Thomist idea of the just 
war against the infidel, who were in this case the dreaded SJWs. Alongside 
the globalist and the so-called Cultural Marxist, the figure of the SJW 
served to unite these online antagonistic communities. While originally 
derived from the famous psychedelic scene in the 1999 film The Matrix, 
the ‘red pill’ became a metaphor for revealing and overcoming false ideol-
ogy through The Dark Enlightenment – a quasi-philosophical movement 
that may be considered as a precursor to the Alt-Right – which posits the 
existence of a hegemonic, unconscious consensus between powerful fig-
ures within academia and the media who use the concept of “political cor-
rectness” as a tool of oppression (see Sandifer 2017). Dark Enlightenment 
thinkers thus advocated embracing the most extreme elements of trolling 
as an antidote to, and violent rejection of, insidious attempts at mind-con-
trol by these unholy forces. Thus, it is by way of fan culture and conspiracy 
ideology that we may we come to understand the newfound appeal of reac-
tionary post-digital activism.
dARk FAndom 
It would be a mistake to claim that the Alt-Right pioneered this relation-
ship to fan culture. American media studies scholarship has for some 
years sought to study how online fan culture might inform new forms of 
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liberal protest politics. Building on the celebration the ‘agency’ of active 
audiences in 90s cultural studies scholarship, Henry Jenkins argued that 
fandom represented not only a source of cultural innovation but a new 
model for citizenship and even activist politics (Jenkins 2006). In con-
trast to the anti-consumerist culture jamming practices of earlier activ-
ists, with their fatalistic and purist vision of commercial culture, Jenkins 
champions the notion of the empowered consumer: co-creation versus 
co-optation. In this new model, which has been referred to as “transme-
dia organizing” (Costanza-Chock 2014), activists thus come to resem-
ble the active audience of fan culture by engaging in the co-creation of 
world-building leading to narratives or story elements dispersing across 
multiple delivery channels. We can find striking examples of Jenkins’ 
model on the American progressive left, notably the #MyHungerGames 
protests in 2014 in which the Twitter hashtag allowed young adult sci-fi 
fans to show solidarity with low paid service employees (Ashoka 2014). 
While such progressive examples continue, it would however appear that 
in the aftermath of Gamergate, and especially since the rise of Trump, 
the new vanguard has become “toxic fandom” (Parham 2018). Indeed, at 
a structural level reactionary memes like Kekistan seem more innovative 
and original than their politically-progressive counterparts: As instances 
of world-building they can be understood as the autopoetic creations of the 
deep vernacular web.
The argument developed above is that the deep vernacular web, long 
the source of memetic innovation, has recently become a staging ground 
and recruitment center for the new-right. In contrast, however, to the 
post-critical argument (so forcefully articled by Henry Jenkins), it would 
appear that what makes the new-right so appealing to so many in these 
subcultures is how this ideology seems to offer a critique of the dominant 
hegemonic system which they perceive as threatening their enjoyment 
(Lovink/Tuters 2018). Whatever we call them, these online antagonistic 
communities appear to be here to stay. Part of the reason for this is indeed 
their capacity to world-build by drawing from the abundant ‘lore’ of gam-
er culture. Although equally significant is the schadenfreude of triggering 
SJW. These innovations come together in the deployment of ‘meme mag-
ic’ in the sphere of protest politics. However idiotic such protest-LARPing 
may appear to ‘normies’, those who consider themselves to be ‘in on the 
joke’ may perceive their actions to be a kind of avant-garde activism, which 
aims to disrupt ‘consensus reality’. We may even consider the former in 
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terms of an anarchistic protest against what Jacques Rancière (2004) re-
fers to as the dominant “partition of the sensible,” according to which 
aesthetic conventions are used to disguise the essentially arbitrary nature 
of political domination. Insofar as protest-LARPing does not exhibit an 
accompanying “desire to engage in reasoned discourse”, by this same mea-
sure one may say that it fails to meet the normative standard of a genuine-
ly activist “disruption effect” (Rancière cited in Bennett 2009: 109).
In spite of all the ironic posturing, what we should not overlook is the 
extent to which these communities also represent the concerns of those 
who perceive their identities as under threat. Given the demographic 
make-up of the culture of 4chan and of ‘hard core’ computer gamers, this 
political movement has appeared as a backlash spurred by an aggrieved 
‘silent majority’. While one may not necessarily sympathize with the sub-
stance of these grievances, in terms of political strategy it would be an 
oversight to dismiss them out of hand. Given the degree of their entrench-
ment in the broader political discourse, it is not obvious how to respond 
to this situation. In a simplification of Gramscian meta-politics, the New-
Right in both Europe and America would have us believe that “politics is 
downstream from culture” (Griffin 2000; Meyers 2011). While these on-
line antagonistic communities appear to have occupied the high ground 
in the current online culture war – figuratively speaking of course – it 
has also been argued that “this supposed new and revolutionary counter-
cultural influence hasn’t produced any original cultural artefacts of note 
beyond a few frog memes” (Wendling 2018). If, as the red pill metaphor 
would seem to suggest, there is a deep desire on the part of many to see 
beneath the ideological superstructure, then the left can gain advantage 
by shifting the theatre of conflict from half-baked pop culture to the con-
ventional political sphere and issues like economics and social justice. On 
that terrain, we might say the left still has all the best memes.
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Parallel Ports  
Sociotechnical Change from the Alt-Right to Alt-Tech
Joan Donovan, Becca Lewis and Brian Friedberg
Before the insurgence of the so-called ‘Alt-Right’ into contemporary politi-
cal discussion, white supremacists have long used the internet as a means 
to organize and share information.1 Early adopters of email and bulletin 
board technology – organizations such as the Aryan Nation and the Ku 
Klux Klan – saw great possibilities for using networked communication 
technology to circumvent social, physical and legal restrictions on the ex-
pression of racism and antisemitism. Sites like Aryan Liberty Net (1984) 
and Stormfront (1995) provided early platforms for the sharing of racist 
propaganda, novel means of organization and recruitment, and new tools 
to harass and intimidate vulnerable populations (Berlet 2008).2 The in-
creasing ubiquity of online communication has allowed white suprema-
cist groups to grow and transform, preserving the movement’s knowledge 
and tactics for decades.
More than a tool for communication, social media platforms are in-
creasingly condemned for supporting the organization of a broad base of 
white supremacists. One key event, The Unite the Right Rally, held on 
August 2017 in Charlottesville, North Carolina, was organized by a broad 
coalition of white supremacists, many of whom were highly active online. 
This violent gathering led to the death of Heather Heyer and the injury of 
dozens of others. Much of the subsequent criticism lodged against social 
1 | According to the Associated Press Style Guide, references to the “Alt-Right” 
should always be in quotes. For more information, see: https://blog.ap.org/be 
hind-the-news/writing-about-the-Alt-Right
2 | Southern Poverty Law Center (2015): “Stormfront: A History”, 25 March 2015 
(https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/03/25/stormfront-history).
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media companies concerned the failure to enforce their own ‘Terms of 
Service’ contracts in the lead up to the rally. Corporations such as Goo-
gle (including Youtube), Twitter, Facebook, Cloudflare, GoDaddy, AirBnB, 
Uber, Paypal, Discord, Patreon, and others reacted by ‘no platforming’ (i.e. 
refusing services) known white supremacists account holders. 
The event revealed a fissure across platform companies’ terms of ser-
vice and their willingness to enforce them. Platform companies showed a 
commitment to ethical use by banning far-right and extremist accounts, 
which was debated in the media as a form of censorship. In this case, the 
actions by internet companies prompted a significant change in far-right 
organizing: the Alt-Right suddenly needed the support infrastructure of 
an ‘Alt-Tech’ movement. One of the organizers of the Charlottesville rally, 
Tim Gionet (aka Baked Alaska on social media) told the LA Times: “We’re 
getting banned from using payment-processing services, so we have no 
other choice. If that’s the gamble they want to take, I guess they can, and 
we’ll make our own infrastructure” (Pearce 2017). This question of infra-
structure emerges for social movements in the face of particular obstacles, 
and Donovan (2018) argues that this infrastructural turn happens when a 
movement’s very survival is threatened.
Therefore, while no-platforming efforts have raised public awareness 
of online hate speech and racist organizing, they have also necessitated the 
development of alternative platforms to prolong the life of the movement. 
We argue that these so-called ‘Alt-Tech’ platforms also serve as recruit-
ment and organizing sites for the far right, allowing for direct communi-
cation and continued engagement. All of which begs the question: what 
shifts in the sociotechnical organization of networked communication 
have enabled extremist communities to flourish? We take up this question 
by exploring how alternative sociotechnical systems have developed after 
the violence in Charlottesville.
In computer science, parallel ports were an early hardware solution 
for connecting peripherals, allowing for multiple streams of data to flow 
simultaneously. The concept of parallel ports as a type of forking (i.e. 
changes in the organizational flow of information to allow for process-
ing different streams of data) is embedded within the design of tech-
nical systems and the open source movement (Kelty 2008). It is also 
an important frame for understanding the maturation of networked 
social movements as they are both structured by and structuring their 
own technological infrastructure (Donovan 2018). By porting the social 
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movement community from one platform to another, movement leaders 
are making decisions about what technological features are necessary to 
sustain the movement.
We use the figure of parallel ports here to analyze the development of 
alternative platforms. We ask: is the ‘forking’ of the Alt-Right’s techno-
logical development driven by a need for stabilization? Or, is it the case 
that the alternative technology developed in the wake of Charlottesville 
is something fundamentally different? In this article, we describe the de-
velopment of a social media platform called Gab to show how technology 
was used by the Alt-Right to align with other online movements. While 
there are points of affinity where these movements have overlapped, we 
describe how the design and widespread adoption of Gab, a small online 
social media platform, rose in prominence after the riot in Charlottes-
ville. Gab sought to bridge these movements not only to expand its user 
base but also because technology is a movement unto itself. Technological 
change is often intertwined with social movements learning to use the 
technology and innovating at the margins of utility (Mattoni 2013; Don-
ovan 2016). As such, mapping technological change and the adoption of 
new technologies by social movements is a critical site for understanding 
sociotechnical systems designs and their challenges.
TACTiCAl innoVATion ACRoss The AlT-RighT  
And AlT-TeCh
Doug McAdam (1983) explains the process of social movements’ deve- 
lopment and decline through a theory of tactical innovation. In order to 
develop and to reach their goals, social movements must understand the 
broader political context in which they are positioned and devise tactics 
accordingly. Violent and disruptive tactics have a higher success rate than 
more institutionalized routes (Piven/Cloward 1991), but to achieve success 
these disruptive tactics must change often (McAdam 1983; Piven/Cloward 
1991). The transformation of tactics either leads to legitimate power or the 
insurgents must develop new forms of disruptive protest (McAdam 1983).
In order to study social movements in this way, McAdam develops 
three concepts that emphasize the relationship between movements and 
counter-movements: tactical innovation, tactical adaptation, and tactical 
interaction. Tactical innovation refers to “the creativity of insurgents in 
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devising new tactical forms,” i.e. an initial action. Tactical adaptation is 
“the ability of opponents to neutralize these moves through effective tacti-
cal counter,” i.e. the responding action. Tactical interaction is the process 
through which these actions are understood and offset, much like a chess 
match (McAdam 1983: 736).
But, how does a social movement choose its tactics and decide on a 
course of action? The political opportunity structure is key to understan- 
ding how a movement’s chosen tactics are limited to the legitimate and 
illegitimate means available to meet a desired goal. Holly J. McCammon 
(2003) illustrates how political defeats, factionalism, and the limitation of 
particular resources led in some cases to tactical stasis and in other cases 
provided an impetus for tactical innovation. As well, a movement’s orga-
nizational readiness, its ability to mobilize resources and communicate 
tactics, often shapes what tactics they have in their repertoire.
Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman (2000), Melissa J. Wilde (2004), and 
Marshall Ganz (2000) have called attention to tactical innovation as it re-
lates to the biography of a movement’s leaders. While some measure of 
charisma must always be present for leadership to be effective, successful 
leaders often have affiliations with other movements, coupled with strong 
alliances both inside and outside the movement, and the ability to inno-
vate to reach their desired outcomes.
In the case of the Unite the Right rally, we see the field of political op-
portunities opened wide for white supremacists in the lead up to and fol-
lowing Trump’s 2016 election. Not only was the national media receptive 
to their messaging and dedicated a large amount of resources to covering 
their movement, but Jeff Sessions became the Attorney General, whose 
agenda was highly focused on other racialized issues, such as tracking 
the gang MS-13 across borders and labelling Black Lives Matter as ‘Black 
Identity Extremists.’ Within Charlottesville itself, the political gains of the 
Black Lives Matter movement included renaming Lee Park as Justice Park 
and removing the large statue of Robert E. Lee.
The Alt-Right, led by Richard Spencer and other charismatic figures 
popular on social media, chose Lee Park to stage the Unite the Right rally 
to protest the removal of the statue. This would also draw in counter-pro-
testers who wanted to protect their earlier wins. Here, Spencer’s choice 
to rally in Charlottesville was a tactical innovation that sought to produce 
a confrontation with local activists in order to gain media attention. In 
May 2017, prior to the Unite the Right rally in August, Spencer and others 
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held a torch-lit protest in the same park. This protest got significant media 
coverage, despite the event itself being rather low-energy with only a few 
dozen people in attendance. By organizing events Spencer brought in new 
recruits and created alliances with new groups, mainly militias, who want-
ed to share the media attention.
Online recruitment for the Unite the Right rally depended largely on 
sharing digital fliers and memes. Spencer enrolled speakers from several 
other white supremacist organizations who raised funds so their mem-
bers could attend. The mass rally was the most significant call to action 
across the US white supremacist movement in years. The organization of 
the event relied heavily on the belief that for the movement to grow and 
continue to influence politics, members had to show up in person. While 
communication about the event online occurred on every prominent so-
cial media platform, certain sites were key conduits of information, such 
as 8chan, discord chats, altright.com, and the Daily Stormer (a white na-
tionalist message board) along with podcasts such as the Daily Shoah, 
Alt-Right Radio, and Youtube channels by Baked Alaska and others. The 
event itself was organized to bolster the leadership of several charismatic 
figures. The goal was to rebrand the image of the white nationalist move-
ment as one with a youthful and rebellious vision. If they were too timid 
to face potential violence or could not afford to travel, others were asked to 
participate online.
The simultaneous use of multiple platform companies’ products 
coupled with lesser known communication tools as their movement’s in-
frastructure ensured that if one line of communication were shut down 
the event could still carry on. Online video streams from far-right public 
protests are often closely followed in discussion threads as they happen, 
so it was not surprising that when a major act of violence occurred in 
Charlottesville, online participants jumped at the opportunity to impact 
the course of events by manipulating media narratives in an attempt to get 
journalists to blame their political opponents.
For movements with their roots on the internet, it is imperative that 
tactical innovation occurs in real time, where offline events feed into on-
line dialogues that shape a movement’s followers’ ability to communicate 
with one another. That is to say, infrastructure is integral to the socio-tech-
nical design of a movement like the Alt-Right. While charismatic leaders 
are instrumental in providing ideological frames and being spokespeo-
ple to the media, day-to-day participation in networked social movements 
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is largely monotonous. With few possibilities to meet in public without 
opposition, the Alt-Right has relied on creating an abundance of online 
media, forums, and opportunities for engagement that require internet 
infrastructure for the survival of their movement. As platforms began to 
remove far-right accounts and content, the Alt-Right adopted a developer’s 
mindset and fashioned solutions out of existing code and resources. In 
the next section, we describe these steps taken by the Alt-Right to align 
with an Alt-Tech community in the wake of no platforming after Charlot-
tesville.
TACTiCAl innoVATion As A ResPonse  
To ‘no Pl ATFoRming’
The Unite the Right rally was a horrifically violent event. In the lead up 
to it, much of the online discussion revolved around open-carry permits, 
where some posted pictures of themselves posing with homemade weap-
ons, handguns, and rifles. In some online forums and chat services, the 
coming event was described as a ‘civil war’ and ‘battle with Antifa’. For 
those counter-organizing in Charlottesville, residents repeatedly attended 
City Council meetings asking for the permit to be revoked because there 
was going to be violence.
Emboldened by previous symbolic victories of harassment campaigns 
such as Gamergate (Losh 2017) and far-right intervention in the 2016 pres-
idential election (Daniels 2018), leaders of the Alt-Right and other white 
nationalist groups openly promoted Unite the Right on public forums, 
anonymous imageboards, social media and Youtube. Gamergate was a 
large-scale online coalition of anonymous trolls, right wing pundits and 
social reactionaries who united to attack prominent women in the video 
game industry in 2014. For the Alt-Right, coordinated amplification of the 
call for many far-right factions to coalesce under a single banner would 
not have been possible without strategic use of public-facing media and 
simultaneous backchannel coordination and communication. The tactics 
for coordination owe much to Gamergate, relying on similar social and 
technical networks for organization and amplification (Losh 2017; Mas-
sanari 2015).
After the violence of Charlottesville, many platforms that took lighter 
approaches to content moderation were forced to confront the growing 
Parallel Por ts 55
threat of large-scale white supremacist organizing on their platforms. 
Symbolic targets, such as removing blue check marks on Twitter and the 
removal of Facebook pages, were chosen to give the impression that plat-
forms were both willing and able to respond to this threat. Some, like 
Spencer, called for platforms to be regulated like other public utilities 
in the USA, where net neutrality applies to speeds afforded by internet 
service providers but not the content itself. In the USA, platforms are 
allowed to choke/censor/moderate content in the interest of the online 
community, which is key to market retention. In other countries, such as 
Germany, racist content is restricted by tighter government regulations, 
placing legal burden of removal on social media platforms and hosting 
sites. There are, however, easy technological circumvention techniques 
that allow for access, such as the use of the TOR browser or VPNs that 
mask location.
Others, in response, called for alternative platforms to arise and fill the 
communication and amplification void left by large-scale banning, or for 
right-wing operatives to double-down on pre-existing platforms with lax 
approaches to censorship or mission statements aligned with free-speech 
absolutism. This was a critical shift in the far-right’s ability to stay or-
ganized as platform companies reacted to their violence. By shifting the 
focus from Alt-Right to Alt-Tech, a new wave of organizing continued 
online while offline events faltered or were completely overwhelmed by 
counter-protesters (Neuman 2017). One such influential platform, Gab, 
found its niche in the fall of 2017. While there were many other platforms 
competing for attention and users at this time – Voat, Bitchute, and Minds 
– Gab stood out as one that adopted a public stance on the issues of free 
speech, technological design, and white nationalism. We focused our 
study on the public communications of Gab founder, Andrew Torba, and 
analyzed the design of Gab to illustrate how the platform capitalized on 
this crisis within the far-right movement to simultaneously populate their 
platform and provide infrastructure to the floundering social movement.
During an interview with far-right media personality Alex Jones, An-
drew Torba, founder of Gab.ai, encouraged the claim that, “This is a war 
we need to fight on Facebook, Google, Twitter everywhere – we gotta drive 
people to Gab.ai, to Infowars.com to Drudge Report.”3 Gab is a small so-
cial media platform that combines elements of Twitter, Reddit and Face-
3 | Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmiXxPNy6N0, 5:15.
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book (Sovryn 2017). Launched in 2016, Gab saw a rise in users in late 
2017, after a summer of far-right public actions across the US. Designed 
to supplement or replace the regular social media habits of its users, Gab’s 
designers consolidated the features of larger platform services for a user 
base vocally dissatisfied with other social media services.
In the summer and fall of 2017, Gab positioned itself to take on users 
abandoning Twitter as a fork in three overlapping movements: the free 
speech movement, the open technology movement, and the Alt-Right. In 
the US, freedom of speech as a public value is commonly invoked as a 
defense of vile and vicious speech. This is how liberal and progressive 
groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, got caught up defen- 
ding the rights of neo-Nazis in Charlottesville (Goldstein 2017). Instead of 
exclusively pushing far-right propaganda, Gab saw itself as a defender of 
vile speech and movement infrastructure; both a place for organizing and 
technological development. By asking not only for users to join, but also 
technologists, free speech fundamentalists, and far right provocateurs, 
Torba’s Gab was bringing together different factions of online movements 
across parallel ports.
The PoliTiCAl ideology dRiVing AlT-TeCh
Two days before the Unite the Right rally, Gab announced the ‘Alt-Tech 
Alliance.’ They wrote: 
“The Free Speech Tech Alliance is a passionate group of brave engineers, product 
managers, investors and others who are tired of the status quo in the technology 
industry. We are the defenders of free speech, individual liberty, and truth.”4
However, on August 17, 2017 after the fallout from Charlottesville, Gab 
was removed from the Apple play store because, as Apple told Ars Technica:
“In order to be on the Play Store, social networking apps need to demonstrate a 
sufficient level of moderation, including for content that encourages violence and 
4 | Gab (2017): “Announcing the Free Speech Tech Alliance”, 10 August 2017 
(ht tps://medium.com/@getongab/announcing-the-alt-tech-alliance-18bebe8
9c60a).
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advocates hate against groups of people. This is a long-standing rule and clearly 
stated in our developer policies. Developers always have the opportunity to ap-
peal a suspension and may have their apps reinstated if they‘ve addressed the 
policy violations and are compliant with our Developer Program Policies” (quoted 
in Lee 2017).
Torba used this decision as an opportunity to raise capital using a crowd 
campaign and redoubled his efforts at recruitment (Kircher 2017).
In press and marketing campaigns for his platform, Torba pushes the 
bounds of platform accountability by calling out other social media plat-
forms for censorship. Taking a stance of American-centric free speech 
absolutism, Torba and staff refuse to monitor or moderate hateful content, 
despite Gab’s community guidelines strongly advising international users 
to adhere to their particular nation’s speech laws.5 These policies create a 
haven for users banned from Youtube, Twitter, and Facebook. A lifelong 
conservative dissatisfied with his previous experiences in Silicon Valley 
startups, Torba has publicly embraced the controversy and began circu-
lating white nationalist talking points in an attempt to draw in new users 
(Brustein 2017; Hess 2016).6 On Gab, Twitter, Youtube and Medium, Tor-
ba frequently aligns himself with conservative and far-right causes. Im-
mediately following Charlottesville, Gab became an important hub for the 
far right, where they coordinated trolling brigades to attack journalists 
and others on Twitter. In a Medium post entitled We Are At War For A 
Free And Open Internet, Torba walked back his claims about his platform’s 
positions on free speech and hate speech while publicly defending his de-
cision to remove a notorious neo-nazi hacker, Weev, for violation of their 
domain registrar’s terms of service.7 Asia Registry, the domain registry for 
Gab, threatened to take the site offline if they did not remove antisemitic 
5 | For more information on Gab’s Community Guidelines, see https://gab.ai/
about/guidelines.
6 | Gab (2018): “EXPOSED: Anti-White ‘Hate Speech’ on Twitter By CNN, Buzz-
feed, NY T, and LA Times Reporters”, Medium (blog), 4 August 2018 (https://
medium.com/@getongab/exposed-anti-white-hate-speech-on-twit ter-by-cnn-
buzzfeed-nyt-and-la-times-reporters-fa72327e5010).
7 | Gab (2017): “We Are At War For A Free And Open Internet”, 4 September 2017 
(https://medium.com/@getongab/we-are-at-war-for-a-free-and-open-internet-
426629fba4bf).
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posts by Weev (Hayden 2017). In an effort to reclaim their reputation, a 
new ‘censor-proof social media protocol’ IPO was launched to expand in-
vestment opportunities in the Gab ‘family’ of projects, and to keep Gab in 
the tech press.8
Gab’s marketing, as a centralized platform for the far right, relies on 
the fear of social isolation coupled with a willingness to involve the plat-
form’s services in political debate. In 2017, emboldened by large-scale ral-
lies in California, Tennessee, and Virginia, far-right groups escalated their 
ongoing attacks against both the mainstream media and racialized groups 
using targeted harassment on platforms. Known white supremacists op-
erated openly on Twitter, with only the most violent content subject to 
removal. In response to public pressure and critical reporting on the con-
tinual harassment and spreading of extremist propaganda, Twitter issued 
an updated Hateful Content policy on December 18, 2017. Aimed at curb-
ing hate speech and harassment, the policy would more aggressively ban 
users for violent and egregious behavior observed both on and off the plat-
form. Twitter’s announcement regarding tighter control of hate speech on 
their platform was preemptively decried as a form of ‘censorship’ amongst 
far-right communities. For several weeks leading up to Twitter’s Terms of 
Service update, conservative and far-right networks employed the hashtag 
#TwitterPurge.
Gab has experienced difficulties raising funds as they are both unwill-
ing and incapable of supporting or acquiring advertisers. Alt-Tech plat-
forms, like Gab, are limited in their ability to interact with financial and 
advertising systems available to larger established platforms, like Twitter. 
On other platforms, advertisers threaten and withdraw support when it is 
discovered their marketing materials are paired with content promoting 
hate (Solon 2017). The influence of advertisers on a platform’s standards 
for monetization and hosting limits bad actors who seek a means of am-
plifying their messages. Alongside the inability to secure advertising re- 
venue, Gab’s mobile app has been continually rejected from the Apple and 
Google mobile stores, limiting their audience. There are no third party 
applications that can work with Gab’s architecture, which is limited by a 
8 | For more information on fundraising see: https://www.star tengine.com/
gab-select.
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private and reportedly fragile API.9 We now turn to discussing the techno-
logical features of Gab to illustrate how the ability to consolidate so many 
of the features popular on other platforms, like Twitter, Youtube, Face-
book, and Reddit, shows the promise of such tactical innovation to provide 
a all-in-one social media experience, but ultimately that the public uptake 
of a technology depends largely on the charisma of leadership and the 
values of its community of users.
The TeChnologiCAl inFR AsTRUCTURe  
sUPPoRTing AlT-TeCh
Gab became a central hub for the Alt-Right movement following the Unite 
the Right rally as Torba positioned his technology as the only unmo- 
derated space online. Since then, Gab has continued to develop social 
movement community, integrating new features as Twitter, Facebook, 
and Youtube’s Terms of Service pose problems for infrastructural stabili-
ty. Keeping with their goal of being a one-stop community platform, Gab 
offers users an experience designed to recreate Twitter, Facebook, and 
Reddit in a ‘censorship-free’ environment – it mimics many functions of 
its main rival Twitter, the social connectivity of Facebook, and the news 
aggregation and voting system of Reddit. These are not merely inferences; 
Gab’s creators and community posit the platform as a viable alternative 
for users unsatisfied (or permanently banned) from these major social 
media sites.10 Gab is therefore a prime example of how the greater Alt-
Tech space integrates and modifies the pre-existing models of interaction 
their user base has come to expect from their social media experiences 
elsewhere. Here, Gab is not one platform among many, but is a hub that 
brings together many nodes – including white supremacist, misogynist, 
and ‘free speech’ communities – under the banner of Alt-Tech.
While largely replicating and consolidating features found elsewhere, 
Gab has a few unique tools or early innovations. Gab includes the ability to 
9 | For more information on Gab’s API: https://dev.to/welcome/the-day-i-broke-
gabai
10 | Gab (2017): “Announcing the Free Speech Tech Alliance”, 10 August 2017 
(ht tps://medium.com/@getongab/announcing-the-alt-tech-alliance-18beb
e89c60a).
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filter keywords and followers, predating Twitter’s ability to remove certain 
terms entirely from a feed, as well as muting individual users who may 
be engaged in harassment. However, Gab does not feature a block system 
on ideological grounds. The introduction of ‘Pro memberships’ expands 
dedicated users’ power to control their experience, as well as introducing 
features to incentivize creators to use Gab as their primary broadcast plat-
form.
Moreover, international news of white nationalists being banned from 
hosting services or detained while travelling has bolstered use of Gab in 
countries outside the US. As a result, Gab provides a place for discussion 
and coordination of translocal ideologies called ‘networked nationalisms’, 
“a belief that national borders are strengthened by the international coop-
eration of far-right politicians and ‘Identitarian’ movements to preserve 
the white race and culture” (Donovan et al. 2018). While ‘strong borders’ 
are often invoked by white nationalists in order to establish ties between 
Europe and the USA, the use of online platforms has digitized this rhe- 
toric in the form of popular memes. These memes, such as the ‘no more 
brother wars’ series, propagate on Gab and help other users to identify 
with each other as a form of solidarity.
Alt-Tech Alliance. By DeviantArt user SwyTheQ.11
11 | Source: https://www.deviantart.com/swytheq/art/8-14-2017-The-Alt-Tech- 
Alliance-is-Coming-698733718. 
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While being begrudgingly accepted by right-wing pundits, journal-
ists, and content creators, Gab has yet to find its ‘cool’ among younger 
users. Gab’s logo itself is a transparent appropriation of Pepe, a cartoon 
frog meme associated with the culture of the image board 4chan, the Alt-
Right and the online campaign for Donald Trump. Breitbart and Infowars 
writers have amplified hostile attitudes to major tech firms in their re-
porting, helping to bolster Gab’s reputation. Resultingly, Gab has become 
an echo chamber for the most disgusting content offered online, where 
antisemitism, misogyny, anti-LGBTQ, and racist epithets circulate expo-
nentially. While technologically Gab can be glitchy and unstable, it has 
integrated some of the most popular features offered by other social media 
platforms. However, few journalists comment on the innovative incorpo-
ration of technological features because Torba’s public expressions of his 
political ideology overshadows every discussion of its design.
ConClUsion
Our analysis shows that technology is not politically neutral. Instead, the 
leadership of the platform company, alongside the profile of the user base 
and the content they circulate have a significant impact on how platforms 
are perceived by the public. Gab provides a limit-case for analyzing how 
the Alt-Tech movement continues to be wedded to the values espoused by 
the developers. Instead of assessing the technology on the qualities of its 
design, its designers’ politics are built in and can alienate potential new 
users. By cloning features common to larger platforms and consolidat-
ing them into a single user experience, Gab’s platform is both political 
and infrastructural. In The Politics of Platforms, Tarleton Gillespie writes 
that platforms, “like the television networks and trade publishers before 
them, [...] are increasingly facing questions about their responsibilities: 
to their users, to key constituencies who depend on the public discourse 
they host, and to broader notions of the public interest” (Gillespie 2010: 
348). He goes on: “Unlike Hollywood and the television networks, who 
could be painted as the big bad industries, online content seems an open 
world, where anyone can post, anything can be said” (ibid.: 353). The day 
has come where Youtube, Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and Google have now 
become media giants, like Hollywood. As such, the social reckoning for 
platform corporations requires attention to key communities, audiences, 
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and public interests. Alt-Tech platforms, like Gab, now serve as a warning 
that without moderation policies, users will share noxious content, which 
becomes a liability for indexing quality and for promoting the platform’s 
features. Moreover, all communities have rules, both online and off. Re-
sponsibility lies not only in the design, but in the enforcement of a plat-
form’s Terms of Service, much like a code of conduct.
And so, we return to our main question: is technological development 
within the Alt-Right driven by a need for stabilization? The answer here 
is: sometimes. While movement leaders, like Richard Spencer and Tim 
Gionet (Baked Alaska), understand why Gab is important for organizing a 
social movement community online, they also recognize the need for stay-
ing on more established platforms, like Youtube and Twitter. Both called 
for new regulation to make net neutrality a feature of platforms that allow 
for unmoderated sharing of user generated content. Critically, while Gab 
would stabilize the internal life of the movement, it would not be ideal for 
reaching out to new audiences, recruiting new members, and capturing 
media attention; all of which are central for prolonging the life of move-
ments (Donovan 2018). For networked social movements, having a pres-
ence on all available platforms ensures stability when counter-movements 
tactically adapt and create obstacles, like in the event of ‘no platforming.’
Is it the case that the alternative technology developed in the wake 
of the violence in Charlottesville is something fundamentally innovative? 
While we identified that Gab both clones and consolidates features from 
other platforms, it does not significantly change how online movements 
connect, collaborate, or organize. In fact, the engagement on this small 
platform has become so vitriolic that it may do more to destroy the allianc-
es across these movements than to build them. While Torba’s public proc-
lamations heralded the platform as the only place online where speech 
goes unmoderated, he had to remove some racist posts because online 
infrastructure does not stand outside of the information ecosystem. Pres-
sure to change one’s platform can come from the public, journalists, or 
from other infrastructure companies. No single user or platform can act 
in isolation given the architecture of the internet. That is to say, while 
platforms may be organized as parallel ports, which can function inde-
pendently of one another, they must be plugged into other internet ser-
vices such as service providers, domain registrars, and cloud services. As 
a result, the terms of service for companies that are deep in the stack may 
become the ultimate arbiters of what content gets to stay online.
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In conclusion, because hundreds of movements coexist online and 
use internet infrastructure to recruit and get organized, the charisma of 
movement leaders and the political values of the movement will deter-
mine how their social movement community tactically innovates both 
online and offline. The violence in Charlottesville both gained the Alt-
Right widespread media attention, but also propelled online companies to 
‘no platform’ white nationalists. The use of violence by social movements 
often has similar effects, whereby movements that resort to violence of-
ten become heavily surveilled by formal authorities, such as the police. 
However, in this case, sanctions came from platform companies who were 
implicated in the communication and coordination of the Alt-Right, which 
suggests that technology makers are a movement unto themselves. As 
such, the burgeoning Alt-Tech movement as well as the online free speech 
movement will have to choose their political alliances more carefully if 
they are to succeed in recruiting and retaining members that do not also 
support far right perspectives. Platforms, as sociotechnical infrastructure, 
will adapt to new forms and norms of conduct, but the values that support 
design must also support a diversity of tactics and users.
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Creating a New Normal 
The Mainstreaming of Far-Right Ideas Through Online  
and Of fline Action in Hungary
Philipp Karl
On 1 February 2011, hundreds of people demonstrated peacefully against 
the appointment of a known antisemite as the new Director of the Új Szín-
ház theater in Budapest. Roughly one hundred far-right counter protestors 
in paramilitary uniforms from a successor organization of the Hungarian 
Guard staged a counter protest, trying to attack the antifascist demon-
strators. Four months later, on 7 July, Jobbik organized a protest march 
from the MSZP headquarters to the Fidesz headquarters with the support 
of various other far-right groups, marching triumphantly over Budapest’s 
World Heritage Site, the boulevard Andrássy út. Only one lone counter 
demonstrator showed up. The contrasting turnouts of counter-activists at 
these two events indicate lots of things, not least the far-right’s ability to 
mobilize grounded action in Hungary. The far right heavily advertised 
these events on the internet and used documentation of their strong show-
ing at both as propaganda afterwards online. 
This paper aims to analyze how Jobbik, as Hungary’s main opposi-
tion party, mainstreamed far-right ideas through a combination of online 
and offline action. As a variety of terms are used in academic and general 
media discourses to describe political families with specific sets of cha- 
racteristics, the notion of ‘the mainstream’ is analytically difficult to de-
fine and understand, as demonstrated by Aristotle Kallis (Kallis 2015). 
He observes that ‘mainstream’ and ‘extremism’ are mutually-dependent 
relational terms, as is the case with the left-right-dichotomy that pre- 
supposes an inherent center (Bobbio 1997). Using a Gramscian approach, 
Bert Cammaerts has most recently examined discursive strategies that 
the far right employed in the Netherlands and Belgium to mainstream 
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its discourse (Cammaerts 2018). He described how a successful war of 
position, through provocations by far-right leaders, led to media coverage 
which amplified their message and helped to normalize their ideas. In 
Hungary the far-right discourse is not only normalized but actually insti-
tutionalized, by fences, laws, a new constitution and various other legal 
practices. Therefore, in the context of this chapter, the process of main-
streaming is understood as getting people to sympathize with a set of 
ideas so as to mobilize them to act accordingly, in order to institutionalize 
those ideas through legal or other actions. To put it more bluntly: main-
streaming is the attempt to define what is normal and, at the same time, to 
make or frame the meaning of events, actions, structures, and institutions 
at the level of popular political discourse. Every mainstreaming process 
necessarily involves an attempt to construct a new reality, a new normal. 
Since mainstreaming processes take place in dynamic and contentious 
settings, they do not necessarily have to succeed to become influential. 
Grounded on ideas developed by Sidney Tarrow and Manuel Castells, 
I would argue that political mobilization processes (and mainstreaming 
is the final result of such a mobilization process) have a better chance 
of being successful when accompanied by interdependent and self-refer-
ential online and offline action. Tarrow identified the power of networks 
and organizations, as well as the power of frames, emotions and collective 
identities as two of the main “powers in [a] movement” that transform sin-
gular claims into actions (Tarrow 2011). Castells examined contemporary 
revolutionary events and new social movements and concluded that those 
movements were networked in multiple forms offline and online, they be-
came movements through the appropriation of urban spaces, were highly 
self-reflective and aimed to change the values of society (Castells 2012). 
In this vein, this essay details how Jobbik used the internet and social 
media in synch with offline actions such as its May festivals to turn ethno- 
nationalist obsessions into the new normal in Hungary.
sPRe Ading ide As And mAking me Aning:  
jobbik As AVAnT-gARde on FACebook And TwiT TeR
The internet, and particularly social networking platforms, offer alterna-
tive ways to circumvent more established media forums such as news-
papers, television and radio, enabling communication with audiences 
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without the interference of external editors. For example, Castells demon-
strated how the internet and social networking sites such as Twitter helped 
to bypass censorship and the traditional media during the Tunisian upris-
ings in 2011 (Castells 2012). The potential audiences accessible via these 
new channels are also larger and more diverse. Crucially, too, they can be 
interacted with and analyzed at the same time. Barack Obama’s election 
campaigns in 2008 and 2012 were considered ground-breaking in terms 
of how they used the internet to connect and reinforce support and sup-
porters. But even before that, the Hungarian far right created an online 
network of websites and the earliest forms of social networking sites in 
conjunction with the street protests of 2006, which erupted when it be-
came public knowledge that Ferenc Gyurscány, the then socialist Prime 
Minister, had willingly lied about the national economy. Not only were 
Jobbik instrumental to this online-offline action, they were also the ear-
liest political party to become regular users of Twitter and Facebook in 
Hungary. New means of communication can facilitate social change when 
used appropriately. Therefore it is historically typical for social movements 
in general, and in some cases particularly for the far right, to become early 
adopters of new technologies (for example the use of cinema and mass 
propaganda by Nazi Germany). Referring to the new social movements he 
observed, Castells says:
“Historically, social movements have been dependent on the existence of spe-
cific communication mechanisms […]. In our time, multimodal, digital networks 
of horizontal communication are the fastest and most autonomous, interactive, 
reprogrammable and self-expanding means of communication in history” (Cas-
tells 2012: 15).
Whether short messages, videos, clips, gifs or images, Jobbik has come to 
use everything at its disposal and has been hugely successful in doing so. 
For example, between June 2013 and June 2014 Jobbik had 142 individual 
Facebook posts that were either liked or shared by over 1000 users, while 
the other two major Hungarian parties lagged behind: Fidesz had 140 and 
MSZP 112. These statistics may now sound small, but for comparison Ma-
rine Le Pen’s French Front National had merely ten. During the same peri-
od, Jobbik posted 67 short videos, 27 event advertisements, and 42 graphs. 
Fidesz shared 7 videos, 58 event advertisements, 54 graphs and 16 articles 
from their web page. MSZP posted 23 videos, 23 event advertisements, 49 
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graphs, and 11 articles from their web page (Karl 2016). To highlight the 
differences more precisely, one can take a closer look at the posts from 15 
March 2014, which is the Hungarian national bank holiday. The differenc-
es between the three party’s posts are telling. All three used photos, but 
while Jobbik posted joyful images from the midst of their annual festival, 
Fidesz posted photos of the renovation of the city square in front of the 
parliament building and MSZP posted a collage of pictures taken during 
speeches. In other words, Jobbik conveyed togetherness and included its 
Facebook users in the event through the lens of a photographer, while Fi-
desz depicted one governmental achievement and the MSZP post had the 
character of an official press release.
Jobbik’s communication and online strategy is built around five pil-
lars: interconnectedness with other far-right actors at the national level; 
international ties to parties, groups and associations; interactivity with 
its online audience; multi-mediality; and cross-mediality. At the national 
level, Jobbik is constantly interconnected through likes, links, shares and 
retweets with other far-right actors, be they groups, associations, brands 
or music bands. This network helps to spread messages across different 
spheres and so reach wider audiences – not exclusively the political or 
media spheres, but simultaneously the music, sports, clothing and even 
food spheres. At the international level, Jobbik’s connections to Spanish, 
French and Italian far-right groups have been mutually supportive, with 
the communities sharing knowledge about best practice concerning on-
line communication methods and modern styles of formulating political 
ideas. Via these connections we now know that Hungarian far-right prac-
tices have had an international impact. For example, in 2015, the German 
NPD showed a Facebook banner on its official page thanking Hungary for 
building the fence at their southern border. While such an act might seem 
superficial, it is still quite extraordinary. 
Alongside these (inter-)national connections, interactivity is an- 
other pillar of Jobbik’s communication strategy online. The official party 
accounts occasionally share and post contents from non-party-affiliated 
sources, and motivates its followers to actively share, retweet and engage 
through likes and follows. Such strategies have been rare for far-right par-
ties who predominantly just share their own content. Those more tradi-
tional parties have a clear top-down approach to the management of social 
media channels, while Jobbik has a relatively bottom-up approach and in-
teracts with its followers.
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Jobbik’s social media appearances are neither streamlined nor kept 
distinct from each other. When content on Youtube, Facebook or Twitter 
‘works’ or ‘goes viral’ it is shared across the party’s other platforms as 
well. While this is the essence of social network marketing, other politi-
cal parties have been much slower at using cross-mediality to boost their 
online performance. This cross-medial approach goes hand-in-hand with 
multi-mediality. Be it videos, graphs, memes, articles or photos, different 
kinds of content are tailored by Jobbik to attract different audience types. 
And while other parties post long videos, Jobbik rarely posts videos that 
last more than 30 seconds, offering lots of quick content that only require 
limited bandwidth or small data transfers to access, and short attention 
spans to consume.
liking, linking And APPRoPRiATing:  
A sTR ATegiC APPRoACh
Those pillars made Jobbik’s use of social networking sites efficient and 
successful. At a time when major parties in Hungary and elsewhere were 
just starting to form a strategic approach to social networking sites, Jobbik 
already had more than 300,000 followers on Facebook. Of course, it is 
not known how many of these users were actually fake profiles but their 
follower numbers grew at a steady rate from mid-2013. By June 2018, the 
party had already reached half a million followers, which is a remarkable 
proportion of the potential audience given that Hungary has only 10 mil-
lion inhabitants and roughly five million Facebook users. 
Donald Trump’s successful election campaign is the most famous ex-
ample of how repetition and echo-chambers can blur messages with facts. 
His enormous number of Twitter followers made him and his candidacy 
relevant and set him apart in the first place when vying for the Republican 
nomination. Although much less famous, Jobbik has also proven itself 
adept at reinforcing its messages in the simplest forms, beginning with 
its name. Jobbik is an abbreviation and play-on-words that stands, on the 
one hand, for ‘more on the right’ ( job means right in Hungarian) and, on 
the other hand, for ‘better’ ( jobb means better in Hungarian). The idea 
that Jobbik is the better right-wing alternative in Hungary is reinforced 
everytime its name is repeated. In fact, Jobbik had (and maybe still has) a 
special task force dedicated to communications on Facebook and Twitter 
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with the goal of making the party appear more likable, young, family-ori-
ented, modern and tech-affine. One telling example was the background 
image used on the official Facebook page in 2016 of then vice-chairman 
Előd Novák:
The picture shows him, his wife (at the time the youngest female mem-
ber of parliament) and their three kids. The background colors are warm 
and there is no obvious reference to Jobbik. The slogan on the left means 
“Hungarian family, Hungarian future”. The flowery, ornamental symbols 
around the slogan, as well as those on the family’s t-shirts, are derived 
from Hungarian folklore. The family of foxes in the background refer to 
a popular childrens’ television series from the communist era called Vuk. 
The appropriation of images and symbols, as well as their synthesized 
repetition online, are hallmarks of Jobbik’s strategy.
Interconnectivity online through links and banners was a major trait 
of both Jobbik and the Hungarian far right even before the growing in-
fluence of social media platforms. Yet on Facebook and Twitter those con-
nections are made visible through likes and follows. Jobbik’s official party 
account maintained a relatively neutral status, but its affiliate regional 
and youth groups’ accounts were evidently connected with paramilitary 
groups, bands, labels, clothing brands and other organizations of the rad-
ical right network. Media sites that belonged to Jobbik, including its You-
tube channel, were linked to that network even more strongly, retweeting 
or sharing content.
Background image of Előd Novák’s official Facebook page.
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Those different platforms are used in slightly altered, reflexive ways. 
Jobbik’s strategy on social networking sites is less concerned with sub-
stance – elaborate arguments, fact-based discourse or demonstrations of 
their goals (for that purpose they had the party manifesto) – but more with 
style and emotionality. Quite often they actively encourage users to share 
or retweet, which is a simple but highly efficient method to gain more 
likes and followers and so reach a wider audience. Real life events such 
as marches or festivals are advertised through social media. Afterwards, 
photos and videos from those events are shared with their followers again, 
creating a loop or connection beyond the temporary offline action. 
ge T Ting To The ne w noRmAl ThRoUgh oFFline ACTion: 
be T ween sTRee T PRoTesTs And hAPPenings
Spreading ideas online is highly effective and helps to mainstream them, 
but online discourse needs to be transferred to the offline sphere for it to 
become part of everyone’s lives. In other words, the threshold for a simple 
click is quite low but when the sheer number of clicks eventually trans-
fer to votes, participation at events or to steer the topics of everyday dis- 
cussions then the mainstreaming process has reached a new phase. An es-
sential factor in Jobbik’s success has been its use of a diverse set of offline 
activities that strengthened, defined and ultimately transformed the pub-
lic image of the party. When it was founded in 2003, Jobbik was known 
because of its paramilitary sister organizations, such as the Hungarian 
Guard, and for the public swearing-ins it held at the very central Heroes 
Square in Budapest. Such ritualistic action created publicity and helped 
to make Jobbik’s presence in Hungarian politics a topic in itself. Mean-
while, the party’s symbiotic relationship with nationalist music helped to 
mainstream its frames and world view to non-political audiences. Jobbik’s 
annual May festivals are central to this. At those festivals, which are open 
to the general public, not only do nationalistic bands play, co-developing 
new audiences with Jobbik, but a variety of family games are organized 
and – since it is officially an event organized by a political party – political 
speeches are held. 
This appears to be in stark contrast to the Hungarian Guard and its 
various successor organizations who formed the public image of Jobbik 
and helped to popularize the party’s original goal: to dominate the politi-
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cal discourse concerning the Roma minority. Then, the party was widely 
known for martial events and its connection to paramilitary and vigilante 
groups – thereby appearing to be at the fringes of the political spectrum. 
While militaristic, authoritarian and Romaphobic forms of offline action 
dominated the party’s public image, they were secondary to building a 
new extreme discourse around the party’s core ideological concern: na-
tionalism and nativism. Therefore, commemorations and the fostering of 
an image as ‘the’ national party that defines what is Hungarian and what 
it is not were integral to developing and maintaining Jobbik’s appeal. In 
many post-Soviet states, as well as many post-Yugoslav states, national-
ism has been crucial for the formation of the ‘new’ state. Jobbik tried to 
spread a ‘positive’ message focused on nationalist ideals for the present 
and future while depicting the other parties – Fidesz and MSZP primarily 
– as traitors to the nation, corrupt and belonging to the past. While Jobbik 
wanted to ideologically define ‘the national’, Fidesz re-appropriated Job-
bik’s idea of national interest by using its ideas and concrete propositions 
as the basis for policies, thus pushing Jobbik’s ideas from the fringes in to 
a mainstream reality.
In order to do that, especially in a way that speaks to young tech-savvy 
people and families, a key technique has been to create a kind of nation-
alist cool or nationalist spirit that transcends politics and becomes part 
of everyday life, permeating other spheres of society beyond the political. 
May festivals provide a good example of exactly how. From 2004 until 2018 
the annual Jobbik May festival, dubbed Nemzeti Majális (Nationalist May 
festival), has been the most important far-right event organized by Jobbik 
each year. Taking place at the Óbudai Sziget in the Danube in Northern 
Budapest, the festival lasted three days in its peak and featured the lea-
ding bands in Hungary’s Nemzeti Rock (nationalist rock) scene. The bands 
that played most often at the event represent the two different ideological 
branches of the far right in Hungary: the former ultra-band, Romantikus 
Erőszak is a prime example of the more violence-prone, minority-hostile, 
authoritarian-xenophobic branch; while the soft-rock band, Ismerős Ar-
cok exemplifies the romantic-nationalist branch (Karl 2016). Many of the 
bands present at the venue are quite popular, closer to the mainstream 
than the fringes, yet fringe bands were always present as well.
In 2018, the May festival tradition has momentarily come to a pause, 
officially due to a lack of finance but more probably due to the internal par-
ty splits that became apparent because of Vona’s resignation and the ongo-
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ing successor battle between the party’s more moderate faction and its ex-
tremist faction. Prior to this, the public adverts for the festival sometimes 
resembled music festival promotions rather than party political adverts. 
The picture underneath shows the official advert for Jobbik’s May festival 
in 2016. No party affiliation is mentioned. Apart from the word nemzeti 
(nationalist) and the right-wing Árpád-flag alongside the Hungarian flag 
on the right edge, it looks more like a mainstream festival than a far-right 
event: from the font, to the colours, to the plants and trees, it looks young, 
family friendly and well produced.
The May festivals helped to attract young people and families to a party 
once known as militarist and authoritarian, using a blend of music, games 
and food. It evoked a kind of radical right flower power, a Woodstock-like 
feeling on the surface. At the event, antisemitic literature, chauvinistic 
shirts, nationalistic beer and paramilitary outfits (and memberships to 
the Hungarian Guard’s successor organizations) were promoted and sold. 
Youth culture and subculture, as well as traditionalist and conservative 
values, were mixed together to appeal to as many people as possible.
First and foremost, the May festivals are political music events. But at 
the same time they showcase, highlight and define Jobbik’s understan- 
Official advert for Jobbik’s Nemzeti Majális 2016. 
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ding of Hungarian identity. As events aimed at appealing to families, they 
can be analyzed in a broader context as a means of blurring the bound-
aries between traditional conservative and far-right values. For example, 
Jobbik’s election manifesto of 2010 defined what types or model of ‘the 
family’ Jobbik wants to promote, devising its recipe around the ultimate 
nationalistic goal of the ‘survival of the nation’:
“Jobbik’s goal is to slow, then halt, then gradually reverse the rate of population 
decline, through the use of a coherent family and social policy; so that the nation 
grows. To achieve this will f irst and foremost require the promotion and protection 
of the institution of the family, particularly from attacks by a liberalism whose 
objective is to put the family unit on an equal footing with every conceivable alter-
native living arrangement or deviant lifestyle.”1
At the core, far-right parties see the family as the smallest unit of the 
nation, in particular mothers as they can give birth to new generations 
(Mudde 2007). However, many of the contemporary and recently formed 
far-right parties hold a supposedly ‘modern traditional’ view of women. 
Jobbik provided a perfect example of this view in its treatment of the afore-
mentioned Dóra Dúro, wife of Előd Novák and mother of their three chil-
dren, supporting her to gain election to the parliament in 2010, when she 
became the youngest MP at the age of 23. 
FR ACTURes And CoUnTeR ACTions
For a decade Jobbik mastered a strong and close relationship with Hun-
gary’s far-right subculture, but the more moderate and professional the 
party became the more it was estranged from that subculture which had 
made the party visible in the first place. Tarrow described this competition 
between radicalization and institutionalization as inherent for cycles of 
contention within political groups (Tarrow 2011). Whether this will trigger 
the downfall of the party in Jobbik’s case remains an open question at the 
time of writing. So far, the party’s leadership has shown creativity and 
1 |  Jobbik (2010): Radical Change. A Guide to Jobbik’s Parliamentary Electoral 
Manifesto for National Self-Determination and Social Justice, (https://www.job 
bik.com/sites/default/files/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf).
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good communication skills with a variety of tools, and might be able to 
adapt once more to the ever-changing biosphere of the Hungarian polit-
ical system. With respect to Fidesz and Orbán’s policies in recent years, 
Jobbik’s influence cannot be overestimated. The party created an environ-
ment in which radical right ideas flourished among large parts of the soci-
ety and became acceptable across the political spectrum. Their ‘nationalist 
chic’ is currently the new normal in Hungary. In any case, it is an im-
portant example of how civil society, the media and other political parties 
should not deal with radical right parties – mainstreaming their ideas to 
compete for their supporters is never the best option. The institutional-
ized changes altering the constitution, the country’s legal framework, its 
media system and educational landscape will have a lasting effect. The far 
right will dominate for the coming years in part because they have built a 
broad social base and continue to enforce their vision on the next gener-
ation through illiberal school curricula. Liberal Hungary will come back 
when it is ready to form a strong inter-party alliance and when it has finally 
learned its lesson from the disastrous socialist-liberal collaborations that 
collapsed in 2006. 
In Hungary as well as in other countries it is crucial to contradict those 
that seek to define nationality through an ethnic lens. Put differently, an 
inclusive and pluralist vision of citizenship should be advocated as a multi- 
and inter-generational project. In the short term, different measures 
might help. First, far-right demonstrations or events in the public space 
need to be countered in those spaces otherwise those demonstrating are 
allowed to define what ‘the public’s’ pressing concerns are. Second, virtual 
spaces need to be used for organizational as well as for attentional purpos-
es. Since many traditional media outlets in Hungary provide a very narrow 
image of the political and social reality, as well as of what it means to be a 
Hungarian, social networking sites need to be used as counter-channels 
to contradict those narratives and discourses. Paradoxically, the history of 
both Fidesz and Jobbik provide an example of how this process might get 
started. Both parties were initially formed as student organizations. That 
might be how we begin to challenge the new normal.
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Between Anti-Feminism  
and Ethnicized Sexism  
Far-Right Gender Politics in Germany
Lynn Berg
In March 2018, more than 4,000 right-wing protesters demonstrated in 
Kandel, a small town in Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany. Their motivation 
was the death of 15 year-old Mia, who had been killed in December 2017 
by her ex-boyfriend Abdul in a drugstore in Kandel. Mobilized under the 
slogan ‘Kandel is everywhere’ (Kandel ist überall) via Facebook, Youtube 
and Twitter, the murder was made into a political symbol of the supposed-
ly flawed migration and refugee policy of the German government, since 
the perpetrator had fled from Afghanistan to Germany. The call was an-
swered by a broad spectrum of right-wing actors, including neo-Nazis, 
the Identitarian Movement, far-right extremist hooligans as well as mem-
bers of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and the Alter-
native for Germany (AfD) party, making ‘Kandel ist überall’ a symbol of 
far-right resistance. By referring to the violated safety of girls and women, 
and the lack of protection for these groups, hatred and exclusion against 
migrants and fugitives is rationalized: “We mothers did not have children 
to have them defiled and slaughtered by the Merkel guests”, was shout-
ed over loudspeakers at the demonstration. The initiative also continues 
to mobilize online by using sexualized violence against women to justify 
far-right positions. Under the title ‘Merkel’s stumbling stones’ (Merkels 
Stolpersteine), a picture of brass plates with names of murdered girls (such 
as Mia’s) appears on the many online platforms of the initiative. They look 
like the stumbling stones used to memorialize the victims of Nazi purges, 
thus symbolically equating the crimes.
The Kandel Manifesto resembles a classic catalogue of far-right de-
mands: Border closure for all types of immigration to Germany, deporta-
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tion of “illegal immigrants”, assimilation and jus sanguinis (the principle 
of descent for the acquisition of German citizenship). In pink letters they 
demand “Germany first” and the abolition of mosques, a ban on the full 
veil, the reintroduction of compulsory military service and information on 
“insurmountable cultural differences” between Europeans and non-West-
ern migrants1.
Online banner by the initiative Kandel is everywhere writing “Merkel’s 
stumbling stones”.2
Murders, sexualized violence, feminicide, women’s rights and equality are 
no longer issues here. It is not surprising that these topics have no place 
in far-right discourse, since they advocate anti-feminist politics and prac-
tices. It is not the first time that the racist narrative of the violent migrant 
man who attacks ‘German girls’ has proved to be an enormous motivator 
for mobilization. It also shows how gender issues are absolutely central 
for racist and authoritarian demands and right-wing mobilizations. The 
AfD is a key group here because it has been the strongest opposition in 
the Bundestag since 2017 and is represented in almost all state parlia-
ments. As the parliamentary arm of a far-right culture war, it represents 
anti-feminist positions by, on the one hand, opposing equality policies, 
gender studies, feminists and same-sex marriage, and on the other hand, 
supporting normative ‘traditional’ gender roles and concepts of family. At 
the same time, it emphasizes, as it did at the demonstration in Kandel, the 
rights of women and minorities – gender equality as part of ‘German val-
1 | (Kandel ist Überall (2018): “Das Manifest von Kandel”, (https://kandel-ist-ue 
berall.de/startseite/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ manifest-von-kandel.pdf).
2 | Source: https://kandel-ist-ueberall.de/startseite/wp-content/uploads/2018 
/07/stolpersteine_titel_2.jpg.
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ue culture’ – and presents itself as protector of women against sexualized 
violence and for their sexual self-determination. It is thus representative 
of a new way of making politics with gender. The AfD will be used as an 
example in this chapter to show what far-right gender politics currently 
looks like and what functions it fulfils for them. In doing so I will ask: 
Which topics and terms are occupied and how? Which political strategies, 
rhetoric, linguistic images and narratives are used? How are anti-feminist 
positions combined with an emphasis on women’s rights? What impact on 
public and political debate can be observed? What could gender-sensitive 
counter-strategies look like?
ThRe AT sCenARio gendeR: RePRodUCTion,   
FAmily And FAR-RighT gendeR hieR ARChy 
“Hungary wants to abolish gender studies! Let’s do the same: Cut fund-
ing for unscientific branches of research!”. “Welcome culture for new-
borns and unborn babies” was posted on Facebook on Christmas Eve. The 
AfD-Bavaria demanded on Twitter: “Bavaria gender-free! No to gender 
mainstreaming and early sexualixation”. According to the AfD, the goal of 
gender education is “to systematically ‘correct’ the classical understand-
ing of the roles of men and women through state-sponsored re-education 
programs in kindergartens and schools.”3 The chairman of the AfD-
Thuringia, Björn Höcke demanded at a demonstration: “We must redis-
cover our masculinity. Because only if we rediscover our masculinity do 
we become manly. And only if we become manly do we become fortified, 
and we must become fortified, dear friends!” (Lehmann 2018). On the oc-
casion of World Women’s Day 2018, the structural disadvantage of women 
in society was compared in the Bundestag with a “yeti” that everyone was 
talking about but that nobody had ever seen.4
Online campaigns, political speeches, party and election programs in-
tertwine here to express the same content in different ways. Jasmin Siri 
3 | AfD Basic Program from 2016, p. 55.
4 | Speech by AfD Member of Parliament Nicole Höchst on the occasion of World 
Women’s Day 2018 in the Bundestag (ht tps://www.bundestag.de/mediathek? 
v ideoid=72056 4 4 #ur l=L 21lZGlhdGhla292Z X JsY X k /dmlk Z W9pZD03MjA1N 
jQ0&mod=mediathek).
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(2016) describes how AfD party and election programs are worded much 
more liberally than campaigns and speeches by its politicians. It becomes 
clear that the more directly the contents are addressed to the citizens, the 
clearer and more radically they are worded, as Höcke’s speech illustrates. 
Through social media they can directly address their sympathizers and it 
allows them to position themselves as the voice of ‘the people’ in a staged 
proximity to ‘their own people’ and their concerns (Reisigl 2012: 154). Gen-
der politics in the AfD consists largely of anti-gender politics, i.e. mainly 
politics that oppose emancipative contents, actions and institutions. These 
anti-gender politics are defined in opposition to an imagined gender ideol-
ogy, the goal of this gender ideology is defined as:
“Gender ideology marginalizes natural dif ferences between the sexes and ques-
tions gender identity. It wants to abolish the classical family as a life model and 
role model. Thus it is in clear contradiction to the Basic Law which protects (clas-
sically understood) marriage and family as a state-supporting institute, because 
only this can produce the people of the state as supporters of sovereignty. Gender 
ideology contradicts the scientific findings of biology and developmental psycho- 
logy as well as the daily life experience of many generations.”5
AfD thus constructs a specific threat scenario on multiple levels:
1. The ‘traditional family’, as a heterosexual marriage with children, is 
attacked and abolished by a gender ideology that is present in all areas 
of life (work, school, science).
2. Gender ideology contradicts people’s perception of gender and sex and 
endangers the natural development of gender and sexuality in chil-
dren.
3. The ‘traditional family’ ensures the continued existence of the ‘pure 
people’, which is precisely what is threatened by the existence of gen-
der ideology.
4. The governing parties promote the instruments of gender ideology 
and thus the abolition of ‘their own people’.
On the basis of this threat scenario, the AfD can do two things: On the 
one hand, justify its anti-politics; on the other hand, legitimize its own 
5 | AfD Basic Program from 2016, p. 40. 
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gender and family ideologies as national biopolitical policies, centred 
around the heterosexual family to save the ‘pure people.’ This ‘rescue’ in-
volves an increase in the birth rate of the ‘native population’ and a new 
abortion register, legal changes to the abortion law and pregnancy-conflict 
counselling in the interest of ‘life protection’. Strategically, key terms 
would become additionally ‘protected’: Just as marriage is granted exclu-
sively to heterosexual couples, the term family is only accorded to those 
unions that follow the model of a heterosexual marriage with children.
Rhetorically, right-wing populist gender and family policies are de-
scribed as protective (e.g. of the ‘traditional family’), ending discrimina-
tion (e.g. of full-time mothers), supportive and facilitating (e.g. of wom-
en’s freedom of choice for motherhood) (Siri 2016). Anti-gender-politics 
and the goals of oppressive gender ideology are also combined with an 
aggressive rhetoric of annihilation (Berg 2016). Strategically, a combi-
nation of defamation, emotionalization and annihilation goals are used 
to re-define terms and policies that relate to gender issues. At the same 
time, these re-definitions are contrasted with supposed common sense 
constructs – pseudo-general knowledge about heterosexual binaries being 
natural. All politics in support of gender equality appear, on these terms, 
as if imposed from above on people against their will, a far cry from their 
reality as a political instrument that is intended to protect people from 
various forms of discrimination. In the AfD’s online campaigns a variety 
of staging strategies are also used to legitimize heteronormative ideas as 
natural. People from an educational elite, mostly men with professorships 
or doctoral degrees, act as educators, teaching concepts such as gender 
or gender mainstreaming (Berg 2016: 94). Another staging strategy is to 
have female party members appear as key witnesses. As a member of a 
discriminated group – as women, mothers or female politicians – they 
deny that there is discrimination and oppose countermeasures (ibid.: 95). 
In all of these ways and more, far-right gender and family politics focus 
strongly on the regulation of women and female bodies. 
The AfD constructs a line of conflict between the ‘pure people,’ on 
the one hand, and gender ideology and the other parties, on the other. 
Ultimately, the AfD positions itself in this field of conflict on the side of 
the ‘people’, as a fighter for the survival of the German people and for 
their supposedly natural understanding of gender and sexuality, ideal-
ly represented by the normative family. This is where online media and 
speeches are particularly effective, as this narrative is especially suitable 
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for addressing sympathizers directly. The lost ideal of masculinity cam-
paigned for by Björn Höcke can be positioned here, as can the idealiza-
tion of the mother role of female party members and the sexist posters of 
younger AfD members. The family politics of the AfD ultimately has two 
functions: First, an ethnicist concept of ‘the people’ is conveyed through 
the family. Second, the family, consisting of mother, father and several 
children, is constructed as a leading figure in order to realize a naturally 
and hierarchically structured society (Bebnowski 2015: 7–8).
gendeR PoliTiCs in The ConTe x T oF migR ATion  
And belonging
In recent years, far-right gender politics has increasingly shifted to a dif-
ferent thematic focus. Issues of gender and women’s rights are linked to 
the topics of migration and Islam. Especially after the sexual assaults on 
New Year’s Eve 2015/16 in Cologne, old right-wing narratives have been 
re-activated in order to position their own topics in the public debate. Var-
ious online media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Youtube have 
been used to push these topics into the political and public discourses 
with two central narratives. In leading this push, the AfD has demons- 
trated a sophisticated awareness of how to combine online tools with its 
offline political practices in a way that is publicly effective. 
The first narrative is practically omnipresent in contemporary Euro- 
pean public discourse. The AfD and its members publish posters on Face-
book at very short intervals with messages such as, “Brutal group rape: 
8 migrants attack 13-year-old” and “Sexual offences on trains & at train 
stations ‘Everyday life in Merkel-Germany’: the proportion of non-Ger-
man perpetrators rises to nearly 60%”. These are illustrated with photos 
of victims of violence, or dark silhouettes with or without weapons, in 
public spaces. While the posters and contributions were formulated less 
directly in 2015 (Berg 2016), today no room for interpretation is left by 
either the language or images. Now a more direct scenario of violence and 
fear is named: people who are being labelled as migrant or non-German 
as perpetrators, and ‘German’ women as victims. The constant repetition 
of these old narratives on the AfD’s social media channels is followed by 
interviews and talk show appearances by individual politicians supposedly 
legitimizing the scare claim.
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One example of an effective combination of media campaigning and 
parliamentary political work is the AfD’s representation of the case of the 
murdered and raped 14-year-old student Susanna from Mainz. The alleged 
perpetrator, Ali was described as a 21-year-old refugee who had fled from 
Iraq to Germany. Member of Parliament Thomas Seitz brought the case 
to the Bundestag. In a speech that was meant to be about debates on the 
Rules of Procedure in the house, he instead brought up the death of the 
schoolgirl and then remained demonstratively silent. The presiding vice 
president of the Bundestag Claudia Roth then asked him to speak to the 
debate, as otherwise she would expel him from the desk, which she did. A 
short time later there was a video on Twitter entitled “Minute of Silence for 
Susanna: Revealing Reaction of the Other Parties”, which led the narrative 
for the broad media coverage that followed.
The narrative is always the same. The violent offender is marked as 
foreign, immigrant, misogynist and often Muslim, and as someone who 
has sexually abused and/or killed a girl or woman who is marked as ‘Ger-
man’ or ‘ours’. The other parties are positioned on the side of the perpe-
trators while the AfD presents itself like lawyers on behalf of the victims. 
The rhetorical strategy behind this is to establish the attributes Muslim, 
immigrant, misogynistic and violent as synonymous with one another. 
Furthermore, the acts of violence are presented as evidence to mark a gen-
eral threat group, to homogenize it and to create a constant threat situa-
tion. Translated, it would mean that all migrant or migrant-labelled men 
are violent and hostile to women, and from them emanates a new perma-
nent threat to ‘our women’ and ‘our society’. They are thus marked as not 
belonging and alien to ‘our society’ and are made into the antagonistic 
evil ‘other’.
The second narrative is directly connected to this and concerns wo-
men wearing headscarves, burka or niquab: “The equal rights of women 
and men guaranteed by the Basic Law as well as the free development of 
personality are contradicted by the headscarf as a religious-political sign 
of the subordination of Muslim women to men.”6 A full veil stands for 
conscious demarcation as well as for “a rejection of our enlightened-dem-
ocratic values and our image of humankind.”7 AfD faction leader Alice 
6 | Ibid., p.40.
7 | AfD proposal in the Bundestag to ban full veiling in public spaces from Feb-
ruary 21, 2018: (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/008/1900829.pdf).
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Weidel said in a speech in the Bundestag: “Burkas, girls in headscarves 
and financially supported knifemen and other good-for-nothings will not 
ensure our prosperity, economic growth and above all the welfare state.”8 
On Facebook, the full veil is frequently used as a symbolic image as soon 
as the word ‘Islamization’ appears, for example in the headline “Cover-
ing Swimwear for Everyone! An Islamization is not happening?” First, 
a homogeneous group is constructed, which includes all women with 
headscarves, niquab or burka. They are labelled as oppressed, not inte-
grated, a financial burden on society and symbolic of Islam, which has 
been marked as threatening. As such they stand for an antagonistic and 
incompatible culture and become symbolic of everything that a suppos-
edly German society and culture is not: backward, violent, anti-women, 
discriminatory, Muslim. As Leila Hadj-Abdou has explained, this narra-
tive portrays an inequality between the supposedly emancipated and free 
women of “one’s own people” in contrast with oppressed Muslim women, 
a portrayal that serves to obscure the inequality between men and women 
within “one’s own society” (2010: 118).
There are two gender-specific threat images that are intended to jointly 
create a threat scenario for the safety of ‘our society’ or ‘our people’, which 
simultaneously creates two opposing gendered groups. First, a miso- 
gynist, oppressive and violent group is labelled as Muslim and immigrant 
and is thus characterized as foreign, non-affiliated and threatening. They 
form the negative image for a supposedly free, gender-equal, emancipat-
ed, liberal, ‘our German’ society, and at the same time are presented as a 
threat to it. Birgit Sauer calls this “ethnomasochism”, an idea of ‘suffering’ 
caused by the patriarchy of the ‘others’ (2017: 12). These narratives are 
both racist and sexist, since they divert sexism and sexualized violence 
into a cultural and personal problem of an othered group of men, while 
also using ascription and homogenization to characterize this group as 
inferior and dangerous based on a constructed culture of values. Ruth 
Wodak calls this combination of homogenization, dichotomous confron-
tation and characteristic ascription “neo-colonial sexism” (2015: 160). Sec-
ond, yet simultaneously, the externalization of misogyny, sexual violence 
and discrimination against “the others” allows the self-declared natives to 
8 | Speech by Alice Weidel in the Bundestag from May 16, 2018 (https://www.bundes 
tag.de/mediathek?videoid=7227207#url=L21lZGlhdGhla292ZXJsYXk/dmlkZW 
9pZD03MjI3MjA3&mod=mediathek).
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legitimize the complete exclusion of this foreign group. Demands for na-
tional exclusion and the deportation of a group that is under general sus-
picion can thus be rallied behind an alleged need to protect ‘our women’ 
and their rights to freedom, ‘our values’ and ‘our culture,’ along with the 
promise of restoring a peaceful society. Koray Yilmaz-Günay has shown 
how such strategies of argument are arranged around claims about civil 
rights and liberties: “The reference to the freedom of individual women 
(and today also: homosexuals) robs a patriarchal analysis of its contexts 
[…] in order to conceal systematic inequality and to bring disadvantaged 
groups into opposition to one another” (2013: 118). 
The FAR-RighT Cl Aim To hegemony in gendeR PoliTiCs 
Far-right gender politics make it possible to establish a social structure of 
inequality and standardization. Not only are exclusion and belonging es-
tablished through a misconstrual of gender, but these divisions also create 
a privileging and hierarchization within ‘the people’. Birgit Sauer points 
out that the far-right notion of natural gender inequality generates a gen-
eral idea of inequality within a people, which subsequently legitimizes a 
social subordination and superiority of some over the rest (2017: 13). By 
excluding gender inequality, attributing it to a group of ‘others’ on the one 
hand and constructing gender politics as a misguided and threatening 
gender ideology on the other, the AfD can convey its idea of gender or 
gender justice as the only right one for the people and as coming from the 
people. 
Behind this the AfD conceals its own concepts of inequality standard-
ization and privileging. They claim sovereignty over the interpretation of 
what the right idea of gender and gender justice should be. They try to 
control the definitions of gender, family, marriage and sexuality, as well as 
the family and gender politics that are subsequently constructed. It is a ba- 
lancing act between a pseudo-emancipatory coating that appears to protect 
women’s rights or puts female MPs at the forefront of gender issues, and 
anti-feminist positions that make women the object of national population 
politics. However, this balancing act allows space for the ambiguities and 
contents of a broad right-wing spectrum and at the same time enables the 
AfD to connect to the center of society. 
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This anti-feminist position in combination with ethnicized sexism is 
shared in Europe and North America by many far right actors. The in-
creased appearance of women as allies in the far right seems initially a 
welcome development, since they give movements and parties a ‘softer’ 
image, are considered less dangerous in mainstream discourse and thus 
cushion right-wing extremist content (Armstrong 2018). At the same time, 
they conflict with the notions of male supremacy within these groups, 
and are therefore only accepted if they advocate far-right content and do 
not develop emancipatory demands within the groups or publicly speak 
out against their assigned roles. The Anti-Defamation League (2018) pub-
lished an analysis of the link between misogyny and white supremacy, 
showing how the other side of gender politics makes a special alliance 
possible. Male supremacy is, in this case, closely linked to the fear of white 
men losing their privileges. The fear of this loss unites classic far-right 
groups with women-hating men’s rights groups in opposition to feminism 
and emancipatory gender roles. Similar to Sauer’s argument, the notion 
of natural gender inequality and the inferiority of women is a gateway to 
an ideological notion of the natural inequality among people, who white 
men are supposed to lead. Politics with gender works in many ways and 
on different levels; it is not a German phenomenon but one that is repre-
sented internationally.
ConClUsion
The AfD is only one of many anti-feminist actors in both Germany and 
Europe. Within Germany, the AfD can provide parliamentary backing for 
right-wing radical protest campaigns like Kandel ist überall where a wide 
range of far-right activists come together. They follow precisely the racist 
narratives about women’s rights, sexualized violence and migration that 
have been described above, and combine online campaigns with street 
protests and public events as part of an online and offline strategy. In 
addition to women’s rights and gender justice, the concept of feminism is 
here also reinterpreted in a racist and culturalizing way. Nevertheless, the 
terms, interpretations, narratives, language and images used are also re-
produced in mainstream media and debates, and become represented and 
shared by actors in non-right contexts. The public debate about New Year’s 
Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne is exemplary of this broad-spectrum alignment. 
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The increasing ethnicization of sexism we are witnessing now was also 
observed in earlier times (Jäger 2000). All of which shows that far-right 
politics offers a connecting space for these agendas, both in terms of its 
anti-feminism and familialism and in terms of the entanglement of sex-
ism and racism, in particular anti-Muslim racism. 
The aggressively conducted far-right culture war, with its new and old 
strategies and networks, presents democratic societies with a range of 
challenges. We must confront it online and offline and effectively counter 
the increasing normalization of far-right terms in and for public debates. 
Devaluation, discrimination, homogenization and hatred cannot be an 
‘opinion’ in a democratic debate. It is necessary to disagree as an indivi- 
dual, group, organization or association with these terms for debate, and 
to debate their naturalization of misleading definitions of key terms. But 
first, we need to develop and share a common knowledge of far-right nar-
ratives and methods. Gender politics must become a more visible and sig-
nificant aspect of our political battles. The acculturation of racist images 
linked to gender must be deconstructed, dismantling both the image of 
the ‘oppressed woman wearing headscarves’ as well as the ‘migrant perpe-
trator of violence.’ Narratives must be dealt with analytically. Ascription, 
homogenization and generalization must be identified and challenged. 
There needs to be a broad social debate about language and power. The 
aim may be to linguistically uncover far-right self-descriptions and terms, 
and to identify them for what they really are. The demand to construct 
appropriate meanings for key terms such as ‘women’s rights’ and ‘fe- 
minism’ should not be handed over to the far right and their interpreta-
tions. Instead, we still need intersectional perspectives that can enable us 
to conceptualize the links between racial and gender inequality as well as 
the racist appropriation of both. This means, for example, that sexualized 
violence cannot be addressed and politicized only if the perpetrators can 
be othered. Sexism must continue to be identified as a structural problem 
and not a personal and cultural problem of a particular group of men. Re-
sistance requires alliances, exchange and solidarity. Anti-racist positions 
and initiatives should not be positioned against feminist or queer content 
and groups. Both are affected by right-wing devaluations and attacks and 
can strengthen rather than divide each other. It is precisely in this way 
that effective and positive images of open, democratic coexistence within 
society can be created.
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The Far Right Across Borders  
Networks and Issues of (Trans)National Cooperation  
in Western Europe on Twit ter
Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh1
Historically, far-right activism2 has had a transnational dimension.3 More 
recently, across Europe, various far-right organizations including the Iden-
titarians and also the more established Italian Ligue have come together to 
promote continental campaigns targeting European borders and refugees. 
In an increasingly globalized world, information and communications 
technology plays a prominent role in fostering communication exchanges 
between far-right organizations across borders (Burris et al. 2000). More 
precisely, hashtags like #DefendEurope, #StopMigrantsAlpes or #chiu-
diamoiporti (let’s lock the harbors) underline the importance of Twitter 
in contemporary right-wing activism. Low costs and the opportunity to 
produce and rapidly spread user-generated content online should ease in-
ternational cooperation between like-minded groups, especially those that 
do not enjoy similar opportunities in other parts of the public (offline) 
sphere. This chapter analyzes transnational exchanges between audiences 
of far-right organizations on Twitter, comparing parties and social move-
ments across the borders of nation states.
1 | This chapter draws upon material from Froio/Ganesh (2018).
2 | The chapter uses the umbrella concept of far right to refer both to extreme 
and radical right populist organizations sharing nativism, authoritarianism and 
populism (Mudde 2007: 15–30) and encompassing political parties and social 
movement organizations. 
3 | For a discussion on the history of far-right transnationalism see Albanese/
Hierro 2016; Macklin 2013; Mammone 2015; Zuquete 2015.
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Defining the transnational aspect of far-right activism is not an easy 
task. Social movements literature distinguishes between transnational is-
sues, targets, and mobilization (Rucht 1999; Schain et al. 2002). We qual-
ify far-right activism as transnational when organizations from more than 
one country place similar discursive emphasis on particular issues. In our 
understanding, focusing on common issues (such as immigration or Eu-
ropean integration) is a preliminary step in the construction of the nec-
essary interpretative frames, i.e. interpretations of social reality elabora- 
ted by the leaders of organizations who orient activists’ actions (Snow/
Benford 1988; Castelli Gattinara 2017). In doing so, we do not claim that 
common issue attention is disconnected from other dimensions of trans-
nationalization or more important than the others. We simply argue that 
focusing on similar issues provides a fertile ground for other forms of 
mobilization and organizational cooperation across national contexts. 
While existing studies dealing with progressive movements show that 
Twitter facilitates transnational mobilization and frames (Castells 2012; 
Gerbaudo 2012), to the best of our knowledge no systematic study exists 
that accounts for the way in which Twitter might ease the construction of a 
transnational discourse between parties and movements on the far right. 
Here, we focus on retweets across country borders, which we understand 
as signs of transnational discourses (more on this below). To do so in an 
evidence-based way, this chapter relies on a dataset collated by us (Froio/
Ganesh 2018) on the activities and audiences of far-right Twitter users in 
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
dATA And me Thods
Although established and less established far-right organizations of the 
sort we studied are active in the four countries, the configuration of the 
far-right spectrum in each differs. While France and Italy host two of 
the most electorally successful and long-lived radical right populist par-
ties (the Front National and the Ligue respectively), in Germany and 
the United Kingdom the far right has experienced only modest electoral 
performances so far (for instance, the National Front then British Na-
tional Party in the UK) and the success they have enjoyed has mainly 
been achieved recently (like the Alternative for Germany). Less estab-
lished far- right organizations like movements and other loose groups 
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are particularly active in Italy and France, where political opportunity 
structures for the far right have been shown to be more open than in 
Germany and the UK.4 
To begin with, based on official reports and secondary literature by 
scholars and watchdog organizations, we built an initial purposive sam-
ple, identifying the most important far-right actors (e.g. established and 
non-established organizations, as well as individuals related to them) that 
are active in the four countries and that use Twitter. Subsequently, we 
built a network graph of Twitter users that retweeted one of our selected 
far-right accounts more than five times. Retweeting is a function on the 
platform that allows a user to share another’s Tweet with their own follow-
ers. While there are debates about whether retweeting constitutes support 
for a cause or a statement, it is the best available metric for identifying us-
ers that seek to engage with far-right discourse by embedding themselves 
in a particular discursive context (Murthy 2012a; Boyd, et al. 2010). Many 
who seek to disrupt a far-right group on Twitter might follow its account, 
but retweeting such content and sharing it with their own set of followers 
suggests that a user is using their political agency to broadcast an idea 
or statement (Bruns/Stieglitz 2012; Williams/Burnap 2016: 215; Murthy 
2012b: 7). Thus, the retweet resonates with the user retweeting it and that 
they have a desire for the message to reach other users of the platform 
(Halavais 2014). Retweets, then, allow us to explore the resonance of the 
messages of a given user. 
Finally, we analyzed the content of retweets that remained within the 
national community and retweets that did not to identify the types of con-
tent that are most likely to garner transnational audiences. Because our 
data spans far-right content from 2016 and 2017, we are able to go beyond 
specific issues and analyze discourse trends over time rather than those 
that centre around specific events.5
4 | For a discussion of this trend, see Castelli Gattinara/Pirro (2018).
5 | For fur ther methodological details please refer to Froio/Ganesh (2018). 
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ResUlTs 
How transnational is the far right on Twitter? Figure 1 shows how complex 
the far-right network is, including accounts belonging to far-right parties 
(like the party Forza Nuova), social movements (UKPegida), grassroots 
groups (Riposte Laïque), and far-right leaders (Marine Le Pen Officiel). 
The far-right network includes 6,454 nodes representing unique Twit-
ter users. Each edge in the graph represents a retweet. There were 2,398 
unique tweets authored by the named nodes which were retweeted 55,983 
times in total. Of these retweets, only 1,617 retweets were identified as 
transnational (in term of content).
To begin the investigation, we explored whether the network could be par-
titioned into communities that represented each of the countries sampled, 
in different colors in Figure 1. Using a community detection algorithm 
(Blondel et al. 2008), four communities emerged corresponding to each of 
the four countries from which we had gathered samples. Nodes that have 
edges between one or more communities – and were consequently located 
between clusters in the graph – are identified as transnational retweeters. 
The results appear in Table 1.
Figure 1: Far-right retweets network, 2016 and 2017. From left to right: Italy, 
France, Germany, UK (Froio/Ganesh 2018). 
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Type of  
retweet
Initiator Total
  Party Movement  
National 1099 45.83% 1299 54.17% 2398
Transnational 411 51.83% 382 48.17% 793
Total 1510 47.32% 1681 52.68% 3191
National and transnational far-right retweets by parties and movements 
Source: Froio/Ganesh 2018 
The results show that most retweets stayed within country borders and 
so were intranationally connected. Thus, far-right transnationalization, at 
least as it regards its audiences’ willingness to retweet, is a relatively rare 
phenomenon and accounts for less than 3% of activity in the filtered net-
work. There are 2,398 unique tweets, of which 793 were retweeted by a 
user belonging to a different national community. A small majority of the 
tweets are authored by accounts of individuals belonging to far-right social 
movements or the official accounts of movements themselves. 
We then shifted to examine the issues that are more likely to garner at-
tention and retweets from transnational audiences. To address this ques-
tion, we qualitatively analyzed the content of the tweets to identify the 
interpretative frames accompanying transnational issue focus between 
parties and movements. In other words, we are interested in understan- 
ding which arguments are chosen by political actors to justify their posi-
tions and mobilize activists and supporters transnationally. Of all issues, 
it seems tweets that reflect anti-immigration and economic discourses are 
more likely to gain traction beyond the national context.
To begin with, the importance attributed to immigration in transna-
tional retweets is hardly surprising and it mirrors broader offline tenden-
cies. In his seminal 2007 study, Cas Mudde suggested that nativism – i.e. 
xenophobic nationalism – is indeed a core ideological feature of the far 
right, despite the heterogeneity that characterizes this side of the poli- 
tical spectrum. More precisely, it is an ideology that wants congruence 
between the state (a political unit) and nation (a cultural unit). Nativists 
want a state for every nation and one nation for every state. They perceive 
all non-natives (people or ideas) as threatening (2007: 18–20). Still, by ana- 
lyzing the content of tweets in this category, it appears that, at least in 
our sample, nativism is driven far more by Islamophobia than by other 
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forms of xenophobic and exclusionary nationalism. Although other mi-
norities are mentioned (such as Roma people in Italy) or vaguely referred 
to as “asylum seekers”, Muslims are targeted most vehemently. They are 
described by two main interpretative frames, positioning Muslims as a 
cultural threat to the West or as security threats.
To portray Muslims as a threat in cultural terms, tweets emphasize a 
classic fear of cultural invasion and replacement. The transnational form 
of such a discourse is well illustrated in a tweet from UKPegida, ideolog-
ically related to its sister organization Pegida in Germany. The tweet in-
cludes a video of an allegedly Muslim preacher shouting about an Islamic 
takeover in a city square. UKPegida posted the video with the following 
text: “Islamic cleric in Germany warns Germans at a city square: Sharia 
Law is coming. ‘Yr [your] daughters will marry Muslims.’” Reminiscent of 
Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilizations and by civilizationist un-
derstandings of national identities (Brubaker 2017), in this worldview the 
‘West’ is portrayed as vulnerable to the invading Muslims and their pur-
ported plan to institute Islamic law in Europe. Islam is described as being 
homogeneous, inherently fundamentalist, and as a “religion cum ideolo-
gy” (Mudde 2007: 84). This frame incorporates liberal and civic character-
istics of national identity such as women’s rights, animal well-being and 
halal slaughter, and LGBTQ rights to paradoxically present the far-right 
actors as the only ‘authentic’ defenders of the nation’s reputation for tol-
erance (Froio 2018; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). In March 2017, referring to 
a morning radio broadcast, Marine Le Pen provides an example of such a 
frame, quoting herself in a tweet: “I defend women’s rights in the face of 
fundamentalist Islam. I am, by the way, the only candidate to speak about 
this problem.” 
Such stereotypes are well documented in literature on far-right dis-
course (Virchow 2016; Berntzen/Weisskircher 2016). What our findings 
add is that Islamophobia and anti-Muslim claims are more frequent in 
transnational rather than in national retweets. Given the well document-
ed links between anti-Muslim ideologues in the US and Europe (Bail 
2015), we demonstrate that Islamophobia is a cornerstone of the produc-
tion of transnational far-right social movements and parties. Beyond cul-
ture-based prejudices, tweets often relate Muslims to domestic security 
threats, most notably terrorism, but also frame them as criminals and 
violent sexual deviants. One tweet from UKPegida referred to migrants as 
“rapefugees” with photographs of a march in 2016 that protested “migrant 
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sex attacks”. While ‘Muslims’ are not mentioned specifically in the tweet, 
the implication is clear from Pegida’s counter-jihad stance that this is spe-
cifically a ‘Muslim’ problem. In response to an article about prominent 
British celebrities signing an open letter calling for migrant children to be 
rescued from the Calais ‘jungle’, the British National Party reiterated this 
discourse more explicitly: “How many jihadi rapists will these hypocrites 
be welcoming into their homes…I bet a £ to a penny it will be none.” This 
is characteristic of the ways in which Islamophobia is at the core of far-
right animosity toward migrants, as when they ask why it is that British 
police do not prosecute the ‘Muslims’ who they idenitify as ‘jihadi rapists’. 
The allegation that rape, molestation, and crime are natural, inherent ten-
dencies for Muslims is repeated frequently in far-right discourse (Awan 
2016; Tell MAMA 2014; Tufail/Poynting 2016).
A third emphasis of the transnational tweets is put on the economy. 
The economy has traditionally been part of far-right discourses, however it 
does not constitute an ideological priority for these actors. As illustrated by 
Mudde (2007: 119–137), over time far-right parties do not hold a coherent 
position on the dominant state-market axis even if these organizations 
may differ somewhat with respect to their economic program (Betz 1994; 
Betz/Johnson 2004; Kitschelt/McGann 1997). In the same way, third-
way ideologies associated with programs that reject both the free market 
and the state economy are common among far-right movements but not 
shared by all of them (Albanese/Hierro 2016). In the tweets, we find a ma-
jor interpretative frame through which the economy features at the core 
of far-right transnational concerns: economic nativism. Just as it happens 
offline, also online such organizations use their economic programs in a 
nativist way, assuming that the economy is not a goal in itself but only a 
means at the service of the interests of the (native) nation. In accord with 
this framework, in the tweets, economic procedures concerning budgets, 
labor and industrial development should serve only the economic interest 
of the country. This economic nativist rhetoric is particularly evident in a 
tweet referring to a speech from Marine Le Pen calling for economic pro-
tection of the nation’s sovereignty after the eurocrisis, stressing that the 
French want to decide their own economic fate rather than face anything 
imposed by foreign pressure. This interpretation is particularly the case 
for organizations coming from the so-called tradition of the Social Right 
(Destra Sociale) in Italy and France, like the party Fratelli d’Italia and the 
100 Caterina Froio and Bharath Ganesh
Front National, as well as the less established extreme-right groups, like 
CasaPound Italia and Egalitè et Reconciliation. 
On the matter of economic nativism, our results confirm previous 
findings about far-right transnationalism offline (Macklin 2013) and 
online (Caiani/Kröll 2015). What our data adds is that, compared to the 
national level, at the transnational level the economy is described more 
and more in nativist political terms rather than merely economic ones. In 
other words, if there is a form of economic discourse that is likely to favor 
the construction of a transnational far-right discourse, it is less about the 
state-market dichotomy tout court than about a political and nativist inter-
pretation of this economic cleavage. This in turn might ultimately lead to 
incoherent economic positions that are sufficiently free-market to appeal 
to petty bourgeois supporters while simultaneously arguing to increase 
welfare spending to avoid alienating support by the working-class. 
In sum, our discourse analysis reveals that two main interpretative 
frames operate as unifying factors for the far right in Western Europe: the 
idea of a ‘civilizational conflict’ that targets Muslims, which has cultural 
and security dimensions, and nativist economics, which is associated with 
the state and/or market-based protection of the economic interests of the 
native population by those in power.
Finally, it is important to highlight that in our dataset the category 
of ‘Electoral Politics’ does not receive much attention in transnational 
retweets. This category includes general references – with no policy con-
tent – to domestic political opponents, and electoral debates. Although 
this is a rather crude measure for ‘populism’, it appears that anti- 
establishment tweets are less frequent than anti-Muslim ones. While pop-
ulist tendencies might be prevalent in the national discourses of these 
groups, their development of international audiences depends on their 
politicization of Islamophobic feelings.
so whAT?
This chapter has explored a dimension of far-right politics that is surpris-
ingly neglected in an otherwise rich literature: the transnational efforts 
of parties, movements, and organizations on Twitter. We considered four 
Western European democracies to examine how these audiences share 
information, map salient issues and explore interpretative frames that 
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favour transnational exchanges despite differences in the configurations 
of the far-right spectrums in each of those countries. To do so we used 
Twitter data. 
We illustrated that while the internet may provide the far right with 
better opportunities for exchanges (Davey/Ebner 2017), far-right transna-
tionalism on Twitter is moderate at best, and it depends on issue focus. 
Our network analysis has shown that the number of cross-border retweets 
is particularly limited, suggesting that far-right Twitter activity remains 
mostly intranational.
As for issue focus, the qualitative content analysis shows that the issue 
emphasized in any tweet plays a key role in whether it gets shared trans-
nationally or not. We found that tweets that reflect two issues have the 
greatest likelihood of becoming transnational: anti-immigration and the 
economy. More than immigration in general, it is an opposition to Islam 
and Muslim minorities, based on arguments referring to cultural differ-
ence and security, that garners cross-border attention for far-right social 
media content. As far-right anti-Muslim prejudices are well-established 
in previous research, our results add that Islamophobia seems to be the 
transnational glue of these networks, bringing together extremely hetero-
geneous organizations operating in different political systems.
For future analyses, it might be worth re-evaluating the relative im-
portance of nativism and populism on the far right and their combina-
tion at the transnational level at least. Given the resonance of Islamopho-
bic tropes in these discourses, reference to such organizations as simply 
‘populist’ might obscure the nativist and specifically anti-Muslim beliefs 
that underlie their ideologies and that may fuel their anti-establishment 
critiques. In addition, the description of the economy in nativist (rather 
than just economic) terms is also favoured in transnational exchanges on 
Twitter. At that level, the economy is politicized by describing economic 
programs as catalyzers of the interests of native people. Here again an-
ti-migrant nativist arguments prevail over economic ones, or (at least) en-
compass them. Hence, more than the state-market dichotomy in general, 
the far right speaks about protectionism or neoliberalism to preserve the 
nation’s economic interests, at least in our sample. New studies may use 
our data to investigate how economic issues are framed in more detail, 
also in relation with European integration, and may hopefully disentangle 
similarities and differences between left and right organizations.
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Although interesting for specialists on far-right politics and the inter-
net, these results are likely to be affected by at least three major shortcom-
ings of our research. First, our ‘minimal’ definition of transnationalism 
focused exclusively on common issue emphasis across state borders. Fu-
ture contributions might expand it to account simultaneously for other 
dimensions of transnational activism by the far right, such as targeting 
and mobilization. This major emphasis on issue focus, organizational 
types and analyzing interpretative frames to explain far-right transnation-
alism pushed us to downplay other important factors connected with the 
ideological differences and divisions between extreme and radical right 
populist organizations. Second, this chapter does not consider that there 
may be obstacles to far-right transnationalism online, such as language 
differences and attempts by governments and tech companies to count-
er extreme content. Finally, any future contributions which include more 
countries may integrate our inferences with others to account (more accu-
rately) for political opportunity structures both online and offline. These 
and other related research questions that arise from our work could fur-
ther benefit from comparisons with other social media platforms (e.g., 
Facebook or Youtube) and in-depth studies of users’ profiles.
Despite these limitations, what we have shown is the limited trans-
national potential of the far right on Twitter. At least in Western Europe, 
the idea of a ‘dark international’ is far from reality, even when consid-
ering social media, which are commonly described as ‘perfect’ habitats 
for radicalization. The ideological and organizational heterogeneity that 
characterizes this side of the political spectrum appears to be too big to be 
overcome, even virtually. Indeed, only two issues appear to be able to build 
transnational audiences: opposition to Muslims and opposition to ‘anti- 
native’ economic programs. Transnational counteraction should probably 
invest energy in creating counter-narratives to these specific issues, issues 
that the far-right’s discourses demonstrate an increasingly hegemonic 
stance regarding.
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Zine Publishing and the Polish Far Right
Kaja Marczewska
The rise of the far right in Poland during the last decade has been chilling. 
The 60,000-strong controversial Independence Day march in Warsaw in 
2017 – called “a beautiful sight” by Mariusz Błaszczak, the Interior Min-
ister (Chrzczonowicz 2017), and “a great march of patriots” by one of the 
state-owned TV stations1 – was the subject of extensive coverage in the 
Western media. The march was not an isolated incident but a culmination 
of the far right’s growing strength Poland today. Incidents such as setting 
fire to a flat occupied by a Chechen family in 2013 in Białystok, the stoning 
of a Yemeni doctor and his son in Toruń in 2016, and the violent assault of 
a black female passenger by two ticket inspectors on a bus in Bydgoszcz in 
2017 are increasingly becoming an everyday occurrence in the country. A 
Polish NGO, the Centre for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobic Behavior, 
reports that as many as 100 racist incidents are logged by the organization 
daily (Dulkowski 2017).
In this context, diverse forms of publishing and circulating informa-
tion serve as an important tool for promoting far-right ideology. For ex-
ample, Blood and Honour, an international far-right network very active 
in Poland, regularly releases online lists, the so-called ‘redwatch’ lists, 
of individuals identified as future targets for attacks. In 2017, Młodzież 
Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth) – a prominent far-right youth organiza-
tion – circulated a collection of fabricated death certificates for a number 
of Polish city mayors, whose future demise would be apocryphally based 
on their continued support of ‘liberalism, multiculturalism, and stupid-
ity’, i.e. the mayors’ readiness to offer support for refugees. Online plat-
1 | Wiadomości TVP (2017): “Szkalują patriotów, gardzą Polakami”, 13 No- 
vember 2017 (http://wiadomosci.tvp.pl/34794068/szkaluja-patriotow-gardza- 
polakami).
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forms and periodicals focusing on far-right content are also increasingly 
popular. For example, Nacjonalista.pl, Poland’s most prominent far-right 
online publication, enjoys 270,000 clicks and 100,000 individual page 
visitors per month and Szczerbieniec, a radical nationalist monthly, is 
published in 4000–5000 copies per issue. Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski 
(NOP/National Rebirth of Poland), an ultranationalist political party, runs 
a successful online bookstore selling far-right books, music, and perio- 
dicals. 
While, predictably, publishing online is the most common form of far-
right communication today, in Poland an unusual phenomenon of far-
right zine publishing constitutes an important and an increasingly prolific 
sphere of activity. A report published in 2012 by the Polish Ministry of the 
Interior identified zines as one of the tactics that most contribute to the 
threat posed by far-right organizations in Poland.2 Zines were listed in the 
report alongside music concerts, marches and demonstrations, as well as 
maintenance of internet forums and websites as means of far-right com-
munity building. This chapter explores the parallel resurgence of far-right 
nationalism and DIY forms of publishing since the change of the politi-
cal system in Poland in 1989. It draws on these recent histories of Polish 
radical nationalism and self-publishing to explore the ways in which zine 
culture has been co-opted by the far right today. It focuses in particular on 
the use of print as a tool of organizing and consolidating groups already 
strongly embedded in far-right circles to suggest that the very limitations 
of zines as a media form make them an important and useful safe space 
for radicalization and far-right community enlargement.
zines And UndeRgRoUnd PUblishing in Pol And
Zines are a unique form of publishing. They are handmade, self-published, 
non-commercial, small-run periodicals, usually photocopied, character-
ized by a cut-and-paste aesthetic and amateur feel. They tend to be dis-
tributed through independent networks, often bartered rather than sold. 
Stephen Duncombe (2008) traces zines back to the 1930s North American 
2 | Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (2012): “Raport o Stanie Bezpieczenistwa w 
Polsce w 2011”, (https://mil.link/instytut/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Raport 
_o_stanie_bezpieczenstwa_w_Polsce_w_2011_roku.pdf).
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fanzines, self-published at the time by the science fiction community, but 
they are best known as a product of the 1970s’ punk scene. Evocative of its 
DIY ethos and defiance of the commercial and mainstream media, zines 
helped to perform that community’s commitment to radical, often anar-
chist politics. The punk heritage heavily informs the approach to cultural 
production represented in zines: zine publishing not only works outside 
of the market, it actively opposes its logic, working against the corporate 
media and the culture of late capitalism. As such, it is also implicitly as-
sociated with predominantly left-wing politics. Zines tend to explore sub-
jects as wide ranging as environmental justice, body image, the housing 
crisis, and queer sex, alongside everyday interests approached from points 
of view that interest readerships with unusual tastes, often covering topics 
unacceptable or of little concern to mainstream publications. Although 
many zines are not focused on politics per se, the great majority explicitly 
support political agendas that show allegiances with, and active support 
for, the working class, the marginalized, and the disenfranchised.
The formation of a popular and widespread far-right zine culture in 
Poland seems antithetical to strategies of zine publishing. But in this un-
usual appropriation of the form, the phenomenon is perhaps symptomatic 
of the broader history of zines in the Polish context. This history differs 
quite significantly from the familiar narratives of their USA and UK-based 
equivalents. Until 1989, a strict censorship regime was in place in Poland, 
which made publishing independently almost impossible. Offset prin-
ting, a relatively cheap method widely available in the West by the 1980s, 
was, before the fall of communism, only available in Poland to state- 
supported organizations and so beyond reach for most groups interested 
in the cultural underground. At the time when corner Xerox shops were 
emerging on an unprecedented scale in the USA – a phenomenon that 
exerted huge impact on surrounding zine communities (Eichhorn 2016) – 
the few Xerox machines available to the general public in Poland from late 
1980s onwards were also controlled heavily by the state censorship appa-
ratus. Although officially all publications in print runs of up to 100 copies 
were not subject to censorship – a legislation loophole readily exploited by 
early Polish zinesters – independent publishers attempting to copy their 
work were often refused the service by copy shop owners. 
In spite of – or perhaps precisely because of – the limited and highly 
controlled access to cheap reproduction technologies, a rich underground 
publishing culture emerged in Poland at the time. The underground it-
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self, however, developed into two distinct strands. Publishing in the com-
munist People’s Republic of Poland was organized into the so-called first, 
second, and third circulations. The first circulation included all publica-
tions that were approved by the authorities and supported the political 
status quo, and the second and third circulation was constituted by the 
opposition and spheres of independent publishing (Dunin-Wąsowich/
Varga 1995; Sławiński 2000; Pęczak 1988). The second circulation, which 
emerged in the 1970s, included publishing activities most typically asso-
ciated with the political opposition at the time but also illegally worked 
to ‘supplement’ the first circulation by publishing and distributing 
banned books including works by George Orwell and Milan Kundera as 
well as Polish oppositional authors, such as Tadeusz Konwicki (Doucette 
2018). Although actively resisted by the censorship apparatus, it was well 
established by the 1980s, operating widely known publishing houses and 
sophisticated, semi-official distribution networks. 
Unlike second circulation publishing, third circulation was decen-
tralized, self-organized, and relied on strategies of self-publishing that 
gave rise to what could be described as a Polish zine culture. As a pub-
lishing movement, third circulation formed at least in part in response 
to the activities of second circulation. It was associated with alternative 
movements, punk – somewhat belatedly arriving in Poland in the early 
1980s – and publishing that was not focused on exploring political topics 
(although, similarly to zines more broadly, it was always politically moti-
vated). The publishing communities associated with third circulation did 
not support the government and its politics, but they did not look favorably 
at the second circulation either, which they saw as the new establishment 
(Dunin-Wąsowich/Varga 1995: 228).
For both second and third circulation, however, publishing outside of 
the mainstream was a necessity rather than a choice. The political system 
and then the introduction of Marshall Law in 1981 in particular, which 
strengthened censorship and imposed further limitations on personal 
freedoms, were a natural context for zine publishing to develop, even if 
the system they opposed was radically different from the environment 
that gave rise to zines in the first place. A gradual relaxing of the political 
system in the years leading up to 1989 meant that increasingly small print 
run self-publishing was becoming a possibility in Poland. This transfor-
mation subsequently led to an explosion of independent publishing in the 
1990s. 
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zines And The Polish FAR RighT
In 2001, an anthology of Polish zines was published – the first comprehen-
sive attempt at addressing this form of publishing in the Polish context.3 
The anthology included information about 1,000 underground publica-
tions created after 1989. In the introduction, Dariusz Ciosmak, its editor, 
foregrounds his focus on publications addressing questions of anarchism, 
antifascism, music, ecology, and animal rights, i.e. topics typically asso-
ciated with zine publishing. Ciosmak also explicitly stresses his lack of 
interest in, and intentional exclusion of, zines produced by the far right 
(2001: 3). This declaration and the absence of far-right zines in the anthol-
ogy is perhaps the most telling statement on the complex makeup of the 
contemporary Polish zine scene. It is an acknowledgement of the unusual 
but active presence of these far-right publications in the country’s under-
ground publishing circles. 
Zines have been a communication method used by the Polish far right 
for some time now. Their appropriation of the zine form can be attributed 
to two parallel histories: the transformation of the public sphere, includ-
ing the print and publishing sectors, in the early years of transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, and transformations of the far right in Poland 
during the same period. The fall of communism and the change in the 
political system meant, among other things, the opening of borders, the 
introduction of the free market, the end of censorship, and the reintroduc-
tion to Poland of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom 
of organization.
The consequences of these dramatic changes were many. A new influx 
of media from the West meant new forms of access to all sorts of publi-
cations, both mainstream and underground. In this new political reality, 
the Polish underground, as it operated before 1989, lost its purpose and 
ceased to exist, with books distributed by second circulation now entering 
the mainstream and many third circulation publications transforming 
into official though independent publishers. New access to technology 
and print (paper could now be purchased legally, materials reproduced in 
unlimited and uncensored copies) also lead to an enthusiastic explosion 
3 | The title of this compilation is a misnomer. The publication is a lexicon of short 
entries about zines rather than an anthology. It remains, however, a useful and 
most comprehensive source of information about zines in Poland to date.
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of new forms of independent publishing at the time. Kajtoch estimates 
that by 1995, 1800 new publications were created (2006: 55–56). But as 
the new official, independent publishing culture was forming, so was a 
new underground. In the 1990s, there was a legal zine scene in Poland 
– i.e. publications which were registered and allocated an ISBN number, 
transforming from zines into small, independent magazines – and an il-
legal one – i.e. publications operating as zines, without ISBN registration 
and so, according to then new Polish legislation, in breach of the trade 
laws (Flont 2018: 159). The new underground, however, unlike its censored 
equivalent pre-1989, was allowed to operate freely and the limitations of 
trade laws were not exercised with respect to very small publishers. This 
state of affairs opened space for a rich and diverse zine scene in 1990s 
Poland. 
The systemic transformations in the early 1990s also led to an almost 
instantaneous proliferation of new subcultural activities and youth organi-
zations, including far-right groups, who were almost entirely stifled before 
1989 but who grew in strength rapidly at the time. Marta Polaczek (2006) 
explains that immediately after the fall of communism, it was the political 
left that was the focus of widespread attention. Fears of post-communist 
left-wing organizations growing in strength again meant that little to no 
attention was paid to the activities of the quickly expanding far right. In 
the 1990s, the focus of far-right organizations was on creating a pan-Slav-
ic program, driven by pagan and racist ideologies. A commitment to an 
ethnically-Polish, white community that heavily informed this far-right 
revival was a consequence of the long history of Polish nationalism, with 
its roots in 123 years of partitions,4 the restoration of the independent Po-
lish state in 1918, and the establishment, as a result of the events of World 
War II with its territorial changes and forced migration, of an ethnically 
homogenous Polish state in 1945. This revival of far-right organizations 
after the transition was geared in the early years towards establishing new 
organizational structures and expanding and strengthening their com-
munity of supporters. The appropriation of zine publishing was part of 
this program. 
4 | Three annexations of Polish territory in the 18th century by Habsburg Austria, 
Prussia and Russia which resulted in the elimination of sovereign Poland and Lithu- 
ania (at the time the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) for 123 years. 
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The turn to zines was a directly oppositional response to liberal left-
wing activities and publications, both those continuing the work of third 
circulation titles and the rapidly proliferating new ones. The expansion of 
diverse forms of self-publishing at the time served as an important means 
of accessing the younger population at a crucial moment in the country’s 
socio-cultural development. To the re-emerging far right, this was a key 
priority. For them, zine publishing in the early 1990s was a means of par-
taking in this new subcultural environment. The logic of this approach 
was simple: left-wing, progressive and liberal groups had zines, and so 
right-wing communities had to have zines too. 
The publications of far-right groups discussed here have been referred 
to as zines by their creators since the early 1990s. Like their left-wing 
equivalents, these developed from third circulation publications and were 
disseminated without an ISBN number (second circulation far-right pub-
lishing also existed before 1989, including, for example, Jestem Polakiem [I 
am a Pole], a magazine published by NOP since 1983, transformed in 1992 
into an official, registered magazine). But, typically, the far-right zines of 
the transition period lacked the collage, cut-and-paste aesthetics or zines’ 
characteristic DIY feel. Their makers took little interest in the broader 
aesthetics and politics of the form itself. For reasons described above, the 
character of the zine was only tentatively appropriated by far-right com-
munities to promote and consolidate, somewhat under the radar, their 
ideology. White Storm, for example, a skinhead zine created in the early 
1990s, was produced on a desktop computer. Its pages were set using a 
relatively large font and its text was spaced out to make it easily legible 
(unlike a typical zine, often messy and difficult to decipher due to its lay-
out and design). In its design and feel White Storm was akin to an amateur 
independent magazine, but due to its unregistered status and the models 
of distribution it relied on, it operated as a zine. Its aesthetic was explicitly 
and unambiguously a manifestation of a far-right sensibility. The pages 
of White Storm included ornamental margins into which the Othala rune 
was incorporated, a symbol used by Nazis, as a reference to Aryan heri-
tage. This use of Nazi symbolism on pages of far-right zines was frequent, 
as was the incorporation of numerical codes applied to communicate far-
right messages (e.g. 18 for Hitler, 88 for ‘Heil Hitler’ as well as David 
Lane’s 88 Precepts), symbols all easily identified by the community these 
zines were aimed at, and identifying them almost instantaneously as rad-
ical publications. This approach remains prominent in far-right zines to-
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day, which maintain a similar aesthetic and rely on the same forms of 
symbolic communication. 
Since the 2011 parliamentary elections there has been a continuous 
movement of far-right ideology in Poland from the margins into the 
mainstream. Tomasz Słupik (2009) associates this recent re-emergence 
of right-wing radicals in Eastern Europe more broadly with what he de-
scribes as post-transformation trauma. Poland’s aspirations since 1990 
have been heavily influenced by a vision of an idealized Western order 
that the country was hoping to adopt. But this vision has proven to be an 
impossible dream and has only been realized in part. The far right today 
often draws on this disappointment, to accuse the EU, liberalism, and ref-
ugees of what they see as major failures in the process of systemic change. 
This perception of post-1989 transformations has been an important trig-
ger for the turn towards the right in Polish politics during the last decade. 
Inevitably, an increasingly widespread support for right-wing ideology le-
gitimizes the activities of radical groups, including radical publishers. But 
the content that might have, ten years ago, only been published via zines 
or dedicated online forums, has today entered our everyday discourses. 
Thrust into this context, the underground character of zines also chang-
es. These publications are now not a tool of propaganda and a means of 
communicating messages otherwise invisible in the mainstream, but 
rather a form of community building and inter-group association. Where-
as far-right zines in the early 1990s served as one of the tools employed 
to re-introduce the far right in the public imagination, today they serve 
an altogether different purpose. Utilized first and foremost as an internal 
communication method, these zines are designed to maintain an already 
established network. 
This focus on community, which was prominent in a different sense 
for underground, sub- and counter-cultural groups before, is today cen-
tral to the general aim of mainstreaming the extreme ideologies in which 
Polish far-right zines play a part. The approach is typical for zines more 
broadly, which are, Chris Atton explains, “primarily concerned with the 
object of their attention” (2001: 54) and as a result often serve as a means 
of building and maintaining an alternative community. According to At-
ton, a zine “is dialogical in intent and offers itself as a token for social re-
lation” (2001: 55). Today, Polish far-right zines are less a space for reading 
and writing and more a tool for community formation. Their capacity to 
connect is important not only as a tool for networking; it is also a tool for 
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establishing the agency of community members. It demonstrates a simple 
model of making and sharing in which they can actively participate by 
self-publishing. Such actor-participants have the capacity to co-create the 
culture of far-right nationalism by engaging in this form of publishing, 
not just as readers but also as publishers. 
What emerges, then, from the pages of these zines, is a sense of col-
lective and highly homogenous identity and a sense of a community that 
speaks in a unified voice. Characteristic distinctions between different 
far-right groups are almost entirely obscured on the pages of their zines 
and as a result neo-Nazi, Pagan, and skinhead zines, for example, tend to 
be strikingly similar both in their design and content. This approach is a 
direct outcome of the role zines play within far-right communities. It also 
speaks to the ways in which far-right supporters tend to create their iden-
tity, as individuals and communities, always constructed in opposition to 
any form of diversity and difference. However, its manifestations in the 
Polish context are unusual insofar as contemporary Poland is one of the 
most ethnically homogenous European countries, and ethnic minorities 
as well as immigrant communities are almost non-existent.5 As Daniel 
Płatek suggests, this ethnic homogeneity means that the Polish far-right’s 
attitude grows out of historical resentment (e.g. antisemitism, anti-Ger-
man sentiments) and is not formed in a direct response to the makeup of 
contemporary Polish society (2015: 4). As a result, Płatek argues, the Polish 
far right today relies on creating an ‘enemy’ for itself, fabricating a tar-
get of hate that is almost always absent from its immediate environment. 
The Polish far-right’s approach, then, is deeply rooted in an understand-
ing of a traditional national identity, defined through Catholicism, Polish 
language and Polish ethnicity, and a commitment to traditional values, 
including familial bonds and religion. Central to the contemporary far 
right in Poland, is a certain historical nostalgia for the interwar nationalist 
programs and an idealized vision of a patriotic Poland that once was.
5 | Both a recent Polish census and a 2017 Eurostat survey suggest that only 0,2 
of Poland’s residents are of a nationality other than Polish. In this ninth most high-
ly populated country in Europe of over 38m people, there are estimated 30,000 
Muslims, 30,000 Asians, and ca. 5,000 people of African descent, making Poland 
one of the least diverse countries in the world. James D. Fearon’s (2003) diversity 
study places Poland among the bottom 10 out of 160 studied countries in the 
world with respect of diversity. 
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The homogeneity that far-right zines are characterized by and seek to 
promote is counter to what could be described as the radical differencing 
of traditional zine communities, which, as a phenomenon, are committed 
to a project of creating spaces for a great diversity of voices to be heard. 
This tension in the way the zine form is used by the far right is a direct 
result of its appropriation, one that is inherently antithetical to the ideo-
logical project that informed the emergence of the zine phenomenon in 
the first place. The imagined and fabricated context for an exclusionist, 
racist, nationalist cause makes publications such as the far-right zines so 
much more important to mainstream politics than traditional zines. In 
their appropriated, unified voice they become a space where a common or 
consistent ‘enemy’ can easily be constructed, a space that makes it possi-
ble to create imaginary communities made up of those enemies against 
whom the right-wing groups can position themselves. In the context of the 
Polish far right, the role of publication is central to making the communi-
ty a community in the first place.
The inVisible CommUniT y
Unlike publishing formats that are easily accessible online by a range of 
readers, regardless of their political views, access to these zines is limited 
to those who are already ‘in the know’ due to their small print runs and 
dependence on direct distribution. Whereas ‘traditional’ contemporary 
zines, which in their celebration of print, the zine fair, and the indepen-
dent niche bookshop, also embrace the digital sphere as a tool of circu-
lation and a means of reaching communities far beyond their local net-
works, contemporary far-right zines remain somewhat outside of digital 
distribution channels.6 Their visibility online is limited and any means of 
accessing and sourcing copies of current or past issues are often ambigu-
ous or obscured. These small publications are sometimes mentioned on 
portals such as Nacjonlista.pl., referred to earlier, but access to them is 
unambiguously reserved to far-right supporters who already participate in 
6 | There are, of course, exceptions, and a sub-phenomenon of far-right e-zines 
also exists in Poland. Published and distributed exclusively online, these publi-
cations however, are rare and a not representative of the broader far-right zine 
phenomenon today. 
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far-right networks. They are often made available during football match-
es, right-wing marches, and dedicated far-right gatherings. This relative 
invisibility to any general public is a conscious choice made by the far-
right zine publishers and not a failure on their part. It is an important 
manifestation of the role the medium itself plays among the communities 
it speaks to. 
This is not to say that right-wing zine communities are invisible online. 
A lot of contemporary far-right zines develop out of or are published along-
side a website or a forum. The football fan zine, Droga Legionisty, supported 
by a prominent online platform is a good example. But the content pub-
lished in zines tends to be unique to their pages and is rarely made avail-
able via online channels. This turn to self-publishing in print in the context 
of the far-right’s active online presence is key to developing a characteristic 
aesthetic and discourse; it allows for an unfiltered conversation about ideas 
that would be considered controversial at best in the mainstream. The lim-
ited nature of zine circulation, then, creates a space for the use of more 
extreme ideas, language, and imagery, unconstrained by the norms and 
standards that still dictate the mainstream’s boundaries, even if the Polish 
mainstream, especially when it comes to publicly owned media, is heavily 
controlled and manipulated by today’s right-wing government. 
Open declarations of antisemitism, the promotion of racism as a cen-
tral value, and a commitment to white supremacy are common on the 
pages of far-right zines. While the same ideals and beliefs are central to on-
line communications by far-right groups, their expressions tend to differ. 
What is published online and made widely accessible, like the Blood and 
Honour lists mentioned above, is often a provocation, a trigger for greater 
visibility on a wider scale, inside and outside of right-wing circles. The 
turn to zines among the far right serves the opposite role. This distinction 
between the use of print and digital as far-right spaces of communication 
is particularly interesting as it reverses the logic of publishing today. The 
seemingly unfiltered digital sphere becomes, for these groups, the space 
of relative (self)censorship; whereas publishing in print, in small print 
runs, and outside of mainstream circulation, serves as a space to manifest 
open and unconstrained expressions of the ideology they support. This 
move away from the digital is devoid of the kind of retro-nostalgia that 
often characterizes contemporary zine publishing. Nor does it appear to 
be informed by the new commitment to ‘making’ so central to the zine 
communities. Rather, the materiality of the form, and its characteristic 
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amateur status, is primarily utilitarian in far-right contexts. It offers a 
means of communicating somewhat under the radar within the growing 
far-right community, and it carries connotation of a struggle against the 
repression of free speech or radical ideas. Hidden in plain sight, far-right 
zines are a powerful tool exactly because of their limited reach. Their pro-
liferation is one manifestation of a community growing in strength, yet 
their constrained, underground circulation makes any form of response 
to them significantly more difficult.
While independent media and organizations report an alarming rise 
of far-right activity in Poland, the most recent report on national security 
published by the Ministry of the Interior in 2017 (i.e. after the election of 
the current, conservative government) under the directorship of Mariusz 
Błaszczak describes the activities of the far right as limited and broadly 
unthreatening.7 A new risk, according to the report, is posed by the “radi-
cal left-wing pro-Islamists”. However, this apparent left-wing radicalism, 
i.e. the activities of groups who support refugees and oppose the anti- 
immigration sentiment of the current government, is not flagged up in 
the report as a threat in and of itself. It is instead identified as a problem 
because of its potential to provoke the anti-refugee far right, the same far 
right that the report claims not to be a problem; the same far right for 
whom Poland is fast becoming a new international cradle. 
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Unmasking

What Makes a Symbol Far Right?  
Co-opted and Missed Meanings in Far-Right Iconography 
Cynthia Miller-Idriss
“Many right-wing extremists don’t understand their own T-shirts”, a 
VICE-Germany headline proclaimed in March 2018 (Vorreyer 2018), sum-
marizing research I had conducted with youth in and around far-right 
scenes about the meaning of far-right symbols, codes, and iconography 
(Miller-Idriss 2018). I had found that German young people do not always 
correctly interpret the messages in symbols on T-shirts marketed to and 
by the far-right – even when those codes are on brands that those same 
youths know are banned from their schools because of their far-right ideo-
logical connections. 
As I was writing up the findings about the German case, across the At-
lantic a cartoon character with no relationship whatsoever to the far right, 
Pepe the Frog, suddenly became co-opted by the emerging Alt-Right1 – in 
part through a series of memes depicting Pepe with a Hitler-style mus-
tache, in a KKK hood and robe, and wearing a Nazi uniform, among oth-
er caricatured links (Roy 2016). Within a year, the connection between 
Pepe the Frog and the US far right was so strong that Hillary Clinton 
1 | The phrase Alt-Right is contested. Created by the modern US far right, it is 
criticized for the ways that it can soften or mask the extremist ideas of the var-
ied groups that constitute it. Despite these concerns, the term carries a specific 
connotation to a unique development in the far-right scene in the US since 2015, 
which is distinct from older factions of the American far right such as the Ku Klux 
Klan and the Aryan Brotherhood. I have opted to deploy the term here but use sin-
gle quotation marks around my first mention of the phrase to signal its contested 
nature.
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denounced Pepe publicly, and the Anti-Defamation League added the car-
toon character to their hate symbols database (Daniels 2018).
These two examples reflect the complicated nature of far-right ico-
nography and messaging in both offline and online spaces. Sometimes 
symbols are created and distributed with intentional messages that are 
not received as such – and other times, symbols with no deliberate mes-
saging may be co-opted and marked as ideological in ways that were never 
intended. These developments challenge both our understanding of how 
far-right ideas spread and social scientists’ understandings of symbology 
more generally. What happens to a symbol if its meaning is not under-
stood, even by its own consumers? What happens when new meaning is 
assigned in ways that were never intended?
how do symbols woRk?
Social scientists have long relied on the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
to help understand how symbols and signs work to construct and convey 
meaning. De Saussure’s work in the field of linguistics separated signs 
into two parts: the concept (signified) and the sound-image (signifier). 
Crucially, de Saussure argued that the relationship between concept and 
image is arbitrary: there is no logical reason why the word ‘sister’, he ex-
plains, is linked to the concept of a sister. However, he argued that sym-
bols were different in this regard: 
“One characteristic of a symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, 
for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified. 
The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other 
symbol, such as a chariot” (de Saussure 2017[1966]: 120).
If de Saussure is right, then far-right symbols should be logically con-
nected to, and understood as, far-right concepts or ideas. But in fact, as 
this essay will show, that is no longer clearly the case. The rapid evolution 
of symbols in online spaces offers a specific challenge to de Saussure’s 
argument about symbols, while the ‘missed messages’ in coded clothing 
iconography raises additional questions about how symbols work and 
whether their power holds even when those who display them do not un-
derstand them.
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iConogR APhy And The FAR RighT
In the following sections, I outline three ways in which symbols and ico-
nography are deployed in far-right clothing and products: brands created 
by or for far-right consumers, in products deliberately laced with far-right 
symbols and codes; brands, logos, images and symbols that at their ori-
gins have no relationship to the far right, but become co-opted as far-right 
symbols; and brands and products which deliberately or accidentally de-
ploy far-right symbols and codes, either through attempts to draw media 
attention, or through ignorance and coincidence. Each of these three cases 
also illustrates the ways in which online and offline iconographies interact 
with one another as images, memes, symbols and iconography circulate 
in both domains.
Madagascar T-shirts: Brands Marketing to the Far Right
The first category of iconography appears in brands created by or for 
the far right. This is a relatively recent European innovation – the first 
high-quality, commercial brand marketing products to far-right consu- 
mers was Thor Steinar, a German brand which burst onto the scene with 
a slick mail-order catalog in 2002, but quickly developed physical stores 
and a sophisticated online presence with a website offering internation-
al currency conversion and translation (Miller-Idriss 2018). Other brands 
rapidly followed in Thor Steinar’s footsteps, marketing T-shirts, hoodies 
and other clothing products coded with messages and iconography that 
directly invoked or indirectly evoked the Nazi and colonial era, Norse my-
thology, the Christian crusades, and other contemporary and historical 
anti-immigrant and Islamophobic references. 
Some of the references in these brands are quite arcane, drawing on 
historical allusions that are rarely understood by consumers or observ-
ers. For example, the brand Erik & Sons sells a T-shirt depicting a pas-
senger ship with the phrase “Sweet Home Madagascar”. Madagascar was 
discussed as an original Nazi ‘final solution’ – an island to which Euro-
pean Jews could be deported – before concentration camp gas chambers 
were constructed (Herf 2006: 146–47; Miller-Idriss 2018: 62). But when I 
showed an image of this T-shirt to 51 students as part of a series of far-right 
symbols and images during interviews in 2013-14, only three of them un-
derstood the historical reference. Four respondents understood a similarly 
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obscure historical reference in a T-shirt depicting the ‘Expedition Tibet’, 
which refers to the National Socialists’ Schutzstaffel (SS) expeditions to Ti-
bet that were part of the broader Ahnenerbe (ancestral heritage) movement 
to research the Indo-Germanic roots of the Aryan ‘race’ (Reitzenstein 
2014). But even then, one of those students’ responses was an educated 
guess about the Nazi origins of this code, based on other contextual clues 
in the image, including the old German script and the use of the word 
‘expedition’ – rather than a response that indicated understanding of the 
meaning behind the ‘Expedition Tibet’ reference (Miller-Idriss 2018). 
Pepe the Frog: Co-opted Symbols
The second category refers to brands and symbols that are appro- 
priated from non-far-right contexts and infused with far-right messages 
and meanings. In some cases, it is simply some coincidental symbolic 
resonance of their logos that leads to assimilation by the far right. Thus 
the ‘N’ in New Balance sneakers signified ‘neo-Nazi’ for a generation of 
racist skinheads in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, while the American 
military-style bomber jacket produced by Alpha Industries was co-opted 
in the same period because the Alpha Industries logo is similar in ap-
pearance to a civil badge used to denote the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA). 
German neo-Nazis wear the sporty British brand Lonsdale because when 
displayed under a half-zipped bomber jacket, the letters NSDA are visible 
– the first four letters of the Nazi party’s initials, NSDAP (Miller-Idriss 
2018). Other symbols, images, or brands are favored because they are per-
ceived as aligning with radical right ideologies in some way. In the US, a 
well-known far-right website named the pizza company Papa John’s the 
“‘official pizza’ of the Alt-Right” due to the CEO’s donations to the Trump 
campaign as well as statements and positions that many viewed as aligned 
with Alt-Right ideologies (Maza 2017). 
But still other symbols have been appropriated with little explanation at 
all. The evolution of Pepe the Frog is a perfect example, and also illustrates 
how seamlessly online and offline iconographies are interacting with one 
another as a means through which symbols spread and evolve. Originally 
created by cartoonist Matt Furie for the comic Boy’s Life, Pepe’s original 
character was an affable if crass frog whose antics revolved around life 
with his three roommates and the pranks that characterized their every-
day interactions. Furie originally produced the character in paper form, in 
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zines that he printed himself at a local copy shop and distributed (Serwer 
2016). Eventually, Pepe made his way to online spaces, and sometime in 
2015, the nascent Alt-Right decided to “remake Pepe” as a “white national-
ist icon” (Daniels 2018: 64). Memes began to circulate on sites like 4chan 
and Reddit that adapted Pepe the Frog in varied right-wing extremist ways 
– dressed as a Nazi, spouting racist and antisemitic vitriol, and in images 
accompanied by far-right figures (Serwer 2016). 
Pepe’s popularity with the far right was not only due to the icono-
graphic representation of the frog with Nazi and far-right symbols but also 
because of the way the frog symbolized a kind of superior nonchalance 
toward others, helping to normalize hostile attitudes toward minorities 
and political opponents. Part of the growing use of memes as “emblemat-
ic representations of words and images” that act as “short-hand tools for 
political communication online” (Önnerfors 2018), the Pepe meme com-
municated both far-right ideological positions and a kind of anti-elite arro-
gance and condescension. By the time a meme of Pepe as Donald Trump 
was re-tweeted by the Trump campaign during the 2016 election (Sanders 
2017), Pepe the Frog had become a clear symbol of the Alt-Right, not only 
through online memes but also through the use of the cartoon character 
in emojis, pins, patches and more. In the autumn of 2016, the Anti-Defa-
mation League added the cartoon character to its online database of hate 
symbols.2 Then things got even stranger, as Washington City Paper report-
er Baynard Woods concisely explains:
“At the same time as the far-right elements on message boards began to adopt 
Pepe, they also began using the letters KEK instead of LOL to indicate online 
laughter. Then, when they noticed that there was an Egyptian god named Kek, 
which was depicted as a frog-headed man, these guys – and they are decidedly 
guys – had a mythology and a god. …To go along with their new half-ironic religion, 
they created a purely digital (and imaginary) country called Kekistan and after 
the election they made Trump their God-Emperor. And they star ted getting flags 
made” (Woods 2017).
2 | Anti-Defamation League (2016): ADL Adds “Pepe the Frog” Meme, Used by 
Anti-Semites and Racists, to Online Hate Symbols Database, 27 September 2016 
(ht tps://w w w.adl.org /news/press-releases/adl-adds-pepe-the-frog-meme-
used-by-anti-semites-and-racists-to-online-hate). 
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In this way, a “prank with a big attention payoff” (Daniels 2018: 64) – the 
appropriation of a cartoon character designed for a homemade magazine – 
evolved into a widely circulated series of far-right memes in online spaces, 
inspired a fantasy mythological far right ‘nation’, and led to the produc-
tion of physical flags that began to appear at Alt-Right rallies in offline 
spaces (Neiwert 2017). In 2018, cartoonist Matt Furie, Pepe’s creator, filed 
a lawsuit against the US right-wing media platform Infowars, charging 
copyright infringement (Sommerlad 2018), which is ongoing at the time 
of writing. 
Pepe is an extraordinary case, but there are other examples where 
elements from the offline world are co-opted, infused with new mean-
ing, and circulated online for and by the far right. The appropriation 
of the tiny Swedish industrial town of Finspång into a fantasy far-right 
‘execution meme’ is one such case. Sometime in mid-2017, as Andreas 
Önnerfors (2018) explains, a far-right website posted a meme of two peo-
ple dressed in protective clothing and gas masks entering through a door-
way leading to a ‘white reservation’ named Finspång, described as a place 
established to protect the ‘biological exceptionalism’ of white Swedes. 
Subsequent images and text depicted a polluted, collapsed ‘multi-cultural 
Sweden’ outside the walls of Finspång, in contrast to the ‘clean’ and ‘free’ 
white reservation. In this future fantastical world, tribunals in Finspång 
will lead to executions of ‘traitors of the people’ in street-lamp hangings 
lining the roadways. The real town of Finspång was thus appropriated 
into a meme of a fictional place where national traitors would be executed 
under a future fascist regime. This evolved into a broader Finspång meme 
used to convey various far-right ideological positions and threats against 
groups and individuals through the phrase “See you in Finspång” along-
side images of hangings, echoing German far-right extremists who use 
the phrase “See you in Walhalla”, the mythical hall of the dead in Norse 
mythology. The meme moved out of niche far-right subcultures into more 
mainstream usage, as Önnerfors describes in greater depth, when it was 
deployed by the leaders of a right-wing alternative news site that reaches 
8% of Swedish news readership (Önnerfors 2018). In this way, a real place 
rooted in the offline world became a fantastical place in online spaces and 
was infused with far-right meanings. 
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Deliberately or Cluelessly Offensive
The third category refers to brands which deploy far-right or related ico-
nography either unintentionally or as part of a strategy to draw attention or 
be ‘edgy’. The clearest example in this category is the so-called ‘Nazi’ logo 
adopted by the fashion label Boy London, whose trademark logo depicts 
the Imperial Eagle deployed in the Nazi eagle symbol, except instead of 
holding a wreath with a swastika in its talons, the eagle is holding the “O” 
in the word “BOY”. As journalist Sandy Rashty reported in 2014, a repre-
sentative from the brand rejected the association to Nazism, arguing that 
the logo was “inspired by the eagle of the Roman Empire as a sign of dec-
adence and strength. Its aim is to empower people rather than oppress”. 
Retailers pulled the brand off shelves anyway (Rashty 2014).
The US store Urban Outfitters has repeatedly produced and then pulled 
offensive products from its shelves too, including some with far-right ref-
erences, like a yellow T-shirt with a nearly-identical star to the six-pointed 
star badge that Jews were forced to wear under the Nazis (Chakelian 2012) 
and a gray-and-white striped tapestry with a pink triangle which was strik-
ingly similar to the uniforms gay men were forced to wear in Nazi con-
centration camps (Sieczkowski 2015). Other offensive products included 
a blood-red-spattered Kent State university sweatshirt (in reference to the 
BOY London logo on a Sweatshirt. Photo by Ranim Helwani 
from Drensteinfurt, Germany. 
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1970 shooting of unarmed college students by the Ohio National Guard) 
(Ohlheiser 2014). In each case, the brand issued an apology, but the fre-
quency of the incidents has led to speculation that the offense is an inten-
tional public relations strategy (Haruch 2014; Wang 2014). 
Online spaces are largely responsible for the ways in which public out-
rage builds in reaction to such products. Both the fast-food hamburger 
chain Wendy’s and the Spanish clothing chain Zara have issued public 
apologies after customers shared social media images linking their logos 
or products to Pepe the Frog. Wendy’s was celebrated by the Alt-Right after 
a company representative tweeted a meme of Pepe-as-Wendy on the com-
pany’s social media account; the company’s official response was to plead 
ignorance, noting that the employee who had sent the tweet was “unaware 
of the recent evolution of the Pepe meme’s meaning” (Maza 2017). In 2017, 
Zara pulled a denim skirt with a patch depicting a Pepe-like cartoon from 
both its “real and virtual shelves” (Serwer 2016) after a customer tweeted 
an image of the skirt. Like Urban Outfitters, this wasn’t Zara’s first of-
fense; the company had previously apologized for selling a shirt similar 
to a concentration camp prisoner’s uniform and pulled a purse it had sold 
with embroidered swastikas on it (Raab 2014; Roy 2017).
disCUssion: missed messAges oR mixed messAges?
What does the simultaneous circulation of three separate categories of far-
right symbols in online and offline spaces – intentionally-coded, co-opted, 
and deliberately-or-coincidentally offensive – mean for the way we under-
stand the meaning and messaging of far-right symbols? There are several 
lessons.
First, the supposedly non-arbitrary nature of symbols that de Sauss-
ure pointed to has been clearly disrupted in the case of far-right symbols. 
While this process may well have started before the digital age, it is clear 
that online platforms and communities through sites like 4chan and Red-
dit have accelerated it. In many cases, it is the rapid and ‘viral’ spread 
of online memes and messages that has shifted the linear relationship 
between symbol and meaning to one characterized by more random asso-
ciations. There is no clear reason why Pepe the Frog or the Swedish town 
of Finspång should become far-right symbols, for example, and their rapid 
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evolution as such defies explanation through traditional theories about 
how symbols work. 
Second, these categories illustrate how the global nature of the inter-
net itself has helped disrupt the logical or linear association between sym-
bols and their intended meanings. On the one hand, online communities 
contribute to the rapid and global spread of far-right symbols, enabling 
icons and symbols from nationalist resistance movements from one par-
ticular geography to be claimed and appropriated by social and political 
movements in different locations, for example. As I have argued in greater 
depth elsewhere (Miller-Idriss 2018), the use of global codes and referenc-
es is ubiquitous in far-right scenes and subcultures, and the very nature 
of online sharing has helped facilitate that usage. But online communities 
have also helped create completely new symbols that would be hard to 
imagine in the absence of online far-right culture. It is hard to imagine 
neo-Nazis raising a flag representing the fantasy nation of Kekistan – or 
embedding frogs on those flags – a decade ago. Online communities are 
primarily responsible for the rapid creation, evolution, appropriation, and 
circulation of far-right memes in the contemporary era, even when they 
later appear in offline spaces too. 
The online nature of consumer goods laced with far-right messages 
has also affected the reception of messages. While previous iterations of 
commercialized goods – such as T-shirts and hoodies with far-right sym-
bols or slogans – were sold on folding tables at concerts or in physical 
storefronts – most of today’s commercial products marketed to far-right 
youth are sold through commercial websites and distributers. This re-
duces the likelihood of a conversation between consumer and salesper-
son, in which the meaning of particular symbols or messages might be 
discussed. Although some products are accompanied by website text that 
explains the meaning, this is not the case for all products, particularly 
those which rely on references to the Nazi era. These historical symbols 
and messages were not often understood by youths in my interviews 
(Miller-Idriss 2018). 
Finally, it is also important to think about how online spaces might 
build online and offline community in new and different ways around 
consumer goods and symbols. Some brands marketing to far-right youths 
maintain their own Twitter feeds, Facebook and Tumblr pages, and Ins-
tagram accounts. Those pages then become a constantly-updating feed 
of posts from ‘friends’ and others who share information, update follow-
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ers on new products, and issue announcements about political actions, 
events, rallies, and festivals that take place in offline spaces. 
CoUnTeR-PR ACTiCes And ‘sT yles’ oF ResisTAnCe
The same viral nature of online spaces that led to Pepe the Frog’s rapid 
adaptation into a white nationalist icon also provides the means for the 
rapid development of public outrage and protest. Viral tweets of offensive 
products and symbols generate anger as consumers and observers share 
photos and videos on social media, often tagging brand representatives 
and CEOs in ways that force a more rapid response from companies than 
might have been the case through traditional media reporting. There have 
also been some viral efforts to combat the use of coded and co-opted sym-
bols by the far right. For example, in 2016 the Alt-Right began using tri-
ple-parentheses ‘echo’ symbols around Jewish names online (aided by the 
use of an automated Chrome extension, which was removed by Google) 
– supposedly to signify the ‘echo’ or reverberating effect of Jewish peo-
ple across generations. Both Jews and non-Jews aiming to show solidarity 
quickly began to claim the echo symbol directly, placing ((( ))) around their 
names on Twitter and other social media sites (Hern 2016), effectively 
taking the antisemitic purpose of the symbol away. 
In Germany, a strong counter-protest culture has begun to deploy 
creative tactics to protest the far right in ways that co-opt or transform 
far- right symbols for the left. The de-radicalization group EXIT-Germany 
produced a ‘trick’ T-shirt in 2011, for example; the T-shirt had iconography 
which imitated typical far-right symbols and styles, and was distributed 
for free at a far-right concert. Once washed, however, the T-shirts revealed 
messaging and a telephone number to encourage people to seek help if 
they want to leave far-right extremism.3 Elsewhere, an antifascist group 
called Endstation Rechts created a parody of the brand Thor Steinar with a 
stork mascot called ‘Stork Heinar’ – a play on the brand name – and sells 
umbrellas, T-shirts, accessories and more, all adorned with the stork logo 
(Miller-Idriss 2018: 191). 
3 | BBC News (2011): “Trojan T-shir t targets German right-wing rock fans”, 9 Au-
gust 2011 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14465150).
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More research is needed in order to paint a fuller picture of the ways in 
which counter-protesters and resisters to the far right deploy similar or dif-
ferent kinds of tactics around iconography and symbols. There are also im-
portant distinctions across symbols according to their relative permanent 
or ephemeral nature that merit further study. Symbols that require bodily 
modification, like tattoos or shaved heads, likely require deeper kinds of 
ideological commitments than symbols on T-shirts that can be taken on 
and taken off. Online memes are more ephemeral still and might even 
be shared anonymously, enabling the most experimental or playful en-
gagements with far-right ideas in ways that could act as a gateway to later, 
stronger commitments. More empirical research and analysis is needed to 
disentangle variations in the utility of symbols in offline and online spaces 
for insider and outsider recognition, communication of far-right messag-
es, and the degree of commitment they require to far-right ideas. What is 
clear, however, is that symbols and iconography move between online and 
offline spaces as they are deployed and co-opted by the far right in ways 
that deserve our close attention. Whether meanings are missed, co-opted, 
or cluelessly offensive, far-right symbols have rapidly evolved. The visual 
nature of online spaces might suggest that their use will only accelerate 
in the years to come. 
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“Do You Want Meme War?” 
Understanding the Visual Memes of the German Far Right
Lisa Bogerts and Maik Fielitz1
“People respond to images in a stronger way than to text. By using imag-
es, we can do excellent memetic warfare and bring our narratives to the 
people” (Generation D. 2017: 2).2 Commenting on “the power of imag-
es”, in 2017, German far-right activists widely circulated a “manual for 
media guerillas” that offered advice about how to effectively engage in 
online activism that would challenge the real world. Just a few months 
later, a far-right online activist under the pseudonym Nikolai Alexander 
initiated the project Reconquista Germanica (RG) and invited adherents to 
“reclaim” cyberspace. The Youtuber launched a mass project on the gam-
ing forum Discord to invade the web with coordinated raids that would 
disseminate far-right propaganda. However, his ambitions went far be-
yond mere rhetoric: He assembled ‘patriotic forces’ to use RG as a place 
for convergence, attracting members and sympathizers of the far-right 
party Alternative for Germany (AfD), the German and Austrian sections 
of the Identitarian Movement and loosely organized neo-Nazis. He envi-
sioned the largest far-right online network active in Germany, one willing 
to shake the pillars of liberal democracy and build a community that push-
es far-right agendas. In just a few weeks, RG counted several thousand 
members who were ready to attack opponents, distort digital discourse 
and polarize online interactions. One of their central weapons: internet 
memes – graphics of visual and textual remixes shared and widely distrib-
uted in online spaces.
1 | Special thanks to Stephen Albrecht, Merle Strunk and Philip Wallmeier for 
their thoughts on this contribution. 
2 | All German quotations were translated by the authors. 
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Just a lousy joke by some kids, one might think. How could a troll 
army without any real-world interaction seriously engage in collective ac-
tion? Some years ago, these virtual communities were irrelevant for re-
searchers on far-right extremism. Only recently has the online space en-
tered the research agenda as a venue of antagonistic politics and “cultural 
wars” (Nagle 2017). For some time, the far right has explored the internet 
as a hub for mobilization, propaganda and cultural subversion (Caiani/
Kröll 2015). With the general expansion of online communication into all 
spheres of life, the internet has become a natural medium and catalyst 
space for far-right propaganda, making digital space a central site for the 
current resurgence of far-right influence. 
If far-right groups, just like other political actors, utilize cultural 
means to win the hearts and minds of potential adherents, we must go 
beyond purely cognitive accounts to also examine affective and aesthetic 
means. While ideology is often projected onto images, no doubt, politi-
cal actors also employ images strategically in order to disseminate their 
ideology in more or less subtle ways and to persuade others to share or 
reject certain views and values (Sturken/Cartwright 2001: 21). Drawing 
on methodological tools from visual culture studies, this essay highlights 
the importance of taking visual memes seriously instead of reducing 
them to a merely illustrative role. Although, at first sight, memes seem to 
be humorous, sometimes silly and absurd – but in any case, harmless – 
everyday expressions of online cultural creativity, they can still convey 
hate messages, attract new supporters and give rise to bigotry. In fact, 
we can barely understand recent far-right cultures without taking into ac-
count the diverse messages that memes disseminate.
While there is plenty of reflection on the spread of memes in the broad-
er digital world, this essay focuses on the strategic use of visual meme 
content by far-right entrepreneurs, asking: What visual language, narra-
tives and strategies do RG memes employ to appeal a broad spectrum of 
potential supporters? Taking the case of RG, we want to expand the debate 
on far-right efforts to co-opt online cultures as a gateway to express differ-
ent hate messages and mobilize supporters.
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VisUAl CUlTURe And memes in FAR-RighT moVemenTs
Emphasizing the political power of everyday images and popular culture, 
visual culture assumes that everyday images inform how we see the world, 
and thus literally shape our worldviews (Sturken/Cartwright 2001: 10). The 
world of entertainment, everyday images and popular culture are loaded 
with political interests and more or less subtle ideological assumptions 
(Hall 1993). Therefore, Fahlenbrach et al. argue that critical visual research 
must disclose key visual narratives of memes by both anonymous and visi-
ble activists as part of the public discourse (Fahlenbrach et al. 2014: 210).3 
Engaging with visual online memes is a participatory practice of in-
terjecting cultural information and normative narratives within ideolog-
ical conflicts, which may “shape the mindsets and significant forms of 
behavior and action of a social group” (Knobel/Lankshear 2007: 199; see 
also Hristova 2014: 265; Nooney/Portwood-Stacer 2014: 248). Employing 
humor and rich intertextuality, online memes can be spread fast, anony-
mously and efficiently. Concerning the affective potential of humor and 
joy in social movements, an associate of the internet activist collective 
Anonymous claimed: “[…] boredom is counterrevolutionary. Political re-
sistance needs to be fun, or no one will want to participate” (cited in Fer-
rada Stoehrel/Lindgren 2014: 252). Due to their participatory incitement, 
“memes appear to be democratic in their widespread use and mutation as 
they survive and grow through participation, while they remain structur-
ally autocratic in their conservation of a key idea” (Hristova 2014: 266). 
The possibility of conserving and disseminating key messages while 
displaying creativity ‘from below’ may render online memes an especial-
ly attractive medium for far-right entrepreneurs. Memes take to a digital 
level the New Right’s effort to appropriate Antonio Gramsci’s idea of the 
struggle over cultural hegemony – i.e. the production of consenting ideas 
in civil society  – what they call meta-politics (Bar-On 2013). Along with 
the increasing significance of social media, the web may be considered 
a metapolitical terrain for the reshaping of public opinion. Likewise, far-
right activists in Europe, as Nicole Doerr argues, strategically use “[…] vi-
sual or symbolic media provocation that speaks to multiple audiences” 
3 | For research on memes from a visual culture perspective, see the 2014 spe-
cial issue of the Journal of Visual Culture (Nooney/Portwood-Stacer 2014).
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(Doerr 2017: 4). Reconquista Germany aimed to become a central actor in 
this battle over ideas and – overall – attention. 
ReConqUisTA geRmAniCA: jUsT AnoTheR TRoll ne T woRk?
Reconquista Germanica hit the headlines in the context of the German 
federal elections of 2017 by attempting to subvert online discourses, to 
intimidate supporters of democratic parties and to support the election 
of the AfD (Davey/Ebner 2017: 21). Formed in September 2017, RG can 
be described as a far-right network that organizes collective digital action 
against political opponents and pushes the agendas of far-right move-
ments and parties in online space. Strongly inspired by the American 
Alt-Right, RG’s interventions center around the common topics of eth-
no-nationalism, anti-Muslim racism, anti-Feminism and the rejection of 
immigration. 
Using the online gaming platform Discord, far-right online activists 
converge to exchange on political beliefs and plan digital political actions. 
Before the deletion of their server in February 2018 by Discord, RG could 
assemble around 5000 members (Kampf 2018). However, metrics are 
hardly convincing in the digital world where even a few savvy activists can 
influence the discourse through fake accounts, bots and multiple identi-
ties (Kreißel et al. 2018). Usually there is no physical contact between the 
users. Every user acts under a pseudonym and is careful about sharing 
personal details. 
Repeatedly, the group has described itself as a “satirical project that has 
no connection to the real world”.4 But this is not true. RG’s aim is to provide 
a forum to “effectively connect and pool patriotic forces”.5 Unsurprisingly, 
we find a mosaic of the most important far-right parties and movements 
represented on the platform, such as the Identitarian Movement, the Na-
tional Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and the AfD. It is noteworthy 
4 | Quotation retrieved from the welcoming text of the Reconquista Germanica 
Discord server discussed in the TV documentation “Lösch dich” (Delete yourself). 
See Anders, Rayk (2017): “Lösch Dich! So organisier t ist der Hate im Netz”, 26 
April 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvKjfWSPI7s)
5 | Reconquista Germanica (2018): “Unsere Wunderwaffe im Kulturkampf”, 17 
June 2018 (https://www.bitchute.com/video/1ObHTNg73w0G/).
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that RG endorses strong references to National Socialist ideology, the in-
ternational far right and neo-Nazi community.6 Hence, the appearance 
and language are strongly martial, misogynist and vulgar, while the orga-
nization follows a fixed hierarchy, centralized orders and military ranks. 
To climb up the ladder, one needs to prove commitment by joining orga-
nized raids when RG activists target social media platforms by attracting 
public attention through the seizure of hashtags or the massive spam-
ming of the comment columns. 
A VisUAl AnAlysis oF FAR-RighT memes
In our empirical analysis we examined 110 publicly accessible images that 
had been uploaded to the RG meme gallery.7 By using memes, RG focuss-
es on a mélange of humor, misanthropy and political message. Accord-
ingly, RG developed a meme factory in their internal forum that was open 
for users to copy and paste the content and spread their compositions on 
social media. The group even appointed a ‘memelord’ responsible for the 
dissemination of favorable memes, which shows how central memes are 
to their practice of online mobilization. On their official, publicly acces-
sible website, RG provides a meme gallery that counts several hundred 
copy-paste images for visitors to freely use. While most are categorized 
around the preferential topics of the Alt-Right, such as immigration, left-
ists, foreign politics and the media, we find one category called Reconquista 
that strongly represents the self-understanding of the group.8 For our em-
pirical analysis, we have analyzed the different ways that content from this 
6 | For instance, we took the title of this chapter from a meme in our database, 
that depicts the cartoon character Pepe the frog in Nazi uniform reminiscent to the 
infamous Sportpalast speech by Joseph Goebbels in 1943 invoking ‘total war’. RG 
modified it into: “Do you want meme war?”. 
7 | While most of the images are so-called caption memes, the database also 
includes several GIFs (moving images). See http://reconquista-germanica.info/
meme-galerie/reconquista/
8 | The content varies widely according to the categories and the much more ag-
gressive imagery in categories, such as immigration, is likely to deliver interesting 
results as well. However, we decided not to reproduce these predominantly racist 
and violent images. It is noteworthy that Reconquista contains some of the most 
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category targets broader audiences and have deconstructed the aesthetic 
methods that are applied.
In order to identify common visual elements and narratives, we first 
conducted a visual content analysis (Bell 2004; Rose 2016) utilizing the 
software MAXQDA, and then examined the specific strategies of some 
representative images in more depth. By coding the images and counting 
the code frequencies, we shed light on which persons, objects, animals 
and symbols appear in the image files and how they are linked with each 
other. In another round of coding, taking into account the text elements as 
well, we identified nine key topics (theme codes) usually addressed by RG9 
as well as six stylistic and aesthetic features. The aesthetic styles include 
cartoons (used in 23 memes), 1980s vaporwave style (17), video game aes-
thetics (8) and hipsterish nature photography (5). Further, they often use 
historical image material (32) or refer to popular culture (24). In the fol-
lowing, with the help of representative image examples, we demonstrate 
how RG memes combine a variety of stylistic and aesthetic strategies and 
visual tools to appeal to multiple audiences, and still convey messages in 
line with their core ideological far-right beliefs. These memes represent 
“remixes” (Hartmann 2017) of the most frequently identified stylistic and 
aesthetic traits and are arranged according to RG members prime mo-
tive.10
professional images of the entire site. This shows how important it is for RG to 
generate some kind of group identification (through images and memes).
9 | Frequencies of key themes: Militarism (addressed in 58 images), nationalism 
(49), sympathy with National Socialism/fascism (27), ethnic and cultural suprem-
acy (17), anti-system/anti-establishment (16), traditional values/nature and fam-
ily (14), anti-lef tism (13), patriarchic gender roles (11) and racism, Islamophobia 
and anti-Semitism (10). Additionally, we used the code “non-explicit/unclear” for 
images without a direct reference to any of these themes (17).
10 | Although, against the backdrop of our research question and the wider body 
of data, we provide only one of many possible interpretations, we are aware that 
image interpretation is highly subjective and varies according to the viewer’s indi-
vidual background and knowledge. 
“Do You Want Meme War?” 143
Cartoon Remixes
Numerous RG memes re-contextualize fictional characters from comics or 
cartoons and employ aesthetic styles associated with this media genre. Such 
references to popular culture include Pepe the frog (16), adopted from the 
US American Alt-Right (see Miller-Idriss in this volume), and figures from 
Japanese anime/manga culture, inter alia. A meme with the title Captain 
Germanica (figure 1)11 depicts the Marvel superhero Captain America, who in 
1941 was designed as a patriotic soldier with superhuman fighting abilities. 
Military uniforms (31) and male characters (51) are the two most frequent 
visual elements in our dataset. The heroic figure is here remixed with char-
acteristics from the German context, such as the national flag (black-red-
gold) (8) and the logo of the AfD (3), which consists of a red curving arrow 
11 | Source: http://reconquista-germanica.info/meme-galerie/reconquista/#! 
http://reconquista-germanica.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Captain-Ger 
manica.jpg.
Figure 1: Cartoon remix. Text on the bullets: culture of guilt 
(“Schuldkult”), Islamism, liberalism, degeneration, communism and 
political correctness.
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pointing towards the upper-right, symbolizing future and progress. Both the 
modification of “America” to “Germanica” (in old-German Fraktur script) 
and the RG logo on the shield leave no doubt that the group considers itself 
the defender (here: the shield) of the only political party (the AfD) it consid-
ers able to protect Germany against the ‘threats’ (the bullets) of liberalism, 
communism, Islamism and ‘political correctness’. The bullet with Schuldkult 
(cult of guilt) indicates the common far-right rejection of acknowledging and 
memorializing Germany’s guilt for the atrocities of the Nazi regime (Suer-
mann 2016: 270). Borrowing the biological/medical term ‘degeneration’, the 
authors describe an alleged backward evolution of the human species, refer-
ring either to the political parliamentary system or to ‘degenerated’ gender 
roles in feminist or LGBTQI identities. 
Tracing back the evolution of this meme, we see clearly that it was 
copied from a neo-Nazi meme creator. In this earlier version, there are 
swastikas instead of the German flag, the RG logo and the AfD logo, and 
another bullet is labelled with “jews”.12 No doubt, although the reversion 
of a popular and historical comic superhero may look humorous and cre-
ative at first sight, it reproduces far-right themes such as militarism, na-
tionalism, and Islamophobia as well as anti-leftism and opposition to the 
political establishment.
Historical Remixes
As the Captain America example demonstrated, numerous memes make 
use of historical images with a focus on military battles, attributing them 
with a new meaning. In our dataset, such imagery includes WWII propa-
ganda posters or black-and-white photos from the Nazi era (e.g., of heroic 
Wehrmacht soldiers or members of NS youth organizations) or paintings 
from art history (e.g., portraits of the German emperors Frederick the 
Great and Otto von Bismarck). Representing a historical version of milita-
rism, swords (12) and knights (13) – mounted elite soldiers from the Late 
Middle-Age – are among the most frequent visual elements in the Recon-
quista meme gallery. The knight is a common role model in historical Ger-
man iconography, providing a heroic figure of mystic identification with 
the Fatherland in a Christian nationalist mission (Krüger 2011: 98–100). 
12 | ht tps://www.deviantar t.com/neetsfagging322297/ar t/Captain-America- 
Rebellion-poster-633861202.
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More specifically, several memes depict knights with the Crusader’s cross 
(a red cross on white grounds) (4), who defended the Mediterranean and 
the ‘Holy Land’ from Muslim rule in a series of religious wars. 
One of the memes (figure 2)13 builds on a painting of the Battle of Mont-
gisard (1177) by the artist Charles Philippe Larivière, in which King Bald-
win IV defeated the Muslim sultan Saladin. A huge army of Crusaders 
descends from a castle, following two leaders with a sword and Christian 
crosses, while on the horizon, large clouds of smoke indicate an already 
ongoing battle. Combined with the dominant bold lettering Reconquista 
Germanica and the group’s logo (49), this image illustrates one of RG’s 
main narratives: reference to the so-called Reconquista (reconquest) of the 
Iberian Peninsula in the name of several Christian kingdoms between 722 
and 1492. Many far-right groups, especially the Counter-Jihad network, 
play with this allegory and contemporize the crusade images to express 
anti-Muslim sentiments, claiming Islam to be incompatible with ‘Chris-
tian’ Europe. Claiming to ‘defend Europe’ against an alleged ‘islamization 
of the occident’ due to migration (Virchow 2016), RG aims to present itself 
as standing in the tradition of the Crusades and thus subtly reproduces Is-
lamophobia. Understanding its activities as a contemporary crusade mis-
13 | Source: ht tp://reconquista-germanica.info/meme-galer ie/reconquista/ 
#!http://reconquista-germanica.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/reconquis 
ta3-1.png.
Figure 2: Historical remix. 
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sion, it is no coincidence that RG’s rune-like symbol14 is a modification of 
the Greek letters Chi (χ) and Rho (ρ) of the Monogram of Christ, or that in 
other versions of the logo it also contains a sword. While historical ‘sour-
ces’ carry the authority of visual ‘evidence’ supporting their claims with a 
trans-historic legitimacy of a long tradition, the mix with more contempo-
raneous stylistic features gives the narrative a more ‘youthful’ appearance.
Vapor wave Remixes
In some of the memes, works from art history are combined with more con-
temporary aesthetic styles and a future-oriented narrative. For instance, 
Figure 315 mixes a famous painting with so-called vaporwave aesthetics 
14 | Due to its similarity with the bluetooth logo, the German enter tainer Jan Böh-
mermann mocked RG’s symbol as indicating “a very bad bluetooth connection” 
when he launched his counter-campaign “Reconquista Internet” in April 2018 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAYjSLtz6wQ)
15 | Source: ht tp://reconquista-germanica.info/meme-galer ie/reconquista/ 
#!http://reconquista-germanica.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Zukunf t- 
geh%C3%B6rt-uns.jpg.
Figure 3: Vaporwave Remix. Text: “The Future Belongs to Us.” 
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(see also figure 2). Many of RG’s memes employ this retro style, which 
draws on technology, design, music, TV and video game culture from the 
1980s by using neon colors (mainly pink and purple), chrome logo typog-
raphy, blurred or pixelated images and grid optics.16 These trendy visuals 
make historical references less ‘old-fashioned’ and more appealing to a 
younger audience and/or persons with an affinity to 80s popular culture. 
The artist of this recontextualized painting Wanderer above the Sea of Fog 
(ca. 1817), Caspar David Friedrich, is one of the most important painters 
of German Romanticism, who has been praised by the Nazis for his alle-
gorical landscape paintings attributed with a nationalist message. Similar 
to his paintings, RG memes often depict romantic natural settings, such 
as sunsets or sunrises (8), with people seen from behind gazing towards 
the horizon (12). The composition of this image puts the viewer in the 
same perspective as the person depicted in the image, seeing – just like 
him – the Black Sun symbol (2) rising on the horizon. This occult Nazi 
symbol includes three swastikas superimposed upon each other and was 
inscribed in the SS headquarter Wewelsburg. It is often used as a substitute 
for swastikas, whose depiction is forbidden by German law. In the memes, 
sympathy with National Socialism/fascism is repeatedly expressed by such 
visual elements, Wehrmacht uniforms and the black-white-red flag of the 
German Empire (3), which was also used in the early days of Nazi gov-
ernment (1933–1935). The text “The future is ours” (Die Zukunft gehört 
uns) implies a ‘we’, promising the viewer that they to will become part of a 
strong and heroic community whose days are about to come. 
16 | Arena (2016): The State of Vapor[Wave]: An Interview with Gran Turismo, 18 
September (https://arena.com/article/the-state-of-vapor).
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Nature Remixes
As another far-right theme, the memes frequently address traditional val-
ues regarding nature and family. These images commonly depict moun-
tains (11), fields (2) and forests (10), focusing on landscape associated with 
Northern or Central Europe. In far-right imagery, nature represents “the 
majesty of the Fatherland” (Forchtner/Kølvraa 2017: 266), providing an 
idealized habitat for the German Volksgemeinschaft. Being the smallest 
cell of this supposedly genetic community, the ideal core family lives in 
harmony with nature, which is envisioned as being pure and safe from 
the decadent influences of urban spaces. One meme, for instance (figure 
4),17 depicts woodcutting as grounded, honest work in contrast to the mon-
ey-grubbing workplaces of the cities. Notably, both the woman and the 
children of the ‘natural family’ are blonde and blue-eyed, symbolizing the 
17 | Source: ht tp://reconquista-germanica.info/meme-galer ie/reconquista/ 
#!http://reconquista-germanica.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/15105222 
71514.jpg. 
Figure 4: Nature Remix. 
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‘Aryan’ prototype of an alleged Germanic heritage. This theme of ethnic 
and cultural supremacy is reinforced by the graphic element in the center 
of the collage. Symbolizing the reproduction of racial purity, the Othala 
rune is popular in neo-Nazi circles with blood-and-soil references. It was 
used by an SS mountain trooper unit in the Second World War and later 
referred to the neo-Nazi Viking Youth group that was banned in 1994.18 It 
expresses a völkisch thinking, the idea that genetic heritage makes people 
“an organic unity, a true subject of history” (Forchtner/Kølvraa 2017: 255). 
While the beautiful woman in the upper-right wears a white, traditional 
dress, symbolizing purity, and seems to be responsible for the domestic 
realm, the man on the left upper-left side wears a contemporary military 
uniform, defending and protecting the idealized traditional lifestyle by 
using the latest means of ground warfare available. In terms of restric-
tive visual representations of patriarchic gender roles, the collage visually 
reproduces the binary opposition between active male (attributed with 
power and productive work) and passive female (attributed with beauty 
and reproductive work) (Mulvey 1999: 839), which John Berger famously 
described as “men act and women appear” (Berger 1972: 47). 
However, it must be mentioned that not all of RG’s memes employ 
misogynist stereotypes. Some also visualize women in strong fighting 
positions as well, probably to appeal to and integrate female supporters 
(Forchtner/Kølvraa 2017: 268). Regarding aesthetic style, the collage com-
bines nature and family photography with the simplicity of modern graph-
ic design, giving the meme an aura of what hipster culture idealizes as a 
nostalgic return to a simple and (self)sustainable lifestyle. 
ConClUsion
Throughout history, fascist mass movements have fascinated the people 
not only because of their charismatic leaders and policies, but also by their 
aestheticization of politics (Benjamin 2002). This wider cultural appeal 
is pursued by contemporary fascism as well (Miller-Idris 2018). Regard-
ing the online imagery of the extreme right, Forchtner and Kølvraa argue 
that images serve as vehicles in the delivery of political identity (Forcht-
18 | Anti-Defamation League: “Othala Rune”, (https://www.adl.org/education/
references/hate-symbols/othala-rune).
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ner/Kølvraa 2017: 262). Since the far right, too, has undergone a process 
of (post-)modernization, it must be regarded as closely intertwined with 
post-modern (youth) cultures who express themselves creatively and often 
ironically on social media. However, although the self-representation and 
the attraction of followers requires a more contemporary aesthetic than 
the formal uniformity associated with National Socialism, far-right online 
imagery manages to conserve ideological core values despite the tensions 
between references to symbolic heritage and an updated graphic style 
(Forchtner/Kølvraa 2017: 254).
While, at first sight, memes appear to be harmless instances of 
everyday visual culture and merely ironic, they still manage to convey key 
ideological narratives of hate and bigotry. Far-right media strategists are 
aware of the dual nature of memes and have turned ambivalence into a 
mode of contestation in the digital space. Memes have been central to a 
transformation of far-right visual cultures, making them attractive to wid-
er circles and subcultures. Humor and satire are key to contemporizing 
hate messages and distorting public discourse (Schwarzenegger/Wag-
ner 2018), but also to veiling the ideological roots of Nazi symbols and 
to circumvent censorship. As the Handbook for Media Guerillas claims: 
“An adversary who is laughing is already halfway on our side” (Generation 
D. 2017: 9). Moreover, in image-text combinations typical of memes, text 
elements (including titles, if any) are able to give images completely new 
meanings. In our dataset, most of the memes (82) are a combination of 
images and text elements, while several contain only images (24) and only 
a few (4) consist only of text. In the manner of postmodern aesthetic eclec-
ticism, they link historical narratives with more contemporary styles, and 
thereby normalize militaristic, nationalist, völkisch and racist content. In 
other words, the content seems contemporary even though it is old.
Assuming that RG memes combine a variety of aesthetic styles, we 
argued that they appeal to multiple audiences far beyond those who un-
ambiguously identify with neo-Nazi and other far-right symbolism. No 
doubt, this case study gives only a limited insight into the contradictory 
galaxy of internet memes produced and conveyed by the far right. Since 
we decoded only one of RG’s many meme categories, we did not take into 
account more violent and provocative messages, which may also be found 
on the internal community server. While here we have here focused on the 
representations directed outwards to society at large (front stage), internal 
meme communication strategies (back stage) may be another promising 
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field of research, even if the lines between both are increasingly blurred 
(see also Introduction in this book). By employing humorous ambiguity, 
‘hipsterish’ aesthetics or references to popular culture, particularly car-
toons and video games, this more subtle, not overtly political imagery may 
offer access points for undecided and not-yet politicized users to devel-
op affinities with and support for far-right causes. Hence, we need to put 
more emphasis on the power of everyday images in order to understand 
the ways that the far right attracts supporters, especially if we hope to 
reverse their mainstreaming strategies.
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The Murder of Keira  
Misinformation and Hate Speech  
as Far-Right Online Strategies 
Alina Darmstadt, Mick Prinz and Oliver Saal
A young girl has been murdered in the German capital, Berlin. But before 
the police can launch their investigation, the German-speaking alterna-
tive right claims to have identified the perpetrator – or at least his origin: 
“On Wednesday, Keira has been slain in her bedroom. Everyone suspects 
that the perpetrator is not named ‘Thorsten’,”1 posted a Twitter user going 
by the alias Walden. “We did not know such atrocities before the invasion 
of evil itself”, tweeted another user.
The case of the 14-year-old Keira is eagerly absorbed in right-wing echo 
chambers. Sadly, it blends all too well into the scene’s world-view, thanks 
to rumors that the murderer has a non-German background. All media 
outlets and influential actors of the alternative right contribute baseless 
speculations about the perpetrator’s origin. They weave Keira’s murder 
into a narrative by which Germany has turned into a hotbed of violent 
crime ever since the increased influx of refugees in 2015. Advocates who 
draw this picture see the country en route to civil war because of perceived 
‘mass immigration’ and ‘Islamization’.
Consulting social media on today’s spectrum of political opinions, one 
quickly develops the impression that a majority of users support misogy-
nous, racist, and anti-refugee sentiments. Such hateful positions are ex-
pressed aggressively, seeking to dominate and frame public debates. This 
poses a problem as online discussions are increasingly seen as a truthful 
1 | Authors decided to not refer to websites, posts or tweets of the alternative 
right sphere with URLs, but do possess screenshots of every posting cited and will 
provide them for journalist or research purposes.
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reflection of public opinion. In news reports, social media posts replace 
vox pop interviews with people on the street to represent what the public 
really thinks.
The German discussion about the deterioration of decency in online 
debates revolves around two phenomena: hateful comments and ‘fake 
news’. Both aspects can be subsumed under the rubric of ‘hate speech’. In 
terms of content, the debate is rather imprecise as it ignores one central 
aspect: both fake news and hateful comments are essential tools of a far-
right media strategy. Hate speech, targeted misinformation, and strategic 
attacks on political opponents and minorities are employed to sow enmity 
and strengthen an antagonistic narrative.
The comments in the wake of Keira’s murder shine a light on the ar-
gumentative and functional logic within far-right echo chambers (Ama-
deu Antonio Foundation 2017: 9; Brodnig 2016: 21–35). We analyze these 
chambers to demonstrate how rumors and false reports are used pur-
posefully to strengthen right-wing narratives, but also because such case- 
studies can help those who want to oppose hateful speech, unfounded ru-
mors and fake news. These phenomena cannot be marginalized as prob-
lems exclusive to the internet. Instead, they threaten minorities, erode so-
cial cohesion and thus pose a threat to democracy itself. The second part 
of this chapter highlights strategies to counter this treat, considering the 
reactions by the German state as well as providers of social networks, the 
remaining loopholes, and which promising counter strategies can help 
empower actors within civil society.
FAR-RighT PoliTiCs online
The importance of the internet and social media for organized right-wing 
currents can hardly be overstated. Ever since the dawn of the internet age, 
right-wing actors utilized the internet for networking, recruitment of new 
followers, strategic communication, and the propagation of their world 
view (Dinar/Heyken 2017: 41–42; Caiani/Parenti 2013). The triumph of 
social media since the 2000s coincided with a surge of ethno-national-
ist völkisch, and radically derogatory ideas that have been and are being 
spread through these new channels.
Initially, such ideas lingered on the fringes of non-existence within so-
cial networks. Organized enmity primarily found its niches in closed and 
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non-public groups or little-known websites. Here, hateful speech against 
entire populations could thrive without the public’s notice. In 2015, this 
isolated sphere burst open in Germany due to the establishment of the 
anti-Muslim Pegida movement and the rise of the far-right party Alterna-
tive for Germany (AfD). According to Simone Rafael, the far-right spec-
trum has become significantly emboldened by the successes of the AfD 
and Pegida: “Racist, anti-refugee, and anti-Islam contents now occur un-
disguised on non-right-wing pages or are expressed vehemently in com-
ments to stories by popular media outlets” (Rafael/Ritzmann 2018: 2). By 
and large, the discourse online has been gravitating to the right-wing and 
thus encouraged the normalization of hostile positions. “These positions 
have now become visible and a serious problem”, continued Rafael.
For now, online hate speech has become a popular topic in Germa-
ny. The term itself comprises expressions that aim to deprecate and de- 
nigrate individuals because they are identified as part of a specific group. 
Hate speech stands in for several forms of group-focused enmity, such 
as antisemitism, racism, or hostility towards Sinti and Roma. (Zick et al. 
2016: 33–41) Other than cyberbullying or personal insults, hate speech al-
ways seeks to denigrate characteristics that are ascribed to a certain group 
(Committee of Ministers 2016: 77). Victims of this form of online abuse 
are bereft of the capacity to lead a self-determined life, as hate speech is 
fueled by an ideology of inequality, directed against the democratic princi-
ple that all people are created equal.
We decided to use the term Alternative Right to describe the variety of 
contemporary far-right groups and ideologies which try to convince others 
that the ‘identity of the German people’ is threatened by multiculturalism. 
The concept has been criticized – with some justice – as being euphemis-
tic. Still it seemed more appropriate to us than speaking only of the New 
Right: While both phenomena share an ideology that emphasizes cultural 
and racial homogeneity in one country, the heavy use of social media is 
characteristic for the ‘Alternative Right’ – as the ‘Keira case’ highlights. 
(Amadeu Antonio Foundation 2017: 2; Nagle 2017)
The ‘Keira Case’ and its Hijacking by the Alternative Right
On 7 March 2018 a girl was killed at home in the Berlin district Hohen-
schönhausen. Several stab wounds injured the 14-year-old severely. Para-
medics tried to save her life but could not help. A day later, Berlin’s Police 
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Department issued a press release about the horrible event: The homicide 
division had begun investigations but details on the sequence of events or 
potential suspects were not publicized.2
Shortly after the press release, the first posts on Facebook and Twitter 
using the hashtags #keira and #keiraberlin started to appear. Alternative 
right actors did not need verified information on events or perpetrators 
to instrumentalize Keira’s tragic death for their own political agenda. “20 
stab wounds! The culprit was definitively not German!” wrote one user on 
Twitter. Another suggested: “It is Merkel’s fault, even in the unlikely case 
that the culprit is biodeutsch. Because: We did not know such atrocities 
before the invasion of evil itself”. This last tweet is remarkable in several 
aspects. Its argument provides the justification for improper speculations: 
Even if their allegations are false, they claim to still be entitled to identify 
migrants as “evil itself”. The existence of such violent crimes before the 
summer of 2015 is being ignored despite the facts. The expression bio-
deutsch, which roughly translates to ‘biologically German’, contains a cul-
tural essentialism, according to which only those can be German that have 
a certain number of Germanic ancestors. Its opposite would be ‘passport 
Germans’ (Passdeutsche), who are German citizens, but ‘only’ according to 
their papers and can therefore be singled out as migrants by ‘biological’ 
Germans. Exclusion based on origin becomes ineluctable. And last but 
not least: Angela Merkel is eventually responsible for the whole disaster. 
Not only individual users of social media proliferate such interpretations 
and the corresponding posts. They only retweet and share points made by 
certain actors – right-wing extremists, far-right populist groups, parties, 
media – who stir up fear and hate.
On 11 March, two days after the first press release, Berlin police an-
nounced that they had arrested a suspect who was being interrogat-
ed by homicide detectives. No additional information was published, 
which only kindled further speculations: “The skanky PR department of 
@polizeiberlin refuses to name the cultural origin of the suspect in the 
case of #Keira who was butchered with a knife”, wrote attorney Maximil-
ian Krah on Twitter. Krah is a member of the AfD and a popular speaker 
for the party. Gunnar Lindemann, an AfD state representative in the Ber-
lin parliament, addressed the local police’s Twitter account directly: “Why 
2 | Berlin.de (2018): “Tatverdächtiger ist geständig”, 11 March 2018 (https://
www.berlin.de/polizei/polizeimeldungen/pressemitteilung.682619.php).
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are no details made public? E.g. the perpetrator’s origin? Is something 
being played down?”.
In its response the police department simply referred to the press 
code. The German Press Council (Deutscher Presserat) states in its guide-
lines for reasonable reporting on crimes that generally neither ethnic nor 
religious affiliation should be reported. The rule was designed to avoid 
“discriminating generalizations of individual acts of wrongdoing”.3 Lin-
demann received support from Julian Reichelt, editor-in-chief of BILD, 
a tabloid with the highest circulation in Germany. According to him, the 
press code does not apply to a police Twitter account, tweeting: “We’d like 
to have the regular information on the perpetrator. Thank you!”. By this 
time, speculations on the culprit had been circulating within the alter-
native-right echo chambers for two days. The leading far-right magazine 
Compact wrote that the rumors were justified since the police declined 
further comments.
Toxic Narratives
On the blog PI-News one could read already on 9 March: “‘Mia – Maria – 
Keira’ and hundreds of other injured, raped, and sacrificed German girls: 
Merkel and her system lackeys [Systemlinge] joined in the murders.” The 
website’s name stands for ‘politically incorrect news’. It is one of the most-
read right-wing populist and anti-Islam blogs in Germany. By listing three 
girl’s names, Keira’s murder was connected to two other victims of recent 
violent crimes. For the murder of the student Maria L., an Afghan refugee 
was sentenced to life in prison in Freiburg in 2016. Fifteen-year-old Mia 
from Kandel in Rhineland-Palitinate was stabbed to death in December 
2017. The suspect is her ex-boyfriend, also a refugee from Afghanistan.
Characteristic for far-right echo chambers, several narratives have 
been interwoven in the short statement on PI-News. The three female 
names serve as an insider reference to the blog’s readership that creates 
assumed connections between refugees, Islam, and violence. It is further 
suggested that the increase in asylum seekers correlates with a drama- 
tic rise in violent crimes, especially against women: An external threat is 
3 | Presserat: “Richtlinie 12 – Diskriminierungen”, (http://www.presserat.de/
pressekodex/pressekodex/#panel-zif fer_12_ _ _ _diskriminierungen); Schade 
(2017).
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infiltrating and destabilizing the country. Another sweeping insinuation 
posits that all arriving Muslim men are murderers and rapists (Amadeu 
Antonio Foundation 2016a: 4–7). Politicians, collectively signified in the 
original quote with ‘Merkel’, facilitate this development by not regulating 
immigration and even encouraging it. By doing so, they are opening doors 
to the ‘Islamization’ of Germany. Systemlinge are all those who are arbi-
trarily identified as part of ‘the establishment’. Generally, this includes all 
parties – except for the AfD – journalists of the ‘lying press’, and ‘do-good-
ers’ (Gutmenschen).
Narratives help to explain the world as they establish sensible connec-
tions between isolated events. They provide a wider frame of interpreta-
tion that structures personal opinions. Narratives stir up emotions and 
can help to motivate and mobilize. Thus, they are valuable tools for sowing 
fear and hatred – cornerstone emotions that help exclude whole groups of 
people. One way to trigger such emotions is to repeatedly postulate cor-
relations and causalities that do not exist. Utilized in this manner, narra-
tives become toxic to society. As the Alternative Right constantly preaches 
the bleak dystopian vision of the demise of Germany and its people, the 
groups create an artificial need to take action (Amadeu Antonio Founda-
tion 2017: 9).
This is the playbook that far-right populist AfD party followed in the 
case of Keira. Since its foundation in 2013 as an anti-Euro platform, the 
party has seen a meteoric rise as it continually drifts towards the far-right 
fringes. It masterfully taps into the hysteria raging in alternative-right 
echo chambers. On 31 May 2018 the party’s national Twitter account 
reached 118,000 followers and amassed more than 400,000 likes on Face-
book. 
On the morning of 12th March, the party published a graphic illustra-
tion via both social media accounts showing a blood-splattered wall as a 
background and a stylized knife in the front, accompanied with an all-caps 
warning: “KNIFE EPIDEMIC RAMPANT!”. The posts’ text listed eleven 
crimes that involved knives, counted during the previous week. It claimed 
that Turks, Kurds, Chechens, Afghans, Eritreans, Gambians, and Syrians 
had committed all attacks. Keira’s case had also been listed, accompanied 
with the rhetorical question: “Is this still Central Europe?” Factually, only 
five of the eleven crimes fit the party’s suggested pattern (Vorreyer 2018). 
Despite its false allegations, the post was shared almost 3,000 times on 
Facebook.
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Such statements distort the discussion on criminality and ethnic be-
longing. With its wrongful accusations and non-existent connections the 
party caters to narratives of Germany’s decline, threatened from both out-
side (read: refugees) and inside (read: rotten establishment). The ‘logical’ 
conclusions are implied and do not need to be spelled out: taking action 
against refugees and their supporters, backing up the AfD’s restrictive 
refugee and immigration policies.
Targeted Misinformation
On the eve of 11 March, the Berlin police informed the public that the per-
petrator had been arrested in his parents’ apartment and confessed to the 
crime. According to the press release it was a 15-year-old student from the 
victim’s circle of acquaintances.4 And yet again the speculation machine 
went into overdrive. 
Lutz Bachmann is one of the initiators of the right-wing populist 
Pegida marches (Amadeu Antonio Foundation 2016b: 4). On 12 March, 
Bachmann posted a picture of a 15-year-old boy on both his Twitter and 
Facebook accounts, slandering him in the process. Bachmann wrote: “The 
murder of Keira […] Now it seems to be official: The beast from Caucasus 
[here Bachmann uses the young man’s name], a Chechen Muslim, and 
former refugee”. The post provided a hyperlink to the youth’s Facebook 
page. The images that Bachmann used were snapshots taken from the 
juvenile’s profile. This type of collection and publication of personally 
identifiable information is called doxing and, in this case, there is a par-
ticularly deceitful quality to it: Bachmann’s online vigilantism targeted 
the wrong person on purpose. The youth in question had no connection 
to Keira. He merely shared the first name and the initial of his last name 
with the real perpetrator.
The term ‘fake news’ has been in broad circulation since Donald 
Trump was elected as President of the United States. Trump himself has 
titled all media that reported critically on him as fake news, accusing 
those outlets of deliberately drawing an unfavorable image of his presi-
dency. In the run-up to the German elections in September 2017, many 
commentators feared that false reporting could impact and sway voters. 
4 | Berlin.de (2018): “Tatverdächtiger ist geständig”, 11 March 2018 (https://
www.berlin.de/polizei/polizeimeldungen/pressemitteilung.682619.php).
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Researchers from the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV), a think tank 
at the intersection of technology and society, investigated the reach of and 
ways through which fake news was proliferated. The authors concluded: 
“‘Fake news’ are targeted, false or at least deceptive information, designat-
ed to harm someone (individuals, organizations, or groups)” (Sängerlaub 
et al. 2018: 11). The willful intention behind the information is essential. 
Intentionality is what differentiates fake news from sloppily researched 
reporting (“poor journalism”) or glossy headlines online that captivate 
readers’ interest to generate clicks but deviate from the article’s contents – 
a scheme known as ‘click-baiting’.
As the SNV’s study suggests, the fake news in Germany have been pre-
dominantly spread by right-wing populists or right-wing extremists. Their 
use of the concept to discredit established media constitutes “a double per-
version of truth” criticized by the authors. “While they berate established 
media as fake news and lying press (Lügenpresse) they do not put truthful-
ness front and center. Only the type of media content that supports one’s 
own world-view is regarded as legitimate – the rest is ‘fake news’” (ibid; 
Brodnig 2017: 28–38).
In order to protect himself from hate speech within social media, the 
unjustly accused 15-year-old deleted his profile picture and several posts 
on his Facebook timeline. And yet, months later and despite the facts that 
Bachmann’s tweet is obviously a lie and the police are investigating him 
for it, the false accusations, full name and pictures of the 15-year-old still 
circulate online, accessible to everyone. Political actors like Lutz Bach-
mann aim to fabricate assumed truths in service of their own agenda. 
Bachmann’s own reaction, once his tweet had been uncovered as fake, also 
reflects this. In response to critical posts he merely replied with several 
smilies and insisted that what he wrote, “seems to be official” (Wienand 
2018). He then deleted his posts. Any sign of regret for wrongfully accu- 
Fsing a high school student is missing.
The police also reacted to Bachmann’s posts, trying to quell the ru-
mors spreading within the alternative right’s echo chambers. Berlin’s po-
lice department published a screenshot of Bachmann’s post crossed by 
red, bold letters spelling “FAKE” on Facebook and Twitter. The pictures 
of the student had been pixelated to prevent identification. In the post, 
police officers stated that “willful misinformation regarding the suspect’s 
background and citizenship” circulated online. They demanded: “Please, 
do not take part in speculation and agitating speech and please do not 
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share FAKES”. In another post, the department explained potential con-
sequences of sharing misinformation: “Do not partake in inciting speech. 
[…] Report every user who shares such pictures on Facebook. Those who 
publish may be punishable by law”.
In the police post’s comment section, several users demanded that the 
suspect’s ‘cultural background’ should be made public. According to a ra-
cist world-view, German citizenship is not sufficient proof that someone is 
‘truly’ German. One Facebook user wrote: “Obviously it was a PASSPORT 
German”. Eventually, the Berlin police department reacted to the ceaseless 
requests: “Regrettable that this question is an issue at all. The suspect is 
German and has no migratory background (if such a thing can be defined 
at all)”, retorted the officers.
ChAllenging The e x TReme RighT online: 
CoUnTeR-sTR ATegies FoR The digiTAl CiVil soCie T y
The far-right comments surrounding the Keira case demonstrate how 
hate speech, misinformation, and rumors are used intentionally to rein-
force narratives within right-wing echo chambers. Apparently, to the Al-
ternative Right and its actors hate speech and intentional manipulation 
are legitimate tool to compete politically. Germany’s federal government 
has its eye on hate speech and intends to oppose it. On January 1, 2018 the 
so-called “Network Enforcement Act” (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 
NetzDG) went into effect.5 From an international perspective this legisla-
tion constitutes a novel and aggressive approach to force social media com-
panies to crack down on hateful, slanderous, or racist posts. At the heart 
of the law lies the obligation on the companies to register user complaints 
immediately and to delete “content obviously punishable by law” within 
24 hours or seven days in less clear incidents. Additionally, social media 
providers have to report their resources, teams, and measures dedicated to 
deleting hateful and punishable content every three months. From a civil 
society perspective, the new legislation’s biggest benefit is an increase in 
transparency with regard to the companies’ curating practices. But there 
5 | The German Federal Ministry of Justice and for Consumer Protection provides 
an English translation of the act, 30 May 2018 (http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Themen/
FokusThemen/NetzDG/NetzDG_EN_node.html).
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is much to be lamented. First and foremost, NetzDG shifts the decision 
about whether or not certain contents are illegal and therefore actionable 
on to the employees of private companies. NGOs and experts issued a 
Declaration of Freedom of Expression criticizing this transfer of respon-
sibilities as an unfortunate privatization of law enforcement.6 They are 
also concerned that the high fines threatened by the German government 
might lead to so called ‘overblocking’, which entails the excessive dele-
tion of contents that are not unlawful. The legislation misses the point 
that most hate speech comments and strategic communications within 
and from right-wing echo chambers are not punishable by law but are 
covered by the very freedom of expression activists try to preserve. To be 
successful in fighting right-wing extremism, -populism, and hate speech 
online, the combined efforts of civil society actors, social media providers, 
and national legislators are required. A digital civil society should pursue 
three goals: 
1. Support and protect victims of hate speech.
2. Visualize, repel, and counter intolerance and group-focused enmity.
3. Strengthen a democratic culture of debate.
1) Hate speech usually targets people that are already discriminated 
against. All users can help: by standing in solidarity with affected individ-
uals; by resolutely contradicting hostile comments; by reporting offensive 
content to social media providers or the authorities. Like all users, hosts of 
large Facebook pages, e.g. media companies or publishers, should be in-
terested in pluralistic debates free from discrimination in their comments 
sections. To enable such a debate, resources for community management 
need to be allocated to utilize all tools of moderation available. According 
to a study by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a proactive 
moderation of websites is essential: sites without moderators are up to 100 
per cent more likely to be commented on by right-wing extremist. Enmity 
and hate speech can prosper wherever they remain unopposed. The inter-
net’s old words of wisdom – ‘don’t feed the troll’ – seem refuted. Further-
more, the study shows that hate speech is proliferated and supported by 
very few users – yet they still have a dominant impact on debates. Accor- 
6 | Declaration on Freedom of Expressionon Freedom of Expression (5 April 
2017). Online:  (https://deklaration-fuer-meinungsfreiheit.de/en/).
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ding to the authors, only one per cent of all users generate 25 per cent of all 
likes for hateful comments. Despite their small numbers, these users act 
jointly and express their views aggressively (Kreißel et al. 2018: 12).
2) Right-wing extremist media and their accounts that propagate hate 
speech regard themselves both as being in the right and untouchable when 
they do not have to fear dissent or repercussions. This means, in turn, that 
a digital civil society needs to contradict them within these spaces. Before 
becoming active, users interested in opposing enmity online should think 
first of self-preservation and check what kind of private details about them 
are available online through their profiles. Posts can go viral or at least 
have a surprising reach. Far-right extremists or other hateful communi-
ties might use publicly accessible information against those who challenge 
them. It can be meaningful and sensitive to contradict contemptuous, in-
human posts. One should not expect, however, to convince determined 
haters of an opposite worldview. This will happen very rarely. This limit 
should not ennoble racist or slanderous positions as legitimate arguments 
worth considering. One should rather aim to address and convince the 
part of the silent reading majority that is open to argument. Eventually 
one can help minimize the influence of hate speech and its proponents 
and to protect those targeted by them. Those who do not want to contradict 
hate speech actively could instead like, and thus support, arguments that 
do. Additionally, all users can launch interventions, websites, campaigns, 
or hashtags for equality and against enmity – either alone or with the help 
of allies. A variety of tools are at their disposal: websites or campaigns can 
provide information on far-right actors and document their activities; one 
can work with humor or polemics, or provide arguments, knowledge, and 
facts to those willing to take a pro-equality position within debates. All of 
the approaches above are useful and can cross-fertilize each other in their 
plurality.
3) Advocates of a democratic civil society, who build alliances, organize 
counter-protests against Neo-Nazis, or welcome refugees in the real world, 
still act too timidly in the virtual realm. To spread their approaches to the 
online world, they should cooperate with digital activists. As of now, there 
are too few democratic counter-narratives that celebrate diversity, equality, 
and human rights online. To spread these positive narratives, democrats 
should not reject emotional approaches. State institutions, in turn, should 
not rest on the laurels of the NetzDG legislation, whose impact remains 
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marginal so far.7 A more effective way would be to sponsor youth and adult 
programs that strengthen competencies in using different media. As a 
consequence, users can spot intentional misinformation more easily. Fi-
nally, victims of hate speech and cyberbullying need support and places to 
which they can turn, online and in real life.
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Counter-Creativity  
Innovative Ways to Counter  
Far-Right Communication Tactics
Julia Ebner
“The left can’t meme”, is a common saying among the Alt-Right. Far-right 
efforts to mock the political correctness of the liberal left – who they call 
“libtards”1 – and ridicule the conservative mainstream – in their words, 
“cuckservatives”2 – have relied on transgressive jokes and funny visuals. 
In an unexpectedly inventive fashion, the far right has pioneered a new 
wave of taboo-breaking and controlled provocation, which they call ‘trig-
gering’. “We use the tactics of the left against them”, many of them would 
say. Ironically taking inspiration from the civil rights youth revolts, their 
biggest scapegoat for everything they deem wrong in today’s society, the 
far right has been imitating 1960’s counter-culture strategies to protest 
against establishment politics. Their focus on lifestyle, youth culture and 
the arts can be seen as an attempt to reach the critical mass needed for 
any counterculture movement: in their case, this paradoxically takes the 
shape of a globalized counterculture that is opposed to ‘globalism’, and 
uses modern communication tools to spread anti-modern ideas.
While one can argue whether offensive Pepe the Frog memes (the 
symbol co-opted by the Alt-Right) and racist Synthwave tracks (the favo- 
rite music genre of white nationalists) qualify as art, it is self-evident that 
this new far-right counter-culture has successfully galvanized young peo-
ple worldwide into supporting often openly racist and dangerous groups. 
1 | “Libtard” is a derogatory term used by the Alt-Right – combining the words 
liberal and retard – to describe left-leaning liberals.
2 | “Cuckservative” is a derogatory term used by the Alt-Right – combining the 
words cuckold and conservative – to describe center-right conservatives.
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Has their offer for a collective identity that rejects the political, econom-
ic and societal status quo been sexier, faster and more innovative than 
the voices trying to counter it? Many counterspeech efforts against the 
Alt-Right have been declared ineffective or even counter-productive. Two 
major stumbling blocks for those of us who care about countering the 
far-right’s growth have been our limited understanding of emerging sub-
cultures on the internet coupled with a lack of creative and proactive ap-
proaches. Researchers, artists and concerned citizens can play a huge role 
in filling these gaps.
This chapter will outline a strategy to replace, optimize and comple-
ment current approaches to prevent, disrupt and counter online far-right 
activities. First, it will analyze the set of post-digital tactics employed by 
the far right when targeting different audiences and assess its current 
comparative advantages. In a next step, it will then suggest solutions to 
counter far-right post-internet campaigns, drawing on insights from re-
search and evaluation projects that measured the effectiveness of different 
counter speech and interruption approaches. Furthermore, it will discuss 
a range of novel, experimental approaches that could potentially add to 
the range of current attempts being made to counter far-right activities in 
cyberspace. 
FR Aming The ChAllenge 
Over the past few years, far-right actors have been successful at exploit-
ing windows of opportunity offered by the emergence of new media eco-
systems and the novel interconnected information and communication 
cycles they afford. More specifically, they have leveraged the digital space 
for three different types of campaigns to reach their key audiences: ra- 
dicalization campaigns targeting sympathizers, manipulation campaigns 
targeting the mainstream, and intimidation campaigns targeting political 
opponents.
Radicalization campaigns aimed at sympathizers involve the sophis-
ticated use of micro-targeting, the hijacking of youth culture and the ex-
ploitation of tabooed and under-addressed grievances, fears and identity 
crises, which have enabled far-right actors to lure vulnerable internet us-
ers into their networks. Andrew Anglin, founder of the world’s biggest 
neo-Nazi website Daily Stormer, which is now banned across the world, 
Counter-Creativity 171
has pioneered some of these tactics. By using troll armies and far-right 
influencers with large followerships as mouthpieces, Anglin has managed 
to inject his propaganda pieces into mainstream social media channels. 
His antisemitic conspiracy theories and neo-Nazi ideologies often come 
under the disguise of satire and transgressive internet culture (O’Brien 
2017; Feinberg 2017; Marantz 2017).
Increasingly, far-right groups have learnt to segment their audienc-
es, using micro-targeting tactics and tailoring their language to the dif- 
ferent sub-cultures they want to reach. For example, the organizers of the 
white supremacist Charlottesville protest used entirely different sets of 
memes3 and propaganda pieces for the different communication channels 
they targeted. Their rally trailers on fringe neo-Nazi websites and forums 
were much more explicitly racist and antisemitic than their propaganda 
contents on Twitter and Facebook. While the former featured Swastikas 
and called for the annihilation of Jews, the latter focused on topics such 
as freedom of speech and Southern heritage and addressed fears of immi-
gration and the loss of cultural identity. The aim of these hyper-targeted 
campaigns was to appeal to different online communities along the far-
right ideological spectrum and eventually ‘unite the right’ on the basis of 
their lowest common denominators (Davey/Ebner 2017).
Manipulation campaigns aimed at the ‘greyzones’ involve the creation, 
planting and dissemination of disinformation and the use of psy-ops style 
online campaigns, which have allowed far-right actors to influence main-
stream discussions. Manuals circulated in American Alt-Right networks 
and their European equivalents include detailed instructions on how to 
‘redpill the normies’ – a euphemism for hacking the minds of average 
users. Their strategy documents include guidelines on how to initiate con-
versations, build trust, exploit common grievances and tailor the language 
to the person they seek to bring closer to their ideologies. Generation Iden-
tity highlights that family members and friends might be the easiest tar-
get groups to start with (Generation D. 2017). The New Right Network has 
even hosted tutorials on Youtube, explaining step by step how to “redpill 
your girlfriend/wife”.4
3 | Memes are graphics of visual and textual remixes shared and widely distri- 
buted in online spaces.
4 | New Right Network (2018): “How to Red-Pill your Woman/Girlfriend/Wife or ANY 
woman PARTII”, 26 June 2018 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cdv1yDJfH_g).
172 Julia Ebner
Manipulation campaigns seeking to provoke the ‘greyzones’ to pick a 
side have become a particular priority for the international Alt-Right in 
the run-up to elections. ‘Strategic polarization’ is a concept the far right 
uses to deliberately sow discord, divide communities and spread binary 
world views. Its goal is to force the moderate middle to choose a side in 
order to expand the influence of the political fringes. At the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue (ISD), we have monitored far-right trolling armies who 
sought to influence the elections in favor of far-right populist parties in 
the US, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden and found that the tactics 
they employed, their language and media ecosystems all followed roughly 
the same pattern (see graphic below). The campaigns usually start with 
Alt-Right users trying to mobilize and recruit sympathizers on messaging 
platforms such as 4chan and 8chan in English. Their next step has been 
to shift those conversations into encrypted applications such as Telegram 
and Discord, where they collect materials in the local language and plan 
campaigns that they can then launch on mainstream social media plat-
forms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Their aim is to shape the 
online discourse, set the agenda for discussions and put pressure on pol-
iticians to ultimately persuade the mainstream to support their parties of 
choice (Ebner/Davey 2018).
Author‘s visualization of far-right online influence ecosystems.
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Intimidation campaigns aimed at opponents involve trolling and coordi-
nated hate campaigns have enabled far-right actors to harass, silence and 
publicly discredit critical voices and political opponents including jour-
nalists, activists and politicians (Kreißel et al. 2018). Doxxing has been 
a particularly popular tactic among Alt-Right actors who want to take re-
venge on individuals who openly criticized them or simply don not share 
their opinions. The Crash Override Network, an organization made up of 
former cyber-bullying victims, defines doxxing as “a common first-stage 
tactic of mobs of anonymous online groups looking to intimidate you and 
start digging up information on your life”.5 Campaigns that involve the 
leaking of an individual’s address and phone number, do not just fuel on-
line hate but also increase the likelihood that these people are attacked in 
real life. In the US, activists, journalists and even academics have become 
increasingly frequent targets of doxing campaigns and cyber-harassment. 
At least 250 university professors reportedly became victims of right-wing 
online campaigns between early 2017 and mid-2018 (Kamenetz 2018). For 
example, Joshua Cuevas, a psychology professor at the University of North 
Georgia received racist and threatening private messages and was target-
ed in a sophisticated public doxxing campaign for his liberal leanings. 
“Those of us in higher education increasingly find ourselves the target 
of hostilities” (Cuevas 2018), he reflected in a firsthand account for the 
American Association of University Professors. 
Ultimately, all three types of campaigns – radicalization, manipulation 
and intimidation – are designed to maximize the far right’s online and of-
fline influence by provoking overreactions on a political and societal level, 
which can set in motion profound systemic change.
The far right currently holds a number of comparative advantages in 
the realm of strategic communications: First of all, its campaigns have 
benefitted from the significant time lag in the responses given by policy 
makers, tech firms and civil society. Not only were the prevention and 
countering efforts often reactive but they also tended to be inward-look-
ing and generic. Far-right activists are currently ahead of those trying to 
counter their activities on at least three levels: they have been better at 
5 | Crash Override (2018): Preventing Doxing: “A Primer on Removing your Per-
sonal Information from the most Commonly Exploited Places”, (http://www.cra 
shoverridenetwork.com/preventingdoxing.html).
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exploiting new technologies, at fostering international ties and synergies, 
and at appealing to young audiences.
Far-right extremists, as early adopters of new technology, have been 
particularly apt at spotting and exploiting infrastructural loopholes and 
socio-psychological weaknesses that social media have unleashed within 
our societies. By coordinating slick campaigns in encrypted channels and 
then propagating these on mainstream social media platforms, far-right 
groups have managed to conquer entire online spaces, leveraging the tra-
ditional media’s growing pressure to compete for clicks and baits with 
their faster online counterparts (Kreißel et al. 2018). 
Yet, far-right extremist efforts and effects are by no means limited to 
cyberspace. Many fringe groups have built powerful online-offline hybrid 
strategies to maximize their real-world impact. By sharing knowledge and 
experience across borders, far-right movements in Europe and the US 
have been able to learn from each other. “We’ve mastered the online ac-
tivism, you’ve mastered the in-real-life activism”, said American far-right 
activist Brittany Pettibone in a filmed conversation with European Identi-
tiarian figurehead Martin Sellner in 2017 (Sellner 2017).
The pan-European white nationalist group Generation Identity as well 
as American Alt-Right influencers frequently stage carefully planned 
media stunts on the street, which they then livestream to social media 
(Hentges et al. 2014). By combining sharable – often shocking – contents 
with credible messengers – often charismatic influencers with massive 
followerships – their slick social media campaigns are easily turned vi-
ral. The result is a wide online reach that goes beyond their own fanbase, 
which in turn forces traditional news outlets to report about them. This 
is particularly true once a tipping point is reached, where fringe groups 
make hashtags and their content trends in numbers significantly large 
enough to penetrate mainstream audiences (Philips 2018). 
The creation of transnational and cross-ideological alliances, and ex-
ploitation of international synergies, are a second area where the far right 
seem to have gained a ‘first mover’ advantage. Over the past few years 
the phenomenon of “networked nationalism” (Donovan et al. 2018) has 
become a growing aspect of far-right movements. Increasingly, far-right 
groups and actors put aside ideological differences and historic sources 
of in-fighting. For instance, the Defend Europe mission in the summer 
of 2017, which sought to prevent NGOs from rescuing drowning refugees 
in the Mediterranean Sea, received social media support and donations 
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from across the world (Davey/Ebner 2017). Cases such as the Defend Eu-
rope campaign, the Charlottesville rally and multi-group mobilisiations 
in the run-up to elections, are examples of such explicit efforts to cross 
borders and overcome ideological differences for the sake of maximizing 
collective impact. To act as agents of change they opportunistically join 
forces, focusing on the lowest common denominator: their shared ene-
mies and their shared goals. These are most commonly their aversion to 
multiculturalism, their opposition to ‘establishment’ politics, their hatred 
of the left, and their fear that cultural-ethnic identity is being eroded. All 
three, and others, have become a bridge that has brought together far-right 
groups who traditionally did not cooperate.
The targeting of young people through the creation of counter-culture 
movements and the use of gamification in their communication and re-
cruiting strategies have given far-right activists a third advantage. “Politics 
is downstream from culture. I want to change the cultural narrative”, said 
Andrew Breitbart, the creator of the website that has become the premier 
source of information and commentary for today’s far right (Poniewozig 
2012). Based on Breitbart’s philosophy of changing politics by altering 
culture, far-right movements and influencers have placed their bets on 
developing a strategy that has the potential to bring about drastic attitu-
dinal and behavioral changes within large sections of society. In their 
positioning against the political establishment and in satirical fashion 
their messaging has resonated well with a range of sub-cultures such as 
online gamers, anti-feminists and conspiracy theorists who now coalesce 
around common themes, grievances and online meeting points. The de-
velopment of a shared set of insider jokes, references and even a common 
playbook for online campaigns has created a strong sense of in- and out-
group thinking.
The online far-right’s successes in reaching young digital natives have 
been particularly striking. Their use of computer game references, anti-es-
tablishment rhetoric and exciting counter-culture activities has allowed 
them to appeal to large proportions of Generation Z and the millennials. 
By hiding racial slurs behind funny memes and jokes, and by replacing 
traditional swastika-ridden attire with cool jeans and Ray Ban sunglasses, 
the far right has increasingly polished its image among younger genera-
tions. 
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de VeloPing The ResPonse
An international framework to protect those targeted by radicalization, 
manipulation and intimidation campaigns should be based on a collabo-
rative, integrated approach that builds on the following pillars: Predicting 
the trends, understanding the audiences, building an anti-hate coalition, 
and testing new intervention approaches.
Many of the response systems in place have been too slow to be effective 
as a result of a failure to predict new trends in the use of new technology 
and communication strategies by far-right activists. Research is needed to 
understand the emerging new media ecosystems, their internal dynamics 
as well as their influence on mainstream platforms. Over the last couple 
of years, far-right campaigners have increasingly moved their operations 
to so-called ‘Alt-Tech platforms’ (see Donovan et al. in this book), reacting 
to the introduction of stricter anti-hate speech measures across major Sili-
con Valley companies like Facebook, Twitter and Google. Alt-Tech safe ha-
vens for far-right extremists include, for instance, Alt-Right social media 
like Gab and Minds, the far-right’s Youtube equivalent Pewtube, and the 
white supremacist crowdsourcing website Hatreon. These virtual migra-
tion streams demonstrate that a static, linear perspective will fail to reflect 
the changes in the fast-paced online universe of far-right extremists. It is 
therefore necessary to look at how different platforms interact with each 
other and are used as part of an information and communication ecosys-
tem that runs in parallel to that of the political mainstream. 
Some of the measures undertaken to prevent or disrupt far-right mobi-
lization proved ineffective or even counter-productive due to an insufficient 
understanding of the far-right’s support base, its key target audiences and 
the characteristics of their various sub-cultures. Furthermore, neglecting 
the high degree of interconnectedness among far-right networks can re-
strict the desired effect of counterspeech campaigns or even backfire. 
A case in point is the #MoreThanARefugee video, which told the sto-
ries of individuals who had to flee their countries and was featured on 
Youtube Spotlight in June 2017 as part of the Creators for Change initia-
tive. The campaign focused on maximizing its visibility and reach among 
a general audience but experienced a significant backlash from far-right 
communities on 4chan and Reddit, who launched a so-called ‘dislike raid’ 
on a massive scale. Their reframing and mockery of the original message 
allowed them to spread their campaign on Twitter, where they were able 
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to encourage even moderate users to participate. A month after #More-
ThanARefugee was published, the video counted over 450,000 dislikes, 
compared to just 144,000 likes. The vast majority of its 80,000 comments 
were negative or contained hateful speech and threatening language. For 
example, ISD’s analysis of a sample of 239 of the 80,000 comments re-
vealed that just 4 percent held positive sentiment.
Raids like these expose the need to significantly step up our efforts 
to  comprehend how far-right subcultures take shape in online spaces, 
as well as their grievances, language, insider jokes and reference points. 
Only a handful of institutes are currently focused on the far-right’s use 
of new media. For example, MIT’s Center for Civic Media, the Oxford 
Internet Institute and Data & Society Foundation have released seminal 
studies that can lay the foundation for further research. The University of 
Amsterdam’s Alt-Right Open Intelligence Initiative has released the first 
comprehensive taxonomy of trolls and far-right online communities. Us-
ing Google’s BigQuery Tool, the researchers conducted a linguistic anal-
ysis of 3 billion Reddit comments.6 Likewise, scholars at University Col-
lege London have developed a way to measure how memes spread across 
the web and have identified the most influential groups in the creation 
and dissemination of memetic contents. Their study shows how far-right 
actors have weaponized neutral memes such as Pepe the Frog to spread 
politically loaded, racist and antisemitic messages.7
However, online sub-cultures and different parts of the online far-
right networks remain underexplored. Their audiences are often mis-
understood by outsider commentators. Only by studying their narratives 
and language can we get to the core of their motivations, ideologies and 
identity perceptions. These insights could then serve as a basis to develop 
adequate intervention approaches to debunk, discredit and counter their 
messages.
The creation of a global multi-agent coalition against far-right cam-
paigns in the digital space could be the starting point for coordinating 
6 | Alt-Right Open Intelligence Initiative (2017): “Mapping the Alt-Right: US Alter-
native Right across the Atlantic”, 18 July 2017 (https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/
Dmi/AltRightOpenIntelligenceInitiative).
7 | MIT Technology Review (2018): “This is where Internet Memes Come from”, 11 
June 2018 (https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611332/this-is-where-inter 
net-memes-come-from/).
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such intervention efforts, as well as a massive step towards reducing the 
comparative advantages held by the far right. The goal should be to foster 
closer cooperation between researchers, policymakers, the private sector 
and civil society. Concerted efforts led by stakeholders on all levels could 
help to develop and scale novel approaches to prevent, disrupt and counter 
far-right campaigns. 
Ideally, an integrated intervention model would combine proactive 
counterspeech and rapid reaction systems that make use of internation-
al, cross-sector synergies and explore innovative methods for audience 
analysis, segmentation and micro-targeting. The development of counter-
speech or disruption campaigns should be based on in-depth research of 
the new trends and the target audiences. The first step in the development 
of effective response mechanisms is audience segmentation. Once the dif-
ferent sub-audiences as well as their preferred communication medium 
have been identified, messages that use credible messengers should be 
tailored to the different specifics of the different sub-cultures then tested 
across different platforms (Tuck/Silverman 2016).8 
Most counterspeech and intervention approaches do come with a cer-
tain degree of risk. For example, harmful side effects may include causing 
unintended exposure to extremist propaganda, provoking negative be-
lief reinforcement, setting off cumulative extremism dynamics, or trig-
gering a backlash from fringe communities as in the case of the #More-
ThanARefugee dislike raid. ISD has developed a risk framework that can 
serve as a guide to categorize and minimize many of these problems. 
Building resilience, raising awareness and offering hate aid can reduce 
the risks associated with anti-hate-speech campaigns. The Online Civil 
Courage Initiative, which ISD founded in cooperation with Facebook, or 
networks such as the German organization das NETTZ, can help to con-
nect and empower young activists and NGOs and offer advice and safety 
nets to those that are at risk of receiving abuse as a result of their anti-hate 
campaigns. 
Although risk mitigation is important, it should not prevent interven-
tion providers from taking entirely novel approaches. The self-imposed 
limits of counter-speech should be reconsidered, and new prevention and 
8 | RAN (2017): “RAN Guidelines for Effective Alternative and Counter-Narrative 
Campaigns”, (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/
pages/201702_ran_how_to_measure_impact_of_online_campaign_en.pdf).
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disruption approaches tested as a process of constant improvement. Initia-
tives such as #ichbinhier, an anti-hate community that counters coordinat-
ed trolling and hateful commentary on Facebook, and the No Hatespeech 
Movement, a campaign that mobilizes young people to speak up against 
hate speech, are excellent examples for new models that have effectively 
disrupted and reduced online far-right activities. Counterspeech needs to 
become more dynamic, more innovative and bolder to reach some of the 
obscure and self-absorbed internet cultures as well as those in the grey-
zones. Our future efforts need to be:
• Dynamic: Involving both proactive communication and rapid respon-
se systems to react to spontaneous far-right campaigns. Pro-active 
efforts need a significantly more nuanced method of choosing their 
messages, messengers and medium based on the target audience that 
the campaign seeks to reach. On the other hand, rapid ad-hoc interven-
tions require the pooling of resources and linking of networks, so that 
these can quickly be leveraged and adapted to different contexts. Whe-
never an incident or news event triggers a far-right reaction, this kind 
of collective synchronicity would allow for immediate civic responses. 
• Innovative: Developing creative messages could be done in cooperation 
with artists, scientists or even trolling communities. Furthermore, it 
may be worth testing experimental approaches, using for example vi-
deo games and app games (Ament 2017; Bogost 2006), interactive vi-
deos and music. Out-of-the-box thinking will be essential to penetrate 
new audiences and offer appealing alternatives to those provided by 
extremists.
• Bold: Sexy counterspeech needs to develop bolder and funnier con-
tents. It needs to dare to break taboos, transcend the limits of con-
ventional debates and present issues from entirely new perspectives. 
While the use of sarcasm and humor can be an immensely powerful 
tool to establish sympathy, our research at ISD showed that it can also 
render counter-narrative campaigns counter-productive if it devalues 
or mocks the target audience. However, for example, self-ironizing can 
act as a formidable icebreaker.
To conclude, more research into the different online sub-cultures targeted 
by far-right campaigns will be needed to engage with them in a construc-
tive way. Without a more thorough understanding of their grievances, lan-
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guage, insider jokes and reference points that are galvanizing, far-right 
communities, counterspeech efforts are likely to miss their objective. 
Moreover, a strong coalition of researchers, policy makers, the tech sector, 
artists and voluntary activists will be necessary to pilot new, innovative 
bottom-up approaches to countering far-right campaigns. A counter-cul-
ture to extremist counter-cultures can only be led by civil society itself. 
The Online Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI) is one of many initiatives that 
provide an infrastructure and support network for civil society activists 
fighting at the frontlines to counter online radicalization and hate speech. 
No doubt the challenges are growing in scope and sophistication, but so 
are the response mechanisms.
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Activating the Archive From Below at a 
Moment of Cultural and Political Crisis
Gregory Sholette
The delirium and crisis of capitalism – as well as of art – is now the deli- 
rium and crisis of liberal democracy. From India and Turkey to the Phil-
ippines and the Gulf region, from Hungary to Austria and Italy, from the 
US to parts of Central America and the UK, it appears that both developed 
and developing nations are being equally afflicted with a global contagion 
of nationalistic and authoritarian sentiment grounded in fear, hatred, and 
above all, pessimism about any government’s or any politician’s promise 
to provide a stable and secure future. Neoliberalism’s postponement of 
crisis through consumer credit expansion has run its course. In its place 
we find a narrative invoking wealthy male leadership, military capacity 
and warnings of retribution towards one’s perceived competitors as well 
as certain targeted minorities, be they other states, refugees, precarious 
and paperless migrant workers or even the disaffected surplus populace 
of one’s own nation. On the positive side, the proponents of this toxic worl-
dview who may previously have been hiding in the bushes have no more 
need for camouflage. The stakes for liberal civil societies have become 
much clearer and more urgent.1
Meanwhile, art’s mythical quarantine from everyday life, already made 
improbable under the conditions of what I call bare art, is clearly no longer 
viable in light of the gestating political and economic crisis we now face. 
A ‘bare art world’ has emerged, one in which art’s mystique and romance 
have boiled away, and where its imagined historical autonomy from the 
1 | Some parts of this essay initially appeared in the Postscript and other sec-
tions of my (2017) book Delirium and Resistance: Activist Art and the Crisis of 
Capitalism.
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market place has collapsed to such a degree that the laws of supply and 
demand can be invoked about cultural production without irony. We see 
this nakedness at work when artworks are blatantly transformed into an 
investment instrument, making our nostalgic belief that creative work is 
inherently antithetical to capital vanish into thin air. As one senior man-
ager of the global financial consulting firm Deloitte enthusiastically puts 
it, when the complete monetization of art takes hold its:
“financial activities will have ripple effects on other sectors of the economy. This 
evolution should create a new era for the ar t markets and for the benefit of the 
society as a whole by fostering culture, knowledge and creativity” (Picinatti di To-
cello 2010: 23). 
However, this state of cultural ultra-reification is not the end of art’s sub-
versive potential. This process of reification has both positive and negative 
effects. For example, being subjected to the delusion that capitalism is 
an ahistorical inevitability is a negative deformation caused by reification, 
but confronting our bare art world without illusions is a potentially posi-
tive way of utilizing objectification, a chance to see our conditions clearly. 
The only catch is that the ‘real’ we perceive so plainly is itself delirious. 
In short, we have entered what Rebecca Bryant calls the “uncanny pre-
sent”, which is a shorthand way to say that we seem to be experiencing 
the present as if it were unfamiliar and the future as a mere repetition of 
the present – known and unknown, anticipated and unanticipated, all at 
the same time (Bryant 2016: 27). This surreal feeling of displacement in 
an ersatz reality was neatly summed up by journalist Matthew Yglesias: 
“We’re living through a weird and disturbing dream and we don’t seem 
able to wake up” (Yglesias 2018).
That said, from this moment forwards, culture no longer serves as a 
salve for nervous souls. Art’s freedom – as long as it lasts – its peculiar 
license to speak up, to misbehave, mock and imitate reality, to blur genres 
and disciplines, must be deployed to prevent the normalization of the 
emerging authoritarian paradigm. And if it is blocked, it must then move 
underground to continue its mission as what I call a form of “artistic dark 
matter” (Sholette 2010).
Artistic dark matter refers to the marginalized and systematically 
underdeveloped aggregate of creative productivity that nonetheless repro-
duces the material and symbolic economy of high art. Think of the way 
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the majority of art school graduates will, ten years after graduating, find 
themselves working as exhibition installers or art fabricators, rather than 
living off the sales of their own art (that is, if they are still making art at 
all). Or similarly, the way countless collectives and interventionist art prac-
titioners add energy and ideas to the overall art world from the margins, 
while only a few ever gain recognition within the white citadels of that 
same world. Instead, most participants in high art – the sphere of muse-
ums and galleries and international biennials – make up a necessarily re-
dundant economy of artistic labor. Think of this as a residual agency that 
operates out of sight and from below, somewhere within a surplus archive 
of artistic hopes, possibilities, failures and alternative practices. I call that 
surplus archive, the archive from below. How this underground archive is 
continually developed and expressed against the force of repressive pow-
ers is central to my argument here, just as it is essential to the develop-
ment of socially-engaged art practices that can offer any counter-culture 
to the growing authoritarian mainstream culture.
neolibeR Alism, ComPliCiT y And ResisTAnCe
How art got to this juncture is politically and art-historically significant. 
In the 1990s, a fresh wave of activist art and cultural collectivism emerged 
to immediately challenge many key assumptions held by an earlier gen-
eration of politically engaged artists still linked to the rebellions of May 
1968. Dovetailing with the rise of the counter, or ‘alt’ globalization move-
ment (not to be confused with the more recent term ‘Alt-Right’), this new 
cultural activism was less concerned with demystifying ideology than cre-
atively disrupting it. Unlike most of the critical art practices of the 1970s 
and 1980s, in which dominant representational forms were systematically 
analyzed through a variety of methods ranging from Semiotics to Marx-
ism, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, the new approach plowed directly and 
some would say gleefully into what Guy Debord described as “the society 
of the spectacle” in 1967 (Debord 1994). Groups such as RTmark, The 
Yes Men, Yomango, Electronic Disturbance Theater, Nettime, and Critical 
Art Ensemble, among other artists’ collectives, took full advantage of in-
creasingly widespread and affordable digital communication networks in 
order to practice what was often referred to as “tactical media”, a concept 
inspired as much by the Zapatista rebellion as it was by the Situationist In-
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ternational. According to key theorists of tactical media David Garcia and 
Geert Lovink, the practice involved the appropriation of cheap, available 
technologies for the purpose of engendering political resistance amongst 
socially disenfranchised populations.2
What was unique to these 1990s antagonistic practices was the way 
technology-based artists took advantage of post-Fordist capital’s distribut-
ed communicative networks in order to generate acts of disruption within 
its very structure. Tactical media did this by mobilizing those ‘surplus’ 
practices and practitioners of the archive from below. Though only infor-
mally structured, this ‘secondary economy’ of informal dark matter pro-
ductivity functioned in cellular fashion, much like a social club or rock 
band. Sometimes it even established its own ersatz institutions, or mock-
stitutions, with intentionally unstable public identities (Robert 2015). This 
marginal agency was also structurally entangled with, or parasitic upon, 
the existing mainstream art world and mass media sector as well as (to 
some degree) their cultural markets, hence the term ‘secondary economy’. 
In this way, tactical media practitioners diverged even further from the 
somewhat more hierarchically structured art activism of the 1960s-80s, 
with its vision of an entirely autonomous political cultural sphere.3 In-
stead, the cultural interventionists of the 1990s and 2000s championed 
small-scale, in-between spaces and ephemeral gestures for their work, of-
ten illegally infiltrating public squares, corporate websites, libraries, flea 
markets, housing projects and local political machines in ways that were 
not intended to recover a specific meaning or use-value for either art world 
discourse or private interests. And yet, this emerging interventionist cul-
ture also revealed certain definite similarities with the anarcho-entre-
preneurial spirit of the neoliberal enterprise, including its highly plastic 
sense of organizational identity and a romantic distrust of comprehensive 
administrative structures, a propensity that simultaneously energized and 
deflated Occupy Wall Street (OWS) for instance.4
2 | For a guide to Tactical Media in the visual ar ts see Thompson/Sholette 2014.
3 | See for example the 1982 mission statement of ar t Political Ar t Documen-
tation/Distribution, “PAD [/D] can not serve as a means of advancement within 
the ar t world structure of museums and galleries. Rather, we have to develop new 
forms of distribution economy as well as ar t” (Sholette 2011).
4 | Writing brilliantly about the rise of neoliberalism and Alt-Globalization poli-
tics before the emergence of Occupy Wall Street or Arab Spring was theorist Brian 
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Since roughly the second decade of the 21st century, contemporary social-
ly engaged art has taken shape in the wake of these widespread, entre-
preneurial tendencies, which coincide with the normalization and main-
streaming of the Internet as a full-on capitalist marketplace. Therefore, 
what I am describing as the raw condition of bare art is a state of affairs 
fully entwined with the dominance of a hyper-financialized and spectac-
ularized society. Paradoxically, bare art also generates an increasingly 
politicized art world, perhaps because its participants cannot ignore the 
obvious collusion between art and capital or the fragility of the social re-
ality that it has sprung from. This is the greatest contradiction that ac-
tivist artists must now come to terms with at the theoretical, political, 
and artistic levels: How to invent, or how to reinvent, a partisan art praxis 
when deregulated capitalism has become a dead weight, and its social and 
political forms are imploding across the globe. We might think of this as 
an urguard, a self-appointed primitive rebelliousness that denounces con-
temporary society while purporting to belong to the cutting edge of the 
future. We have seen this outlook on the anarchist Left, but today witness 
it welling up within the far right. This far-right version is typified by raw 
and frequently barbaric language and opinion, including promoting ra-
cialized privilege and anti-feminist ideologies. These affects are then am-
plified by sophisticated communication networks (ironically a technology 
that is very much a part of the contemporary world being denounced) to 
generate an eerie, yet also farcical echo of the early-20th century avant-gar-
de movement known as Italian Futurism, which infamously celebrated 
militarism, technology and machismo. As one of its key figures insisted, 
Futurists would be defined by their “aggression, feverish sleeplessness, 
the double march, the perilous leap, the slap and the blow with the fist”.5
Holmes (2011), whose essays such as The Flexible Personality, substantially in-
form my analysis here.
5 | Excerpt from Filippo Tommaso Marinetti’s, The Manifesto of Futurism (1909). 
For an extended discussion about this assertion see my essay “Confronting Fas-
cist Banalities on the Centenary of the Futurist Manifesto”, in which I propose that 
Trump and the Alt-Right are not genuine cultural radicals, but instead a “bathetic, 
bargain basement version of Futurism redux, more like an astroturf reinterpreta-
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Perhaps this paradox is most apparent if we contrast the surreal au-
thoritarian right-wing culture that surrounds the current US president, 
with the spread of a generalized oppositional activism that takes on public 
forms of creative resistance such as legions of ‘Pussyhats’ or a giant in-
flatable caricature of Donald Trump floating above thousands of London 
protesters during his visit there in July 2018.
Even before Brexit, and the September 2016 US elections, or even 
President Trump’s startling travel ban and various videos showing police 
brutality towards unarmed African Americans, we had already witnessed 
swarms of bodies mobilized with the assistance of modern communica-
tions technology erupt into public spaces, actively interrupting automobile 
traffic flows and deregulating barricades and ordinances that segregate 
those who have access to visibility from those who have little or none. 
Think of groups such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) the Indignados in Spain, or the so-called Arab Spring and other 
self-organized forms of resistance, all of which are evidence that what I 
call marginalized dark matter resistance is no longer dark – that invisible 
peoples, labor and networks have been demanding recognition for several 
decades. After Brexit and Trump, these forces have become even more em-
phatic, and yet more than one paradox arises here. Along with the social 
antagonism that fully networked culture fosters with its panoptic vulner-
ability to surveillance and self-obsessive tendencies (such as sharing one’s 
privacy with thousands of others as well as corporate marketing special-
ists), there are also no barricades or prohibitions that prevent assemblies 
of authoritarian and white supremacist bodies from similarly using net-
worked culture to assemble in an effort to eclipse (or to affirm) their own 
dark matter obscurity. And this is precisely what we have seen over the 
past few years across the globe, at an accelerating pace.
Anti-abortion activists, Tea-Party Loyalists, right-wing Brexiteers, 
Movement for a Better Hungary, Serbian ultra-nationalists, and of course 
Alt-Right Trump supporters are taking full advantage of inexpensive me-
dia tech and tactics borrowed from the playbook of 1960s counter-culture 
to assert their ideology within our uncanny present. Nonetheless, what 
these typically rigid bodies framed by authoritarian doctrine cannot con-
ceal is their fidelity to dogmatic first principles and fundamentally un-
tion of the notorious avant-garde faction than a “roaring motor car which seems to 
run on machine-gun fire” to cite Marinetti again.
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democratic ideas of racial sovereignty. Whether it is a Tea Party Loyalist 
dressed as George Washington or a neo-National Socialist wearing a 1930’s 
swastika armband, the Right’s mimesis is administered by a second-rate, 
Hollywood version of history filled with cardboard cut-outs of a highly 
mediated and phantasmagoric notion of the past. In contrast, movements 
such as BLM, OWS, 15-M/Los Indignados, and Take the Square celebrate 
a critical plurality and the essential uncertainty of an archive from below: 
a communal repository of innumerable attempts at resistance against au-
thority, patriarchy, capitalism, now and then made concrete through the 
collective labors of mass protest, no matter how motley, ungainly or infor-
mal in appearance. 
Cl Ash oF 21s T CenTURy Rebel CUlTURes
Thus, today, two essentially contrasting dissident impulses confront one 
another, and in turn produce contrasting corporeal, visual and narrative 
public manifestations. One, exemplified by the Alt-Right, understands 
history and ‘whiteness’ as a rigid and unchanging guarantee of their own 
longed-for political dominance. That they dress this belief up in a narrative 
about white people as victims of liberal conspiracy, or even appropriate the 
hoodies and bandanas of Antifa or hipster fashion, only conceals the fact 
that neo-fascist acolytes are fundamentally attached to the construction of 
a homogeneous identity – one might even say to narcissistic self-represen-
tation – in ways that shallowly pastiche pop culture.6 
The other rebel impulse recognizes the lacuna of the archive as its in-
heritance: a non-legacy in which the long-term struggle from below has no 
inventory to check-off, and no authoritative catalog of ideal prototypes to 
emulate. This elliptical uncertainty opens up a crucial space for an entire-
ly different social horizon, one that not only resists the mainstreaming of 
far-right politics, but that can also situate its collective resistance within a 
broader socio-political struggle against inequality and exploitation. Thus, 
the surplus archive from below is about the politics of memory, as opposed 
to the memory of politics that a Right-leaning imaginary posits as a histo-
ry of obedience and servility towards authority and mythical origins, such 
6 | An excellent source of detailed reporting on the Alt-Right is found in Angela 
Nagle’s book Kill All Normies (2017).
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as whiteness. By embracing this overabundant surplus – this dark matter 
archive from below with its ambitions, meanderings, resentments, and 
uncertainties – rather than limiting access to it, or curating it into one or 
other official cannon, that critical openness has become the very quality 
that holds out hope for a radically heterodox socially-engaged art practice. 
The task that stands before the forces of progressive culture involves 
not eliminating ambiguity and ellipsis from the historical imagination in 
the way we see neo-fascists and the Alt-Right push for. And perhaps this 
defence is the pivotal task, one that every progressive artist is called upon 
to carry out, lest, as Walter Benjamin somberly maintained, “not even the 
dead will be safe from the enemy, if he is victorious” (Benjamin 1969). 
Therefore, what is called for is a grammar of cultural dissent which does 
not turn innocently away from the chaotic and delirious state of contem-
porary social realities, or the contradictions of bare art, but recognizes this 
moment, this very dangerous moment, as ultimately historical in nature, 
and therefore also as a time and conflict that will one day be displaced, as 
all such moments are. One weapon in this battle is the difficult and con-
tinuous collective development of the archive from below, that activated 
space of surplus memories, marginalized hopes, as well as defeats, that 
the dead have passed to us, and we must pass on to future generations.
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Back to Front Truths  
Hate Library 
Nick Thurston
Montaged poster poem (English version) from Nick Thurston, 
Hate Library (2017). Photo: Courtesy of the artist.
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‘Hate’ means different things to different people in different circumstan- 
ces. Inevitably those different communities and their interpretations 
sometimes overlap and come into conflict. Even if, in theory, a general 
concept of hatred can be agreed, real life tends to complicate its appli-
cability as an underwriter for anything like legal action. What exactly 
constitutes hate speech, or indeed a Hate Library, is therefore deceptively 
complicated. Various derivative concepts are already in use to filter the 
kinds of expressions and intentions we might gather under the umbrella 
of hate speech, to establish more specific and applicable categories like in-
citement or dangerous speech. For example, Susan Benesch and her team 
at the Dangerous Speech Project distinguish hate speech, which is hateful 
to some, from dangerous speech, which motivates an endangerment of 
that group because it inspires violence against them (Benesch 2018).
Images and ideas about activist violence have been popularly fixated 
on Islamic extremism in the wake of 9/11, with representations defaulting 
time and again to the cliché of Jihadist propaganda. The growing use of 
dangerous speech tactics by far-right activists has been either downplayed 
as a traditional conservative entitlement to free speech or ignored com-
pletely because its motives seem entangled with the disgruntlement of 
white customers and voters. Yet hateful rhetoric and victimization meth-
ods, charged by the positive and negative effects of the growing impor-
tance of identity politics and its offshoots like call-out culture, seem to 
flood the expanding archives of images and text that far-right groups are 
creating via public peer-to-peer networks like social media feeds and web 
forums. There, the evidence of hate and dangerous speech is publicly 
available to readers everywhere, and “to make public”, from the Latin pub-
licare, is the root meaning of ‘publish’. Yet in that same fluid digital sphere 
of publishing, those expressions and their effects do not seem to have be-
come public knowledge in any strong sense of that phrase. How do we learn 
to see it, hear it, read it and so get to know it, so that we can do something 
about its base causes? Making offline repositories that re-contextualize 
such material, making it accessible to audiences who would never enter 
those online bubbles, is one answer this essay explores through the case-
study of my artwork Hate Library.
I am not going to suggest that art is the solution to the very real and 
current problem propelling this flood, or indeed any other real world prob-
lem. This book is testament to the fact that there are lots of amazing ac-
tivists and research groups who do grounded social and policy work in the 
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spirit of what we might call ‘language critique’ or even ‘counter speech’ 
– the best of them proving well aware that the status of free speech is a 
contested, even gray issue. For example, in Germany there is the dedicated 
work done by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation’s Debate-Dehate project, 
and in the UK there is the committed anti-fascist action group HOPE Not 
Hate. 
In the fourth section of this essay I describe some the gestures that 
went in to the making of Hate Library, which was commissioned by 
Katarzyna Krysiak for the Foksal Gallery in Warsaw where it was first 
shown in summer 2017. In the second and third sections I explain why 
I think radically public forums for sociable reading – for reading togeth-
er, as epitomized by libraries – are something that can be made as art 
and could be one type of space where a politics of thought and counter- 
thought, speech and counter-speech, can be productively held together. 
Underpinning that discussion is my belief that the arts might be able to 
make some, maybe unique, contribution to broad and collective forms of 
counter-action against aggressively singular visions for what the world 
should be, by embracing the eternal contest over the concept of what art is. 
Rather than prescribe that art must be a mirror as William Shakespeare 
did, or a hammer as Bertold Brecht declared, or a speculative act of world-
ing as Ernst Cassirer proposed, I am interested in the idea that it could 
be all of those things and more, all held together by a society as a web of 
productive contradictions. I am invested in the idea that art is one form of 
culture that can hold things open, in public, as a specific, experienceable 
yet contestable knot of materials and gestures and concepts. 
Nonetheless, the kind of art that I find particularly interesting, and of 
which Hate Library is just one example, tends to display a certain set of 
commitments: First, this kind of work treats languages as contextually- 
specific and necessary lies – not a “noble lie” in the Platonic sense, but a 
present mark or utterance (a gesture) whose primary purpose is to repre-
sent something it is not. Second, this kind of work understands poetics as 
a committed exploration of the compositional and sociological potential 
of those lies when stretched to the limit of their primary purpose and 
acknowledged as present gestures. Third, it leans on documentary modes 
of art-making to deploy, at one of its extremes, the relatively simple prac-
tice of reproducing and sharing documents – effectively, of publishing 
or re-publishing or making language public – as a mode of documentary 
practice in itself (Thurston 2018a).
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Before all that, I want to begin by borrowing an observation made to me 
by my collaborator on the Hate Library project, Matthew Feldman, who is 
the founding Director of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.1 It 
is a corrective that might help us to see why and how issues of right-wing 
populism, ethno-nationalism and even fascism are coming back into view 
but are doing so out of focus. As someone who cares but is not a social 
scientist, I have found it a helpful way of understanding why our appre-
hension of these ideologies remains relatively blurry because of our out-
of-date figures of speech. 
Most of us still use the spatial metaphor of a spectrum to describe 
political positions, stretching from a left to a right. That metaphor tri-
angulates a center, the point between those poles, which then centers or 
anchors political viewpoints and discourse. All non-centrist political po-
sitions are judged by their distance from the center, left or right, from 
the near to the far. It is easy to forget that where the center is at any one 
time on that spectrum can change. The window constituting the center or 
mainstream is not a static point nor singular, unlike the center-point of, 
say, a circle. The range of ideas open for debate that a society will tolerate, 
what we could call the window of mainstream discourse, can move and 
the direction of its movement can be strategically influenced. This politi-
cal center is more like the contingent concentration of power in a particu-
lar socio-historic moment and place. And if the center moves, then so too 
does its proximity to the spectrum’s poles, left and right. 
The center-ground of contemporary mainstream politics in Europe 
has lurched rightwards, and the radical right has become more cultural-
ly and politically active, managing to acculturate previously unacceptable 
extremist terms for public discourse as new norms. Simply put, the ‘far 
right’ is no longer very far away from the political center, and it is the cen-
ter-ground that hedges most of our everyday experiences. We have a near-
ing extreme right and continuing to call it ‘far’ encourages a false sense 
1 | Matthew Feldman has since developed this observation in Between Alt-Right 
and Mainstream Conservatism: The ‘Near Right’ in Contemporary American Pol-
itics and Culture (Feldman 2017) and Islam and the Far Right: Is Bigotry Back? 
(Feldman 2016).
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of safe distance. I am not disputing its accuracy and value as a technical 
term, just flagging the risk encoded in its phrasing.
Whether the blame for that lays with a lack of liberal resilience or what-
ever else, we do need to adjust our metaphors. If the far right is getting 
closer then we should be figuring out how to see it and hear it and read it, 
and to say so more clearly. It should be coming into view and we should 
be sharpening our blurred focus. At the moment, too often, it seems we 
are trying to use a telescope when we really need a pair of reading glasses. 
We need to learn to look in appropriate ways and in the appropriate places, 
which means that we have to re-imagine where and how we look. This 
will require us to nuance a better common-sense grasp of the specific and 
general features of this renewed radical-right energy as well as its diverse 
cultures, which develop with transnational features and local differences. 
To do so, we need access to its manifestations, the literacies to engage with 
them, and for those experiences to be contextualized through informed 
discourses. That is a cocktail of needs that are paradoxically made both 
easier and harder to fulfil in our age of fluid public language and plura- 
lized centers of power and community.
 
Installation detail: Nick Thurston, Hate Library (2017), Haus der 
Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, 2018. Photo: Adam Berry, transmediale, 
CC BY NC-SA 4.0.
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PosT-digiTAl PUblishing And Re Ading
We all know that the way we live is being radically transformed by the 
augmented interaction of digital networked technologies, which largely 
do their work under the surface of daily life (invisibly) while their effects 
and applications work on its surface (visibly or not).2 The recent successes 
of the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) are a good example of how this 
combination works in terms of our topic: Under the surface, they have 
tapped in to the proliferation of user-driven online activism; and on the 
surface of everyday life, they have had unprecedented electoral success. 
I am not saying that the correlation is simple, just that digitally-led mo-
bilization is already recognized widely enough to merit general public at-
tention – what we might call citizen or even civil interest – on more subtle 
terms than those set by Cold War shock stories about Russian Fancy Bear 
hack attacks.
Developing that kind of sophisticated common interest – the basis 
for a stronger sense of what I called ‘public knowledge’ above – will de-
pend in part on civil societies cultivating an appropriate level of media 
literacy. The ability to understand and use media, new and old, often in 
combination, requires a technical and conceptual understanding of how 
networked media work in different ways yet inter-effectively. Any such 
understanding would help us to realize that our literacies will only be ap-
propriate if they are multilayered and keep tow with technological change. 
To take responsibility for the augmented online-offline lives we lead, we 
have to first accept that the “mediascapes” we inhabit are expansive and 
our relationships with them are active and generative (Appadurai 1990: 
298–299). The concept of the ‘post-digital’ can be a crucial part of that 
toolkit because it names the socio-historical condition wherein the distinc-
tion between digital and non-digital are blurred beyond separation – after 
the advent of digitization yet constitutively altered by it.
To even recognize the connections between our post-digital medias-
capes and contemporary far-right activism, let alone robustly critique how 
and why they are entwined, we have to make their interactions legible. We 
have to see it and hear it and read it to comprehend it. One imperfect way 
of doing so is to say it again yet differently, even if we disagree with its con-
2 | For fur ther discussion of this topic, see my essay The Mediatization of Con-
temporary Writing (Thurston 2016).
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tent. Saying it again is the easy bit: You repeat it, and that has never been 
simpler than digital capture and copy-and-paste allow. Saying it differently 
– so that you do not just reinforce or monumentalize its significances – is 
trickier: It is not, necessarily, about changing the content, but it is always 
about re-contextualizing both that content’s legibility and the experiences 
of reading it that others might have. Put simply, a documentary method of 
saying it again yet differently hinges upon changing the mode of attention 
not the testimony (Weizman 2017: 80–84).
When it comes to making legible the specific interaction between net-
worked activism under the surface of life and its effects on the surface 
of lived experience, I think such re-contextualizations can be relatively 
simple but potentially transformative. They involve shifting the manifes-
tations of post-digital activism from the seemingly private circuits of in-
dividuals and their web-enabled devices into unavoidably social situations 
where the largely private mental experience of reading is done in relation 
to other people. Reading is, after all, a fundamentally embodied practice; 
and a group of readers can collectively become a (secondary and minor) 
body politic – a network of actors capable of developing a civil discourse 
based on their shared readings. We need to be reminded as we read, as 
Étienne Balibar so painstakingly manages, that all of our personas and 
avatars are anchored by our actual-world status as political subjects.3 Read-
ing like that keeps the content we are attending to in the same view as, in 
the same earshot as, in relation with, our senses of social justice, of our 
social contracts, and of being-with.
Reading in communal situations – what Abigail Williams calls “so-
ciable reading” or simply “reading together” – tends to be conducive to 
discussing content rather than just commenting on it (Williams 2017: 3). 
When that content is potentially contentious, like all of the expressions 
that would fall under the umbrella of hate speech, those conversations 
may lead to civil debate, maybe even legal action, and maybe forms of 
counter-speech. But how and where they are read makes a significant dif-
ference. Context, form and content all matter, inter-effectively, in ways 
that late-modern and contemporary art can do a good job of reminding us.
3 | For the most extensive account of this connection, see Étienne Balibar’s Citi-
zen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Antropology (Balibar 2016).
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“meRely CiVil” libR ARies
Spaces for reading and discussing communally, without pressure to be a 
customer but with the freedom to listen and speak closely, are rare. You 
need a space that can hold that contentious content together and welcome 
competing readings – it needs to hold those ideas and people together, but 
also hold them open. Public libraries can be one such rare platform for 
doing just that, and not because of some regressive model of civic nostal-
gia. Rather, when it comes to the value of the civic or civil, I find Teresa 
Bejan’s concept of “mere civility” really useful. For Bejan, “mere civility” 
describes a minimal and imperfect sense of respectful engagement with 
our conversants and what they have to say. What she calls “civility skep-
tics” tend to flatten the concept’s range, conflating all forms of civil discus-
sion with being polite, presuming it to be necessarily deferential or even 
a kind of suppression of one’s right to speak freely. But what free-speech 
absolutists often misassume is that there is a flat equality of opportunity 
in public discourse, as if everyone has equal means and chance to speak 
freely, as if intersecting inequalities never matter and are not precoded 
in our languages. As Bejan points out, if there is no baseline for public 
discourse that can allow its participants to sustain an honest conversation, 
then those who disagree are more likely to force their position upon oth-
ers and/or retreat into bubbles of the like-minded (Bejan 2017). “Merely 
civil” libraries could be one such space for readers where the questions 
of public-ness, public knowledge and shared literacies are all sustained 
in non-violent discourse by an open yet respectful archive of ideas – ideas 
that we can disagree about together. 
Making temporary public libraries as artworks brings the qualities I 
described in the opening section – of keeping productive contradictions 
open – to this “merely civil” reference resource. It allows us to compose 
libraries beyond their conventional norms, focussing on the inter-connec-
tion of specific contents, specific forms of sharing and specific contextual 
conditions, with care for both the practical and symbolic value of our de-
cisions. It is the speculative yet specific act of composition, of art-making, 
which can enable this different kind of library-making. This different kind 
of public library is partial, in the sense of incomplete and biased, yet open 
to contested engagements and readings, maybe even “merely civil” dis-
obedience.
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hATe libR ARy
For about seven years I have been trying to bring together my literary and 
editorial work with my interests in the sociology of reading and public art 
by doing exactly this: Making temporary functioning public libraries as 
artworks. These artworks treat the gallery as a specific place with specif-
ic conventions, fill it with specific published holdings, and contextualize 
the audience’s access to them in specific ways. It is the most boiled-down 
recipe for a public library, and very different from the quiet, neo-classical 
conventional civic model most people are more familiar with. These spac-
es should be noisy and temporary, and make unusual literatures available 
to be read and responded to on “merely civil” terms.
Hate Library is a public reference resource in this mold and has five com-
ponents with a very particular choreography. In a ring in the middle are 
twelve blue orchestra stands, spaced according to the design of the EU flag 
with a diameter calculated according to the proportions of the room, but 
all turned inwards as communal reading lecterns. On each stand is one of 
twelve free-to-handle, comb-bound volumes. Each of these 500–700-page 
books is a tiny sample of the on-going public discussions between sup-
Installation detail: Nick Thurston, Hate Library (2017), Haus der 
Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, 2018. Photo: Adam Berry, transmediale, 
CC BY NC-SA 4.0.
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porters of twelve of the most significant far-right groups from European 
nations, which have been exported from their original digital platforms 
and re-materialized here as history books. Each of these unedited volumes 
pauses one far-right national conversation, repeating it offline by using 
simple data-gathering and print-on-demand processes.
Two of the three components on the walls repeat a different, lateral 
chain of conversation. The continuous lines of over-sized blue text are a 
single poem made entirely of buttressed hyperlinks. Each hyperlink or 
phrase included is the title of a thread from a public web forum on Storm-
front, the world’s largest white supremacist discussion platform, kept in 
the order they were found with only duplicated titles removed. Around 
the walls, encircling the history books, runs a frieze of paper columns. 
Each digitally-tiled sheet is one page of results returned by searching for 
the word “truth” across the European sections of Stormfront, ordered 
chronologically until three of those walls are full. Together, this frieze 
and thread-name poem are backdrops that signal the vexing growth of 
transnational cooperation between radical, extreme and far-right groups, 
as enabled by digital networked technology. 
The final component is a montaged poster poem that occupies the 
fourth surrounding wall. It condenses the sharpening problems of civic 
cohesion and free speech at the heart of this project. Inside its frame – 
frames inside frames that brace one another conceptually to form what 
Walter Benjamin called a “dialectical image” (Benjamin 1999: 460–461) 
– from back to front and past to present yet big to small, are an iconic 
photograph of Oswald Mosley addressing a fascist rally in 1930s London 
and a screen grab of the British National Party’s Twitter feed sandwiching 
a news media image of pro-EU liberals marching in Warsaw. The slogan 
printed over the top in translucent mirror writing, “BACK TO FRONT 
TRUTHS”, remixes a pair of colloquial English wordplays with a drama-
turgical metaphor famously borrowed by the sociologist Erving Goff-
man in his influential 1956 book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
Through its combination of text and image, this poster tries to juxtapose 
the confusing overlap between the public ‘frontstage’ and online activist 
‘backstage’ behavior by far-right groups and parties, as well as their mobi-
lization of PR-friendly strategies to conceal and legitimate the beliefs that 
unify their memberships.
In ways that are blunt – maybe even too blunt – a contest over truths 
and truth-claims are at the heart of this library, all of which is obvious-
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ly skewed by my subjective concerns as its librarian and composer. It is 
partial, in the sense of both incomplete and biased. The potential I see 
in this kind of speculative public library is that it eschews the supposed 
neutrality of the conventional civic model. It is too public or excessively 
public, from its catalogue to its cheaply reproduced contents: It hinges 
upon my personal concerns and my small portion of finds; and it amplifies 
the semi-discrete personal discussions of registered community members 
into printed testimonies – it exports them into testimonies said ‘on the 
(old media) record’.
At the heart of the project is the idea of taking responsibility for a pub-
lic language act as, in itself, an authorial act and a key gesture in con-
temporary poetics (Thurston 2018b). But that same idea is the basis for 
on-going international legal debates about liability: Are online platforms 
neutral hosts or responsible publishers? Hate Library tries to open up that 
central issue by very simply documenting just a few of stances adopted 
by nearing-right and right-wing fringe communities, in ways that are too 
partial to be conventionally civic but frank enough to be merely civil. Nei-
ther the dataset nor its collection are robust enough to be evidence for 
any kind of lazy generalizations. It is just a lumpen slice of real commu-
nication, lyrically selected in the spirit of the long history of documentary 
poetry as something that works by playing with an odd mix of literalism 
and allegory. For me, what readers do with it is what matters.
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